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MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1976

**Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve
Affairs)
Washington, D. C.**

February 1975


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MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT FOR FY 1976

AD A015378



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**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
FEBRUARY 1975**

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18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This is the Defense Manpower Requirements Report for FY 1976 and for the following three month transition period ending September 30, 1976, submitted to Congress in compliance with Section 133(c)(3) of Title 10, United States Code.		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This report recommends the annual active duty end strength level for each component of the armed forces for the next fiscal year and the annual civilian personnel end strength level for each component of the Department of Defense for the next fiscal year and includes justification for the strength levels recommended.		

1976 MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT

Errata Sheet

20 Feb 75

1. Page XIII-20, first paragraph on page. Substitute the following paragraph. The underlined sections reflect the correction.

Consistent with Congressional direction, required increases in strategic airlift capability will be achieved to the maximum extent possible by employing components of the Selected Reserve. Recruiting experience indicates that the Air Force can achieve a Reserve forces crew ratio of 1.75 for the C-5 and a 2.0 crew ratio for the C-141. However, the Reserve cannot meet these crew ratio requirements until FY 78. Therefore, to achieve required strategic airlift mobilized crew ratios of 4.0 per aircraft and a capability for sustaining a 10 hour utilization rate, active force capabilities will be increased in FY 76 by two means. Wartime surge and sustained requirements will be met, in part by employing active force "auxiliary" aircrews and maintenance personnel from non-wartime essential positions. This will be done with no increase in total strength requirements. In addition, to make up the remaining capability shortfall, the C-5 active crew ratio will be increased from 2.0 to 2.25.

2. Page XIII-23, paragraph e, third line below the table.

Change 5 WC-130s to 7 WC-130s.

3. Page B-4, Table 2.

Delete footnote b/ after AF Communications Service.


4. Page B-4, Table 2.

Change "Date to be Closed or Consolidated" for US Air Force, Pacific and AF Communications Service from 30 Jun 76 to During FY 1976.

**MANPOWER
REQUIREMENTS
REPORT
FOR
FY 1976**

**Prepared By
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs)**

February 1975



FY 1976 MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT

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PART A - SUMMARY

PART A PRESENTS A SUMMARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MANPOWER PROGRAM FOR THE FISCAL YEARS 1976, TRANSITION PERIOD (197T) AND 1977.

CHAPTER I	-	INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER II	-	SUMMARY OF DEFENSE MAN- POWER REQUIREMENTS
CHAPTER III	-	U.S. DEFENSE POLICY

**PART B - DEFENSE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS BY
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES**

**PART B DESCRIBES EACH OF THE DPPC AND THE ESSENTIAL
ELEMENTS OF U.S. DEFENSE POLICY FROM WHICH MANPOWER
REQUIREMENTS ARE DETERMINED. IT ALSO SUMMARIZES
MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS FOR EACH DPPC.**

CHAPTER IV - STRATEGIC FORCES

CHAPTER V - GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

CHAPTER VI - AUXILIARY FORCES

CHAPTER VII - MISSION SUPPORT FORCES

CHAPTER VIII - CENTRAL SUPPORT FORCES

CHAPTER IX - INDIVIDUALS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Secretary of Defense is pleased to submit to Congress the Defense Manpower Requirements Report for FY 1976 and for the following three month transition period ending September 30, 1976 in compliance with Section 138 (c) (3), of Title 10, United States Code. To assist Congress in considering authorizing legislation for the following fiscal year, this report includes the military and civilian manpower requirements of the Department of Defense for FY 1977.

This chapter discusses the following general topics to assist the reader in using the report:

- o The statutory reporting requirement
- o The Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC) language used throughout the report to present and justify the manpower request.
- o The organization and content of the report
- o The time period included in each fiscal year

Reporting Requirement

The law states, in part, that:

"The Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Congress a written report, not later than February 15 of each fiscal year, recommending the annual active duty end strength level for each component of the armed forces for the next fiscal year and the annual civilian personnel end strength level for each component of the Department of Defense for the next fiscal year, and shall include in that report justification for the strength levels recommended and an explanation of the relationship between the personnel strength levels recommended for that fiscal year and the national security policies in effect at that time."

The law also specifies the type of information which should be included in the report.

The FY 1976 report is the fourth annual report prepared for the Congress. The Department of Defense has tried to improve the usefulness of each succeeding report. This report should be read and used along with the following related Defense Department reports:

- o The Report of Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger To The Congress on the FY 1976 and Transition Budgets, FY 1977 Authorization Request and FY 1976-80 Defense Programs.
- o The FY 1976 Reserve Manpower Requirements Report
- o The FY 1976 Military Manpower Training Report

Defense Planning and Programming Categories. The language used throughout this report to describe and explain defense manpower requirements is the Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPC). These were formerly called "Manpower Categories". The DPPC are as shown below:

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES

<u>1. Strategic Forces</u>	<u>2. General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>3. Auxiliary Forces</u>
Strategic Offensive Forces	Land Forces	Intelligence & Security
Strategic Defensive Forces	Tactical Air Forces	Centrally Managed Communications
Strategic Control & Surveillance Forces	Naval Forces	Research & Development
	Mobility Forces	Support to Other Nations
		Geophysical Activities
<u>4. Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>5. Central Support Forces</u>	<u>6. Individuals</u>
Reserve Components Support	Base Operating Support	Transients
Base Operating Support	Medical Support	Patients & Prisoners
Force Support Training Command	Personnel Support	Trainees & Students
	Individual Training Command	Cadets
	Logistics	
	Federal Agency Support	

The DPPC are based on the same program elements which are the building blocks used in the ten Major Defense Programs. The management structure used in the Major Defense Programs aggregates, for each Program, all the resources which can be reasonably associated with the "output" of that program. For example, the Strategic Program includes not only the bomber squadrons but the base support personnel which sustain these units. The DPPC, on the other hand, aggregates activities performing similar functions. For example, base support is given separate visibility. Each approach has utility for management of resources; however, the DPPC system is particularly well suited for explaining how manpower resources are used. The relation between the DPPC system and the Major Defense Programs is explained in detail in Appendix E.

As requested in the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) Report on the FY 1975 Authorization Bill, we have made very few changes to the DPPC as they appeared in last year's report. Some desirable transfers of manpower from one category to another have been accomplished; these transfers are itemized in Appendix E.

Since the DPPC system uses the same program element structure as the ten Major Defense Programs, changes in categories are inevitable from year to year because of the dynamic nature of the program element structure. We will continue to document all changes that affect the distribution of manpower among the DPPC and major changes will be coordinated with the SASC staff, as requested.

The SASC requested the Department of Defense to undertake a major effort to improve the definition of the various DPPC. A preliminary review has begun and this effort will be continued.

Organization and Content of the Report

The report is organized into three major parts, plus supporting Appendices.

PART A - Summary, Chapters I, II and III

Chapter I provides an Introduction to the report. Chapter II provides a Summary or overview of Defense manpower requirements. Chapter III provides the highlights of Defense Policy.

PART B - Manpower Requirements by DPPC - Chapters IV to IX

These chapters describe manpower requirements for each functional category across all military services. For example, all Research and Development manpower requirements are discussed in Chapter VI, Auxiliary Forces, and the manpower devoted to Logistics for all services in Chapter VIII, Central Support Forces.

PART C - Manpower Requirements by Service, Chapters X to XIV

This year's report contains a separate chapter dedicated to the manpower requirements of each military service and one for the defense agencies. This way of organizing the report provides greater detail on the manpower programs of each service and their unique accomplishments in achieving improved manpower utilization. These service chapters also provide a preview of manpower matters which each service will present when they testify before the Armed Services Committees.

Appendices

The various appendices present special analyses on such subjects as the Cost of Manpower, Women in the Military, Forward Deployments and technical information on the data structure.

Unit Annex

As requested by the Senate Armed Services Committee we are again providing a Unit Annex which describes the planned allocation of manpower to specific units within the force. For security reasons, the Unit Annex is not included in this report. It will be provided by a separate transmittal.

Time Periods

The tables showing manpower data for fiscal years are in terms of "end-strength", meaning the last day of the fiscal year. In compliance with the 1974 Congressional Budget Act, the end of the fiscal year changes from June 30 to September 30, starting with the Transition Period, called FY 197T. The time periods used in this report are defined below:

FY 1974 - June 30, 1974

Actual Strength

FY 1975 - June 30, 1975

FY 1976 - June 30, 1976

FY 1977 - Sept 30, 1976

Planned Strength reflected
in the President's FY 1976
Budget

FY 1977 - Sept 30, 1977

Planned Strength shown in the
DoD Authorization Bill request

The change in the end-strength date from June 30 to September 30, starting with FY 1977, causes a seasonal increase in the military and civilian manpower request. The large number of recruits who enter service during the summer months after graduating from high school causes the number of students and trainees to rise in the fall. For example, the Army's military strength increases from 785,000 in FY 1975 and FY 1976 to 793,000 in FY 1977 and FY 1977. The civilian authorization request for FY 1977 and FY 1977, which end on September 30, includes more than 8,200 teachers and other personnel in overseas schools for children of military and Defense civilian families. In previous years, they did not appear in the civilian employment request because they are off the rolls on June 30.

CHAPTER II

SUMMARY OF DEFENSE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

This chapter presents the Department of Defense manpower request, provides an overview of manpower trends and explains the major strength changes which are contained in the manpower program presented in this report.

A. Manpower Request

As required by Section 138(c) of Title 10, United States Code, the Department of Defense submitted to the Congress proposed legislation prescribing the authorized end strength for active duty military personnel and for direct-hire civilians for FY 1976 and for the three month transition period ending September 30, 1976. The proposed legislation also included the manpower authorization requested for the end of FY 1977, to fulfill the requirement of Section 607 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 which requires such legislation for FY 1977 to be submitted to Congress by May 15, 1975. The strength requests are as follows:

1. Military

Active Duty Military Personnel End-Strengths

	<u>FY 1976</u> <u>(June 30, 1976)</u>	<u>FY 1977</u> <u>(Sept. 30, 1976)</u>	<u>FY 1977</u> <u>(Sept. 30, 1977)</u>
Army	785,000	793,000	793,000
Navy	528,651	535,860	546,005
Marine Corps	196,303	196,498	197,646
Air Force	590,000	590,000	590,000
Total	<u>2,099,954</u>	<u>2,115,358</u>	<u>2,126,651</u>

NOTE: Defense Agency strengths are included in Service totals.

2. Civilians

Direct Hire Civilians, Military Functions ^{1/}

	<u>FY 1976</u> <u>(June 30, 1976)</u>	<u>FY 1977</u> <u>(Sept. 30, 1976)</u>	<u>FY 1977</u> <u>(Sept. 30, 1977)</u>
army	334,133	337,787	337,295
navy	322,067	322,883	328,474
Marine Corps ^{2/}	(17,635)	(18,111)	(18,111)
Air Force	255,904	257,825	255,699
Defense Agencies	72,896	72,946	73,026
DoD Total	<u>985,000</u>	<u>991,441</u>	<u>994,494</u>

^{1/} Includes full-time, part-time, intermittent, permanent and temporary employees.

^{2/} Marine Corps civilian personnel are included in the Department of Navy total.

Consistent with Section 501, P.L. 93-365, the DoD Appropriations Authorization Act, 1975, the proposed civilian authorization excludes the following categories of DoD civilian employees:

MILITARY FUNCTIONS

- o Indirect-Hire Foreign Nationals. These employees work for U.S. forces stationed abroad, but are hired and paid by foreign governments with funds provided by the Defense Department. The planned end strengths for this category are: 95,500 in FY 76; 96,500 in FY 77 and 98,200 in FY 77.
- o Special Student and Disadvantaged Youth Programs. Included are such employment categories as: Stay-in-School Campaign, Temporary Summer Aid Program, Federal Junior Fellowship Program, and Worker-Trainee Oppor- programs. Based on past experience, employment in these categories will be 23,700 in FY 1976, followed by a seasonal decrease to 9,900 in FY 1977 and FY 1977 when the fiscal year ends on September 30. The employment level is based on goals received from the Office of Management and Budget.
- o National Security Agency employees are excluded for reasons of security, in accordance with P.L. 86-36.

CIVIL FUNCTIONS

Employees performing Civil Functions administered by DoD, including Corps of Engineer Civil Works; Postal Construction Program; Cemeterial Activities; and the Wildlife Conservation Program. Civil Functions employment at the end of FY 1976, FY 1977, and FY 1978 is planned to be 32,000.

In order to assist Congress in reviewing the civilian manpower requirements of the Department of Defense, Indirect Hire civilians are included and identified in Chapters IV to XIV which present manpower requirements by DPPC and by DoD component. The statistical tables do not include the other categories of civilians (Civil Functions, Special Student/Youth Programs, NSA) which were excluded from ceiling in the DoD Appropriations Authorization Act, 1975.

The following table summarizes the planned employment of indirect hire civilians.

Indirect Hire Foreign Nationals (End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1976</u>	<u>FY 1977</u>	<u>FY 1978</u>
Army	67.7	68.7	70.4
Navy	11.7	11.7	11.7
Marine Corps	(2.3)	(2.3)	(2.3)
Air Force	15.4	15.4	15.3
Defense Agencies	.8	.8	.8
DoD Total	<u>95.5</u>	<u>96.5</u>	<u>98.2</u>

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

B. Manpower Trends

The following table presents the trends in military and civilian employment.

Defense Employment (End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75*</u>	<u>FY 76*</u>
Military (Active)	2,685	3,547	2,161	2,129	2,100
Civilian-Direct Hire	1,035	1,287	1,014	994	985
Civilian-Indirect Hire	140	119	95	98	96
Total	<u>3,860</u>	<u>4,953</u>	<u>3,270</u>	<u>3,221</u>	<u>3,181</u>

* President's FY 76 Budget

Total military and civilian Defense employment (including indirect-hire foreign nationals) at the end of FY 1976 will be 3,181,000. This number is:

- o 679,000 (18%) less than FY 1964, just prior to Vietnam.
- o 1,772,000 (36%) less than FY 1968, the peak of the Vietnam War.
- o 89,000 (3%) less than the actual strength for FY 1974.
- o 40,000 (1%) less than the planned strength for FY 1975.

1. Military

The table below shows the trend in active duty military strength by service:

Military Manpower - Active Duty
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Army	972	1,570	783	785	785	793	793
Navy	667	765	546	536	529	536	546
USMC	190	307	189	196	196	196	198
USAF	<u>856</u>	<u>905</u>	<u>644</u>	<u>612</u>	<u>590</u>	<u>590</u>	<u>590</u>
DoD							
Total	2,685	3,547	2,161	2,129	2,100	2,115	2,127

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

The FY 1976 authorization request for active duty military personnel is 2,099,954.

- o The FY 1976 request is 585,000 lower than the actual strength in FY 1964, before the expansion for the Vietnam war.
- o The FY 1976 request is 29,000 lower than currently planned for FY 1975. This decrease is composed of a 7,400 decrease in Navy, a 21,500 decrease in Air Force and a decrease of 100 in the Marine Corps. These decrease are primarily caused by force changes and support reductions.

The FY 1977 (transition quarter) authorization request for active duty military personnel is 2,115,358.

- o The FY 1977 request is 15,400 higher than for FY 1976. This increase is composed of an 8,000 increase for Army, 7,200 for Navy and 200 in the Marine Corps.
- o The above increases are caused by the statutory change in the end date of the fiscal year from June 30 in FY 1976 to September 30 in FY 1977. The higher recruit input during the peak summer recruiting months increases the number of personnel in training on September 30. The Air Force is able to adjust for this seasonality factor without an end-strength increase.

The FY 1977 authorization request for active duty military personnel is 2,126,651.

- o The FY 1977 request is 11,300 higher than for FY 1976. This increase is composed of a 10,150 increase for Navy and a 1,150 increase for Marine Corps.
- o The Navy increase provides for operation of new ships entering the fleet; improved manning of other ships and air units; and for a larger number of people in training at the end of FY 1977 to operate ships entering the fleet in FY 1978. These increases are partially offset by other reductions.
- o The Marine Corps increase provides for improved manning of the Marine Divisions.

2. Civilian Employment

The table below shows the trend in direct-hire civilian employment:

Civilian Employment - Direct Hire, Military Functions
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Army	360	462	342	337	334	338	337
Navy/USMC	332	419	324	318	322	323	329
USAF	305	331	274	266	256	258	256
Defense							
Agencies	38	75	75	74	73	73	73
Total	<u>1,035</u>	<u>1,287</u>	<u>1,014</u>	<u>994</u>	<u>985</u>	<u>991</u>	<u>994</u>

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

The FY 1976 authorization request for direct hire civilians is 985,000.

- o The FY 1976 request is 302,000 below the employment level in FY 1968 at the peak of the vietnam war.
- o The FY 1976 request is 50,000 below the pre-Vietnam year of FY 1964. During this period about 120,000 military jobs were converted to civilian incumbency, including 40,000 conversions during FY 1973-75. These civilian substitutions mask the real civilian reduction that has occurred since FY 1964.
- o The employment growth in Defense Agencies since FY 1964 is a result of the creation of new agencies to perform DoD-wide functions more efficiently and the transfer of new functions to existing Defense Agencies. The growth in Defense Agency employment was more than offset by civilian decreases in the military services.
- o The FY 1976 request is 9,400 lower than the employment level planned for FY 1975. This reduction of 9,400 civilians is a net of increases for key programs to improve the combat readiness of the forces, more than offset by decreases resulting from important managment improvements.

Civilian Change From FY 1975 to FY 1976

Increases

Navy Shipyards	+3,700
Army Reserve and National	
Guard Technicians and Support	+2,500
Army Maintenance Depots	+4,800

Decreases

*Research and Development Activities	-5,600
*Base Realignments	-7,000
Air Force Logistics Workload	-4,200
Defense Supply Agency	-1,400
Net of Other Actions	-2,200
Total Change	<u>-9,400</u>

*In Army, Navy and Air Force.

The FY 1977 (transition quarter) authorization request for direct hire civilians is 991,441.

- o The FY 1977 request is 6,400 higher than the level requested for FY 1976.
- o The 6,400 increase is caused by changing the end date of the fiscal year from June 30 in FY 1976 to September 30 in FY 1977. About 8,200 teachers and other school employees associated with overseas dependent education who are not on the rolls during the summer months, will be included in fiscal year end strengths starting in FY 1977. This accounting increase of 8,200 teachers is offset by reductions of 1,800 civilians in other activities.

The FY 1977 authorization request for direct hire civilians is 994,494.

- o The FY 1977 request is 3,100 higher than the level requested for FY 1977, as a result of an increase of 3,800 naval shipyard workers.
- o Shipyard employment is planned to increase by 7,500 during the two year period from the end of FY 1975 to end FY 1977 bringing total civilian employment in shipyards to 68,200. Surface ships are in such generally poor materiel condition, that even with the increased funding and employment programmed in the budget, the backlog of badly needed maintenance will remain above desirable levels through 1980. The backlog of deferred maintenance has been increasing each year from 17 ships in FY 1971 to 74 ships in FY 1975. The increased funding and employment will reduce the backlog to 60 ships in FY 1977.

As mentioned previously, the direct hire civilian authorization request does not include indirect hire foreign nationals. Indirect hire employment is relatively stable during the period FY 1975-77.

<u>FY</u>	<u>End-Strength</u>
1975	97,700
1976	95,500
1977	96,500
1977	98,200

The increase after FY 1976 is associated with the withdrawal of military support units from Europe and the matching increase of combat units in compliance with the Nunn Amendment. By the end of FY 1976, 18,000 support troops will have been withdrawn from Europe. The additional foreign nationals will perform some of the functions previously handled by the military support units.

C. Force Changes

The key changes in force units in FY 1976 are summarized below:

ARMY

- o During FY 1975 and FY 1976 the Army will add three Divisions to its active force structure. This will be accomplished with-in an active force strength level of 785,000 by converting support elements to combat elements. Each of the new Divisions will contain a "roundout" Army Reserve brigade.

NAVY

- o Two attack carriers (Hancock and Oriskany) will be dropped in FY 1976, leaving 13 carriers in the force.
- o Navy fighter/attack squadrons will be decreased from 70 to 65.
- o The nuclear attack submarine force will increase from 64 to 68 through the introduction of 5 new nuclear submarines and the retirement of 1 (Halibut).
- o 12 warships are retired and 7 new ships and 1 converted ship are added to the fleet for a net reduction of 4 warships.

AIR FORCE

- o The total number of strategic bombers remains unchanged, but the B-52 force has been reorganized into one less squadron at 22. The FB-111 squadrons remain constant at 4.
- o 32 KC-135 aircraft will be transferred by end FY 76 to the Air National Guard. (The Air Reserve forces will eventually have 128 KC-135 aircraft.) In addition, the alert rate for B-52s/FB-111s/KC-135s is reduced to approximately 30% permitting a reduction of aircrews and maintenance personnel.
- o The Air Force active fighter force is maintained at 22 wings. Activation of the first two F-15 squadrons has allowed the transfer of one F-4 and two A-7 squadrons from the active Air Force for continued modernization of the Air Reserve forces.
- o Air Reserve forces are further enhanced with the transfer of four RF-4 squadrons and two C-130 squadrons from the active Air Force.

- o The Air Force will activate three F-5E tactical fighter training (aggressor) squadrons and will increase tactical fighter crew ratios from 1.1 crews per aircraft to 1.25, restoring the crew ratio which existed prior to FY 1971. Air Force support reduction initiatives will allow these increases within the 590,000 active military strength level.

MARINE CORPS

- o Three Marine Corps active divisions are continued in FY 1976. However, the manning level is improved over the end FY 1975 level.

The table on the next page summarizes the major force elements.

MAJOR ACTIVE FORCE ELEMENTS

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>			
<u>ICBM</u>			
Minuteman	1,000	1,000	1,000
Titan	54	54	54
Polaris/Poseidon	656	656	656
Bombers (UE)	396	396	396
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>			
<u>Land Forces</u>			
Army Divisions	13	14	16
Marine Divisions	3	3	3
<u>Tactical Air Forces</u>			
Air Force Wings	22	22	22
Navy Attack Wings	14	14	12
Marine Aircraft Wings	3	3	3
<u>Naval Forces 1/</u>			
Carriers	14	15	13
Nuclear Attack Submarines	61	64	68
Diesel Attack Submarines	12	11	10
Surface Combatants	199	199	198
Amphibious Ships	66	64	66
Support Ships	123	114	105
<u>Mobility Forces</u>			
Strategic Airlift Squadrons	17	17	17
Tactical Airlift Squadrons	17	17	15
Strategic Sealift Forces 2/	20	19	19

1/ Includes selected Reserve ships which have sizable active duty nucleus crews.

2/ Excludes ships under charter.

D. Manpower by Defense Planning and Programming Category

Starting in 1973, the Department of Defense has made a determined effort to increase military readiness and reduce costs through better management. Some of the highlights of this effort include:

- o The headquarters review which was initiated in October 1973. Cumulative headquarters reductions in the military services and defense agencies (including agency field activities) will reach 25,600 by end FY 1976. (See Appendix B for details).

- o Base closure and realignment actions.
- o Conversion of 18,000 support troops to combat missions in NATO Europe by end FY 1976 in accordance with P.L. 93-365 (The Nunn Amendment).
- o The elimination of over 400 Air Force administrative and support aircraft.

The following table provides a gross measure of the fundamental shift in manpower which is taking place.

Total Military and Civilian* Active Force
Strength Changes by Category
(End Strengths in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 74</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 76</u> <u>Planned</u>	<u>Change</u>
Strategic Forces	137	113	- 24
General Purpose Forces	949	1,020	+ 71
Subtotal	<u>1,086</u>	<u>1,133</u>	<u>+ 47</u>
Auxiliary Forces, Support Forces, and Individuals	2,184	2,048	-136
Total	<u>3,270</u>	<u>3,181</u>	<u>- 89</u>

* Includes direct and indirect hire civilians.

From FY 1974 to FY 1976 total military and civilian manpower decreases by 89,000. During this same period, General Purpose Forces increased by 71,000, while the support categories and Strategic Forces are reduced by 160,000.

The tables which follow present military and civilian manpower by DPPC for the Defense Department as a whole and by military service.

Department of Defense Military Manpower Requirements
(Active Duty End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 75</u> <u>(FY 1976 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>121.4</u>	<u>109.8</u>	<u>102.4</u>	<u>102.3</u>	<u>102.8</u>
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>871.5</u>	<u>912.5</u>	<u>939.0</u>	<u>937.1</u>	<u>952.7</u>
Land Forces	494.6	529.3	558.9	556.5	560.5
Tactical Air Forces	162.9	169.7	168.7	168.9	171.3
Naval Forces	173.2	173.9	172.6	173.0	182.5
Mobility Forces	40.7	39.6	38.7	38.7	38.5
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>151.5</u>	<u>139.9</u>	<u>127.0</u>	<u>126.2</u>	<u>123.3</u>
Intelligence & Security	55.6	52.6	42.5	41.8	41.2
Centrally Managed					
Communications	46.0	38.8	38.1	38.1	36.2
Research & Development	32.3	32.5	32.0	31.9	31.7
Support to Other Nations	4.3	3.6	3.4	3.4	3.3
Geophysical Activities	13.4	12.4	11.1	11.1	11.0
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>306.0</u>	<u>298.5</u>	<u>289.4</u>	<u>289.3</u>	<u>286.8</u>
Reserve Components Support	13.6	14.0	13.6	13.6	13.6
Base Operating Support	208.9	206.5	199.9	199.9	196.8
Force Support Training	33.1	31.8	31.6	31.7	32.3
Command	50.5	46.2	44.4	44.2	44.0
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>365.4</u>	<u>342.8</u>	<u>333.2</u>	<u>333.4</u>	<u>331.5</u>
Base Operating Support	50.2	46.2	44.9	44.9	45.0
Medical Support	86.7	82.4	79.4	79.4	78.1
Personnel Support	32.1	31.9	31.5	31.4	31.2
Individual Training	134.0	121.6	118.0	118.4	118.1
Command	38.3	35.8	35.4	35.3	35.1
Logistics	21.0	21.1	20.3	20.2	20.3
Federal Agency Support	3.0	3.8	3.7	3.7	3.7
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>345.1</u>	<u>325.6</u>	<u>309.1</u>	<u>330.7</u>	<u>334.8</u>
Transients	110.7	95.7	94.8	92.3	89.5
Patients & Prisoners	12.5	9.3	9.3	9.5	9.5
Trainees & Students	211.4	209.1	193.4	216.1	223.0
Cadets	10.5	11.5	11.6	12.9	12.9
Army Understrength (-)					
in Units 1/				-3.7	-5.3
<u>Total DoD</u>	<u>2161.2</u>	<u>2129.0</u>	<u>2100.0</u>	<u>2115.4</u>	<u>2126.7</u>

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

1/ Explained on page X-28.

DoD Civilian Manpower Requirements
(Direct & Indirect Hire End Strengths in Thousands)

	FY 74 Actual	FY 75	FY 76 (FY 1976 Budget)	FY 77	FY 77 Auth.
Strategic Forces	15.3 (*)	11.7 (*)	10.6 (*)	10.2 (*)	10.3 (*)
General Purpose Forces	77.9 (10.6)	80.5 (11.5)	80.9 (11.6)	81.1 (11.9)	83.0 (13.0)
Land Forces	41.3 (9.6)	42.5 (10.4)	42.0 (10.5)	42.1 (10.8)	43.6 (11.9)
Tactical Air Forces	13.2 (0.2)	14.3 (0.2)	14.8 (0.2)	14.9 (0.2)	15.0 (0.2)
Naval Forces	0.3 (*)	0.3 (*)	0.3 (*)	0.3 (*)	0.3 (*)
Mobility Forces	23.1 (0.8)	23.4 (0.8)	23.8 (0.8)	23.8 (0.8)	24.1 (0.8)
Auxiliary Forces	125.4 (2.6)	122.9 (2.4)	116.5 (2.3)	116.8 (2.3)	116.8 (2.3)
Intelligence & Security	10.2 (0.8)	10.1 (0.9)	9.6 (0.8)	9.6 (0.8)	9.6 (0.8)
Centrally Managed					
Communication	16.5 (1.7)	14.7 (1.4)	14.2 (1.4)	14.2 (1.4)	14.2 (1.4)
Research & Development	86.0 (-)	85.2 (-)	79.6 (-)	79.9 (-)	79.9 (-)
Support to Other Nations	2.3 (*)	2.6 (*)	2.6 (*)	2.6 (*)	2.6 (*)
Geophysical Activities	10.4 (0.1)	10.3 (0.1)	10.5 (0.1)	10.5 (*)	10.5 (*)
Mission Support Forces	224.8 (58.3)	227.2 (60.9)	228.5 (59.9)	229.2 (60.3)	228.2 (60.6)
Reserve Component Support	20.7 (-)	20.5 (-)	20.7 (-)	20.7 (-)	20.7 (-)
Base Operating Support	189.0 (57.6)	191.4 (60.4)	190.9 (59.4)	191.6 (59.8)	190.6 (60.1)
Force Support Training	1.9 (0.1)	2.1 (0.1)	2.1 (0.1)	2.1 (0.1)	2.1 (0.1)
Command	13.2 (0.5)	13.2 (0.3)	14.8 (0.4)	14.8 (0.4)	14.9 (0.3)
Central Support Forces	665.1 (23.0)	649.8 (22.8)	644.0 (21.7)	650.7 (21.9)	654.4 (22.2)
Base Operating Support	103.8 (2.4)	102.7 (2.7)	99.3 (2.7)	98.1 (2.7)	98.4 (2.8)
Medical Support	42.4 (3.7)	45.2 (4.4)	46.5 (4.7)	47.0 (4.8)	47.3 (5.4)
Personnel Support	10.6 (1.1)	11.7 (1.6)	11.8 (1.6)	20.0 (1.6)	19.9 (1.6)
Individual Training	45.3 (0.1)	48.0 (0.2)	48.1 (0.2)	48.8 (0.2)	49.1 (0.1)
Command	60.9 (0.4)	59.1 (0.8)	57.5 (0.6)	57.6 (0.6)	57.8 (0.6)
Logistics	402.1 (15.0)	383.1 (13.2)	380.7 (11.9)	379.3 (12.0)	381.7 (11.6)
Total	1108.5 (94.5)	1092.1 (97.7)	1080.5 (95.5)	1087.9 (96.5)	1092.7 (98.2)
Direct Hire Only	1014.1	994.4	985.0	991.4	994.5

() Indirect hire included.

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

Army Military Manpower Requirements
(Active Duty End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 75</u> <u>(FY 1976 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>.9</u>	<u>.9</u>	<u>.9</u>	<u>.8</u>
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>417.8</u>	<u>444.6</u>	<u>472.5</u>	<u>472.5</u>	<u>475.2</u>
Land Forces	<u>417.2</u>	<u>444.0</u>	<u>471.9</u>	<u>471.9</u>	<u>474.6</u>
Mobility Forces	.6	.6	.6	.6	.6
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>40.1</u>	<u>35.2</u>	<u>27.9</u>	<u>27.4</u>	<u>27.3</u>
Intelligence & Security	<u>18.0</u>	<u>17.2</u>	<u>10.1</u>	<u>9.6</u>	<u>9.5</u>
Centrally Managed					
Communication	12.1	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3
Research & Development	7.8	7.7	7.6	7.6	7.6
Support to Other Nations	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.7
Geophysical Activities	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>42.9</u>	<u>41.7</u>	<u>40.5</u>	<u>40.5</u>	<u>39.7</u>
Reserve Component Support	<u>5.1</u>	<u>4.9</u>	<u>4.9</u>	<u>4.9</u>	<u>4.9</u>
Base Operating Support	25.7	26.5	25.8	25.8	25.0
Force Support Training	.9	.4	.4	.4	.4
Command	11.2	9.9	9.4	9.4	9.4
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>144.9</u>	<u>128.7</u>	<u>121.5</u>	<u>121.5</u>	<u>120.6</u>
Base Operating Support	<u>20.1</u>	<u>18.1</u>	<u>17.1</u>	<u>17.1</u>	<u>17.1</u>
Medical Support	35.5	32.1	29.9	29.9	29.0
Personnel Support	15.2	13.9	13.6	13.6	13.6
Individual Training	55.9	47.6	44.3	44.3	44.3
Command	10.2	9.0	8.9	8.9	8.9
Logistics	7.7	7.4	7.1	7.1	7.1
Federal Agency Support	.3	.6	.6	.6	.6
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>134.2</u>	<u>133.9</u>	<u>121.8</u>	<u>133.9</u>	<u>134.8</u>
Transients	<u>34.2</u>	<u>34.5</u>	<u>34.0</u>	<u>29.4</u>	<u>30.4</u>
Patients & Prisoners	4.4	3.9	3.9	4.0	4.0
Trainees & Students	92.7	92.6	80.9	96.2	96.1
Cadets	2.9	2.9	3.0	4.3	4.3
Temporary Over (+) or Under- strength (-) in Units <u>1/</u>				-3.7	-5.3
<u>Total Army</u>	<u>782.9</u>	<u>785.0</u>	<u>785.0</u>	<u>793.0</u>	<u>793.0</u>

1/ See page X-28.

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

Army Civilian Manpower Requirements
(Direct & Indirect Hire End Strengths in Thousands)

	FY 74 Actual	FY 75	FY 76 (FY 1976 Budget)	FY 77	FY 77 Auth.
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>4.5 (-)</u>	<u>1.6 (-)</u>	<u>.9 (-)</u>	<u>.6 (-)</u>	<u>.6 (-)</u>
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>45.3 (9.6)</u>	<u>46.5 (10.4)</u>	<u>45.7 (10.5)</u>	<u>45.8 (10.8)</u>	<u>47.3 (11.9)</u>
Land Forces	<u>41.3 (9.6)</u>	<u>42.5 (10.4)</u>	<u>42.0 (10.5)</u>	<u>42.1 (10.8)</u>	<u>43.6 (11.9)</u>
Mobility Forces	<u>4.0 (-)</u>	<u>4.0 (-)</u>	<u>3.7 (-)</u>	<u>3.7 (-)</u>	<u>3.7 (-)</u>
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>31.6 (.6)</u>	<u>30.8 (.6)</u>	<u>28.4 (.6)</u>	<u>28.7 (.6)</u>	<u>28.7 (.6)</u>
<u>Intelligence & Security</u>	<u>2.6 (.3)</u>	<u>2.6 (.3)</u>	<u>2.3 (.3)</u>	<u>2.3 (.3)</u>	<u>2.3 (.3)</u>
Centrally Management					
Communication	<u>4.4 (.3)</u>	<u>3.5 (.3)</u>	<u>3.6 (.3)</u>	<u>3.6 (.3)</u>	<u>3.6 (.3)</u>
Research & Development	<u>23.5 (-)</u>	<u>23.5 (-)</u>	<u>21.4 (-)</u>	<u>21.7 (-)</u>	<u>21.7 (-)</u>
Support to Other Nations	<u>1.1 (-)</u>	<u>1.2 (-)</u>	<u>1.1 (-)</u>	<u>1.1 (-)</u>	<u>1.1 (.1)</u>
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>99.6 (39.2)</u>	<u>103.2 (42.1)</u>	<u>105.3 (41.5)</u>	<u>105.5 (41.9)</u>	<u>105.9 (42.2)</u>
<u>Reserve Component Support</u>	<u>10.9 (-)</u>	<u>10.8 (-)</u>	<u>11.5 (-)</u>	<u>11.5 (-)</u>	<u>11.2 (-)</u>
Base Operating Support	<u>84.9 (39.0)</u>	<u>89.3 (41.8)</u>	<u>90.8 (41.2)</u>	<u>90.8 (41.6)</u>	<u>91.3 (41.9)</u>
Force Support Training	<u>.2 (.1)</u>	<u>.2 (.1)</u>	<u>.2 (.1)</u>	<u>.2 (.1)</u>	<u>.2 (.1)</u>
Command	<u>3.6 (.1)</u>	<u>2.9 (.2)</u>	<u>2.9 (.2)</u>	<u>2.9 (.2)</u>	<u>3.0 (.2)</u>
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>227.6 (17.1)</u>	<u>224.0 (16.1)</u>	<u>221.5 (15.1)</u>	<u>225.9 (15.3)</u>	<u>225.2 (15.6)</u>
<u>Base Operating Support</u>	<u>40.8 (.9)</u>	<u>42.3 (1.0)</u>	<u>39.6 (1.0)</u>	<u>38.3 (1.0)</u>	<u>38.2 (1.1)</u>
Medical Support	<u>25.7 (3.1)</u>	<u>27.3 (3.5)</u>	<u>28.7 (3.9)</u>	<u>29.2 (4.0)</u>	<u>29.7 (4.6)</u>
Personnel Support	<u>5.5 (.9)</u>	<u>6.0 (1.3)</u>	<u>6.0 (1.4)</u>	<u>11.9 (1.4)</u>	<u>11.9 (1.4)</u>
Individual Training	<u>21.3 (.1)</u>	<u>23.0 (.2)</u>	<u>23.8 (.2)</u>	<u>24.4 (.2)</u>	<u>24.7 (.1)</u>
Command	<u>23.5 (.3)</u>	<u>23.0 (.6)</u>	<u>21.9 (.4)</u>	<u>22.0 (.4)</u>	<u>22.0 (.4)</u>
Logistics	<u>110.7 (11.6)</u>	<u>102.3 (9.5)</u>	<u>101.5 (8.2)</u>	<u>100.1 (8.3)</u>	<u>98.7 (7.9)</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>408.6 (66.4)</u>	<u>406.1 (69.3)</u>	<u>401.7 (67.7)</u>	<u>406.5 (68.7)</u>	<u>407.7 (70.4)</u>
<u>Direct Hire Only</u>	<u>342.2</u>	<u>336.8</u>	<u>334.1</u>	<u>337.8</u>	<u>337.3</u>

() Indirect hire included.

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

Navy Military Manpower Requirements
(Active Duty End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 75</u> <u>(FY 1976 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>18.6</u>	<u>18.9</u>	<u>19.6</u>	<u>19.7</u>	<u>20.4</u>
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>236.8</u>	<u>245.1</u>	<u>241.1</u>	<u>241.3</u>	<u>249.2</u>
Land Forces	2.5	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.9
Tactical Air Forces	61.4	68.6	65.9	65.7	64.1
Naval Forces	172.5	173.3	172.0	172.5	182.0
Mobility Forces	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>29.7</u>	<u>31.0</u>	<u>29.5</u>	<u>29.5</u>	<u>26.8</u>
Intelligence & Security	11.3	10.9	9.7	9.6	9.4
Centrally Managed					
Communication	9.6	10.8	11.0	11.0	9.0
Research & Development	6.4	6.6	6.7	6.6	6.3
Support to Other Nations	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2
Geophysical Activities	2.3	2.4	2.0	2.0	2.0
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>67.1</u>	<u>70.4</u>	<u>69.5</u>	<u>69.5</u>	<u>69.5</u>
Reserve Components Support	7.1	7.6	7.6	7.6	7.6
Base Operating Support	34.1	37.1	36.7	36.7	36.6
Force Support Training	13.2	12.6	12.5	12.5	12.6
Command	12.8	13.1	12.8	12.8	12.7
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>87.2</u>	<u>86.1</u>	<u>86.2</u>	<u>86.6</u>	<u>85.8</u>
Base Operating Support	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8
Medical Support	20.0	19.7	19.7	19.7	19.6
Personnel Support	6.8	8.1	8.2	8.2	8.2
Individual Training	40.6	38.3	38.6	39.0	38.5
Command	8.5	8.1	8.0	8.0	7.8
Logistics	7.2	8.0	7.8	7.7	7.8
Federal Agency Support	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>106.2</u>	<u>84.6</u>	<u>82.7</u>	<u>89.2</u>	<u>94.3</u>
Transients	39.5	24.4	24.9	27.2	25.5
Patients & Prisoners	5.7	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.4
Trainees & Students	57.8	52.7	50.3	54.3	61.1
Midshipmen	3.2	4.2	4.2	4.4	4.4
<u>Total Navy</u>	<u>545.7</u>	<u>536.1</u>	<u>528.7</u>	<u>535.9</u>	<u>546.0</u>

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

Navy Civilian Manpower Requirements
(Direct & Indirect Hire End Strengths in Thousands)

	FY 74 Actual	FY 75	FY 76 (FY 1976 Budget)	FY 77	FY 77 Auth.
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	1.3 (-)	1.4 (-)	1.5 (-)	1.5 (-)	1.8 (-)
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	5.7 (.1)	5.5 (.1)	5.9 (.1)	5.9 (.1)	6.1 (.1)
Naval Forces	.3 (*)	.3 (*)	.3 (*)	.3 (*)	.3 (*)
Mobility Forces	5.4 (.1)	5.2 (.1)	5.6 (.1)	5.6 (.1)	5.8 (.1)
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	48.5 (.9)	47.8 (.9)	45.2 (.9)	45.2 (.9)	45.2 (.9)
<u>Intelligence & Security</u>	1.8 (.1)	1.9 (.1)	1.8 (.1)	1.8 (.1)	1.8 (.1)
Centrally Managed					
Communication	4.3 (.8)	4.3 (.8)	4.1 (.8)	4.1 (.8)	4.1 (.8)
Research & Development	39.5 (-)	38.6 (-)	36.4 (-)	36.4 (-)	36.4 (-)
Support to Other Nations	1.1 (*)	1.3 (*)	1.3 (*)	1.3 (*)	1.3 (*)
Geophysical Activities	1.7 (*)	1.7 (*)	1.7 (*)	1.7 (*)	1.7 (*)
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	35.5 (4.0)	36.2 (4.0)	37.8 (3.7)	37.8 (3.7)	37.8 (3.7)
<u>Reserve Components Support</u>	3.1 (-)	3.0 (-)	3.1 (-)	3.1 (-)	3.1 (-)
Base Operating Support	27.1 (3.9)	26.7 (4.0)	26.4 (3.7)	26.4 (3.7)	26.4 (3.7)
Force Support Training	.5 (-)	.5 (-)	.5 (-)	.5 (-)	.5 (-)
Command	4.8 (*)	6.0 (*)	7.8 (*)	7.8 (*)	7.8 (*)
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	224.3 (4.2)	219.1 (4.7)	223.4 (4.7)	223.7 (4.7)	228.8 (4.7)
<u>Base Operating Support</u>	21.1 (1.3)	20.7 (1.5)	21.4 (1.5)	21.4 (1.5)	21.7 (1.5)
Medical Support	9.8 (.1)	10.1 (.2)	10.0 (.2)	10.0 (.2)	9.9 (.2)
Personnel Support	1.6 (-)	1.8 (-)	1.9 (-)	2.3 (-)	2.2 (-)
Individual Training	14.2 (-)	14.8 (-)	14.5 (-)	14.5 (-)	14.5 (-)
Command	17.2 (*)	15.9 (*)	15.9 (*)	15.9 (-)	16.1 (-)
Logistics	160.5 (2.8)	155.8 (3.0)	159.7 (3.0)	159.7 (3.0)	164.2 (3.0)
<u>Total Navy</u>	315.4 (9.2)	310.0 (9.7)	313.9 (9.4)	314.2 (9.4)	319.8 (9.4)
<u>Direct Hire Only</u>	306.2	300.3	304.4	304.8	310.4

* Indicates less than 50 spaces.

() Indirect hire included.

NOTE: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

Marine Corps Military Manpower Requirements
(Active Duty End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 75</u> <u>(FY 1976 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	-	-	-	-	-
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>103.2</u>	<u>111.3</u>	<u>113.0</u>	<u>110.5</u>	<u>111.7</u>
Land Forces	74.9	82.5	84.2	81.8	83.0
Tactical Air Forces	27.6	28.2	28.2	28.2	28.2
Naval Forces	.7	.6	.6	.5	.5
Mobility Forces	-	-	-	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>1.7</u>
Intelligence & Security	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.0
Centrally Managed					
Communication	*	*	*	*	*
Research & Development	.7	.7	.7	.7	.7
Support to Other Nations	.1	.1	*	*	*
Geophysical Activities	*	*	*	*	*
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>24.0</u>	<u>22.3</u>	<u>22.3</u>	<u>22.2</u>	<u>22.2</u>
Reserve Components Support	.4	.5	.5	.5	.5
Base Operating Support	16.7	17.6	17.6	17.6	17.6
Force Support Training	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8
Command	2.0	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>24.3</u>	<u>22.5</u>	<u>22.4</u>	<u>22.4</u>	<u>22.4</u>
Base Operating Support	5.6	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.6
Personnel Support	3.1	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.7
Individual Training	8.8	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.2
Command	4.8	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5
Logistics	.9	.9	.8	.8	.8
Federal Agency Support	1.1	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>35.4</u>	<u>38.4</u>	<u>36.9</u>	<u>39.7</u>	<u>39.7</u>
Transients	11.8	11.8	11.7	11.8	11.8
Patients & Prisoners	1.6	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3
Trainees & Students	22.0	25.3	23.9	26.6	26.6
<u>Total Marine Corps</u>	<u>188.8</u>	<u>196.4</u>	<u>196.3</u>	<u>196.5</u>	<u>197.6</u>

*Less than 50 spaces.

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

Marine Corps Civilian Manpower Requirements
(Direct & Indirect Hire End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u> (FY 1976 Budget)	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>10.6 (2.3)</u>	<u>10.8 (2.3)</u>	<u>10.8 (2.3)</u>	<u>11.2 (2.3)</u>	<u>11.2 (2.3)</u>
<u>Reserve Components Support</u>	<u>.1 (-)</u>	<u>.1 (-)</u>	<u>.1 (-)</u>	<u>.1 (-)</u>	<u>.1 (-)</u>
<u>Base Operating Support</u>	<u>10.5 (2.3)</u>	<u>10.7 (2.3)</u>	<u>10.7 (2.3)</u>	<u>11.1 (2.3)</u>	<u>11.1 (2.3)</u>
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>9.2 (-)</u>	<u>9.6 (-)</u>	<u>9.2 (-)</u>	<u>9.3 (-)</u>	<u>9.3 (-)</u>
<u>Base Operating Support</u>	<u>1.9 (-)</u>	<u>1.9 (-)</u>	<u>1.7 (-)</u>	<u>1.7 (-)</u>	<u>1.7 (-)</u>
<u>Personnel Support</u>	<u>.1 (-)</u>	<u>.1 (-)</u>	<u>.1 (-)</u>	<u>.1 (-)</u>	<u>.1 (-)</u>
<u>Individual Training</u>	<u>2.4 (-)</u>	<u>2.5 (-)</u>	<u>2.4 (-)</u>	<u>2.5 (-)</u>	<u>2.5 (-)</u>
<u>Command</u>	<u>1.8 (-)</u>	<u>2.0 (-)</u>	<u>2.6 (-)</u>	<u>2.0 (-)</u>	<u>2.0 (-)</u>
<u>Logistics</u>	<u>3.0 (-)</u>	<u>3.1 (-)</u>	<u>3.0 (-)</u>	<u>3.0 (-)</u>	<u>3.0 (-)</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>19.8 (2.3)</u>	<u>20.4 (2.3)</u>	<u>20.0 (2.3)</u>	<u>20.4 (2.3)</u>	<u>20.4 (2.3)</u>
<u>Direct Hire Only</u>	<u>17.5</u>	<u>18.1</u>	<u>17.6</u>	<u>18.1</u>	<u>18.1</u>

() Indirect hire included.

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

Air Force Military Manpower Requirements
(Active Duty End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 75</u> <u>(FY 1976 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>99.8</u>	<u>90.0</u>	<u>81.9</u>	<u>81.7</u>	<u>81.6</u>
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>113.7</u>	<u>111.5</u>	<u>112.4</u>	<u>112.8</u>	<u>116.6</u>
Land Forces	-	-	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	73.9	72.9	74.6	75.0	79.0
Naval Forces	-	-	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	39.8	38.7	37.8	37.8	37.6
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>79.8</u>	<u>71.8</u>	<u>67.7</u>	<u>67.6</u>	<u>67.5</u>
<u>Intelligence & Security</u>	<u>25.2</u>	<u>23.2</u>	<u>21.6</u>	<u>21.6</u>	<u>21.3</u>
Centrally Managed					
Communication	24.3	19.7	18.8	18.8	18.9
Research & Development	17.4	17.5	17.0	17.0	17.1
Support to Other Nations	2.0	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4
Geophysical Activities	10.9	9.8	8.9	8.9	8.8
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>172.0</u>	<u>164.1</u>	<u>157.1</u>	<u>157.1</u>	<u>155.4</u>
Reserve Components Support	1.0	1.0	.6	.6	.6
Base Operating Support	130.4	125.3	119.8	119.8	117.6
Force Support Training	16.1	16.0	15.9	16.0	16.5
Command	24.5	21.8	20.8	20.7	20.6
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>109.1</u>	<u>105.5</u>	<u>103.1</u>	<u>102.9</u>	<u>102.7</u>
Base Operating Support	21.7	20.7	20.4	20.4	20.5
Medical Support	31.2	30.6	29.8	29.8	29.5
Personnel Support	7.0	7.0	6.8	6.7	6.7
Individual Training	28.7	27.7	27.1	27.1	27.1
Command	14.8	14.2	14.0	13.9	13.9
Logistics	5.2	4.8	4.6	4.6	4.6
Federal Agency Support	.4	.5	.4	.4	.4
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>69.3</u>	<u>68.7</u>	<u>67.7</u>	<u>67.9</u>	<u>66.0</u>
<u>Transients</u>	<u>25.2</u>	<u>25.0</u>	<u>24.2</u>	<u>23.9</u>	<u>21.8</u>
Patients	.8	.8	.8	.8	.8
Trainees & Students	38.9	38.5	38.3	39.0	39.2
Cadets	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.2	4.2
<u>Total Air Force</u>	<u>643.8</u>	<u>611.5</u>	<u>590.0</u>	<u>590.0</u>	<u>590.0</u>

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

Air Force Civilian Manpower Requirements
(Direct & Indirect Hire End Strengths in Thousands)

	FY 74 Actual	FY 75	FY 76 (FY 1976 Budget)	FY 77	FY 77 Auth.
<u>Strategic Forces - Total</u>	<u>8.4 (*)</u>	<u>7.6 (*)</u>	<u>7.1 (*)</u>	<u>7.0 (*)</u>	<u>6.8 (*)</u>
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>26.9 (.9)</u>	<u>28.5 (1.0)</u>	<u>29.3 (1.0)</u>	<u>29.4 (1.0)</u>	<u>29.6 (1.0)</u>
<u>Land Forces</u>	-	-	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	13.2 (.2)	14.3 (.2)	14.8 (.2)	14.9 (.2)	15.0 (.2)
Naval Forces	-	-	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	13.7 (.7)	14.2 (.7)	14.5 (.7)	14.5 (.7)	14.6 (.7)
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>33.1 (1.1)</u>	<u>32.5 (.9)</u>	<u>31.0 (.8)</u>	<u>31.0 (.8)</u>	<u>31.0 (.8)</u>
<u>Intelligence & Security</u>	<u>3.0 (.4)</u>	<u>3.0 (.5)</u>	<u>2.8 (.4)</u>	<u>2.8 (.4)</u>	<u>2.7 (.4)</u>
Centrally Managed					
Communication	6.5 (.6)	5.6 (.3)	5.3 (.3)	5.3 (.3)	5.3 (.3)
Research & Development	22.7 (-)	22.8 (-)	21.5 (-)	21.5 (-)	21.5 (-)
Support to Other Nations	.1 (*)	.1 (*)	.2 (*)	.2 (*)	.2 (*)
Geophysical	.9 (.1)	1.0 (.1)	1.2 (.1)	1.2 (.1)	1.2 (.1)
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>79.1 (12.8)</u>	<u>77.0 (12.5)</u>	<u>74.6 (12.4)</u>	<u>74.8 (12.4)</u>	<u>73.2 (12.4)</u>
<u>Reserve Components Support</u>	<u>6.6 (-)</u>	<u>6.6 (-)</u>	<u>6.0 (-)</u>	<u>6.0 (-)</u>	<u>6.0 (-)</u>
Base Operating Support	66.5 (12.4)	64.7 (12.3)	63.2 (12.2)	63.3 (12.2)	61.8 (12.2)
Force Support Training	1.2 (*)	1.4 (*)	1.4 (*)	1.4 (*)	1.4 (*)
Command	4.8 (.4)	4.3 (.1)	4.1 (.2)	4.1 (.2)	4.1 (.1)
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>141.8 (1.1)</u>	<u>135.5 (1.3)</u>	<u>129.2 (1.1)</u>	<u>131.0 (1.1)</u>	<u>130.4 (1.1)</u>
<u>Base Operating Support</u>	<u>33.2 (.2)</u>	<u>31.0 (.2)</u>	<u>30.1 (.2)</u>	<u>30.2 (.2)</u>	<u>30.3 (.2)</u>
Medical Support	6.9 (.5)	7.8 (.7)	7.4 (.6)	7.4 (.6)	7.3 (.6)
Personnel Support	2.0 (.2)	2.2 (.3)	2.1 (.2)	4.0 (.2)	4.0 (.2)
Individual Training	7.4 (*)	7.7 (*)	7.4 (*)	7.4 (*)	7.4 (*)
Command	12.3 (.1)	12.1 (.2)	11.6 (.2)	11.6 (.2)	11.6 (.2)
Logistics	80.1 (*)	74.7 (*)	70.5 (*)	70.4 (*)	69.7 (*)
<u>Total</u>	<u>289.4 (15.8)</u>	<u>281.2 (15.6)</u>	<u>271.3 (15.4)</u>	<u>273.2 (15.4)</u>	<u>271.0 (15.3)</u>
<u>Direct Hire Only</u>	<u>273.6</u>	<u>265.6</u>	<u>255.9</u>	<u>257.8</u>	<u>255.7</u>

* Less than 50.

() Indirect hire included.

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

Defense Agencies Civilian Manpower Requirements
(Direct & Indirect Hire End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u> (FY 1976 Budget)	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	1.1 (-)	1.1 (-)	1.1 (-)	1.1 (-)	1.1 (-)
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	12.2 (*)	11.8 (*)	11.9 (*)	11.9 (*)	11.9 (*)
Intelligence & Security	2.7 (-)	2.6 (-)	2.7 (-)	2.7 (-)	2.7 (-)
Centrally Managed Comm.	1.3 (*)	1.3 (*)	1.2 (*)	1.2 (*)	1.2 (*)
Research & Development	.3 (-)	.3 (-)	.3 (-)	.3 (-)	.3 (-)
Geophysical Activities	7.8 (*)	7.6 (*)	7.6 (*)	7.6 (*)	7.6 (*)
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	62.0 (.6)	61.6 (.7)	60.7 (.8)	60.7 (.8)	60.8 (.8)
Base Operating Support	6.8 (-)	6.8 (-)	6.5 (-)	6.5 (-)	6.5 (-)
Medical Support	- (-)	- (-)	.4 (*)	.4 (*)	.4 (*)
Personnel Support	1.4 (-)	1.5 (-)	1.7 (-)	1.7 (-)	1.7 (-)
Command	6.1 (*)	6.1 (*)	6.1 (*)	6.1 (*)	6.1 (*)
Logistics	47.8 (.6)	47.2 (.7)	46.0 (.7)	46.1 (.7)	46.1 (.7)
<u>Total</u>	<u>75.3 (.6)</u>	<u>74.5 (.7)</u>	<u>73.7 (.8)</u>	<u>73.7 (.8)</u>	<u>73.8 (.8)</u>
<u>Direct Hire Only</u>	<u>74.7</u>	<u>73.8</u>	<u>72.9</u>	<u>72.9</u>	<u>73.0</u>

() Indirect hire included.
NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

CHAPTER III

U. S. DEFENSE POLICY

A. National Security Objectives

The basic national security objective is to preserve the United States as a free nation, protecting the political independence and the general welfare of the American people. Attaining this objective requires the capacity to deter aggression and to retain world stature and influence. Specific national security objectives are:

- To deter the use, or threat of use, of nuclear forces against the United States, its Allies, or other nations important to our security.
- To deter the use, or threat of use, of conventional forces against our forces, our Allies, or other nations important to our security.
- To terminate any conflict, should deterrence fail, on terms acceptable to the United States and its Allies while preserving our security interests.

Accomplishment of these objectives requires that the United States have, and that the rest of the world perceives that we have, strong and capable Armed Forces. The deterrence of aggression against the United States and its Allies rests upon our clear and evident capability and resolve to fight, in concert with our Allies, at any level of conflict--conventional or nuclear--so that any potential opponent will assess his own risk of loss to be unacceptable.

The control and limitation of arms contributes to the national security of the United States when relative capabilities are stabilized and balanced especially at reduced force levels. Negotiations to achieve desirable arms limitations are an integral part of our national security policy. Faced with an apparent Soviet determination to shift the overall balance of forces progressively in their favor, we will seek to persuade the Soviet leadership that we intend to maintain an equilibrium both in strategic forces and, in concert with our Allies, in theater nuclear forces and conventional forces as well. To do this we will:

- Continue to develop strategic and conventional forces programs necessary to meet National security objectives.
- Continue to encourage our Allies to make similar improvements in their conventional forces.
- Seek such reductions and other control measures in arms control negotiations as will increase stability in the military balance between the two sides.

B. Defense Policy

Our basic National Defense Policy is to deter conflict by ensuring that the United States in concert with its allies maintains a military balance with regard to the Soviet Union and its allies across the full spectrum of potential conflict levels. Our military power is based on clearly perceived and credible warfighting capabilities that can respond to a wide range of provocations with power sufficient to accomplish our objectives with precision, discrimination and restraint. In relying primarily on US and Allied conventional forces to deter conventional aggression we shall maintain a full range of conventional options as preferred alternatives to the use of strategic or theater nuclear weapons. To deter the possibility of successful nuclear coercion of the US or its allies, we shall maintain our nuclear forces so that they do not manifest any imbalance in overall strength and capabilities favoring the Soviet Union and shall maintain a full range of nuclear options.

C. Force Requirements

United States Armed Forces must be capable of deterring war and, if deterrence fails, of achieving United States security objectives. They must be capable of engaging effectively in a wide range of conflict situations across the entire spectrum of conflict levels from conventional to nuclear warfare. United States forces will be structured in accordance with the following policies:

- Nuclear forces will be structured to be capable of employment in a wide range of flexible options in order to limit the risk of automatic and uncontrolled escalation.

- General purpose forces will be structured primarily for conventional warfare and serve to maintain the nuclear threshold at the highest possible level; however, they must also be capable of operating in a nuclear environment.

- Theater nuclear forces and the nuclear capable elements of general purpose forces will not be relied upon as a substitute for conventional forces. However, they will be structured to contribute both to deterrence of conventional and nuclear warfare and to the control of escalation. The combined use of conventional and theater nuclear forces would be appropriate in circumstances in which the capability of conventional forces alone is insufficient to attain US objectives.

- Maximum combat power from a given level of resources is to be attained by seeking cooperation with and participation with our Allies in shared defense concerns; by stressing interservice mutual support in our own Armed Forces; and by achieving effective integration of active and reserve components forces.

- Manpower programs should assure that the correct number of trained people, military and civilian, are available upon mobilization to do the jobs required by the Defense Department and the civilian economy to support the war effort. Peacetime goals for military manpower will be met by attracting and retaining volunteers of appropriate quality.

CHAPTER IV

STRATEGIC FORCES

A. Definition

Strategic forces consist of those nuclear offensive, defensive, control and surveillance forces which have as their fundamental objectives the deterrence of aggression at all levels and, if necessary, appropriate employment if conflict occurs involving the vital interests of the United States or its allies. To fulfill these objectives in strategic force planning, we strive to maintain a reliable retaliatory force, placing emphasis on measures that both enhance survivability and assure our ability to penetrate defenses. In addition, we seek to provide reliable early warning capabilities to minimize the likelihood and consequences of surprise, and to provide an effective and reliable command and control system for all strategic forces.

The Strategic Arms Limitation (SAL) agreements, which consist of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms Limitations, impose constraints on both the U.S. and the Soviet strategic forces. The ABM Treaty limits ABM defenses to a low level. The Interim Agreement, reached in 1972, limits the numbers of ICBM and SLEM launchers the United States and USSR may have operational or under construction; bombers are not constrained. The Interim Agreement, however, may be superseded by the pending agreement reached at Vladivostok. The agreement would limit the United States and USSR to an aggregate level of 2,400 nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLEMs and bombers) with a sublimit of 1,320 MIRVed ICBM/SLEM launchers.

Recent analyses indicate that our planned strategic forces will continue to provide sufficient deterrence for the near term. We do have reliable and survivable strategic retaliatory forces, and their capabilities for retaliation today cannot be denied by nuclear attack.

B. Threat

The growth of the primary strategic threat to the United States -- the capability of the Soviet Union to deliver nuclear weapons against targets in the United States -- has been a matter of grave concern to us. The Soviets have built up their ICBM forces at a rapid rate during the past several years, and they are completing construction of more silos and developing newer type missiles within the limit of the Interim Agreement.

The Soviet ICBM threat is augmented by a substantial nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine fleet. The most numerous component of this

fleet is the Y-class submarine, which like the U.S. Polaris, has 16 tubes for launching missiles. A longer range submarine launched ballistic missile has been developed, and is expected to be deployed in the DELTA-class submarine. At the current production rate, the USSR will deploy within two years an operational force of Y-class and DELTA-class submarines larger in size than the current Polaris/Poseidon force.

The Soviet intercontinental heavy bomber force remains at around 140 aircraft (excluding about 50 tankers). Although we believe the Soviet bomber force is targeted primarily against the Eurasian area, we cannot ignore the fact that these aircraft could be employed in strikes against the United States. A new bomber, the Backfire, has undergone flight tests and is starting initial deployment, but its exact characteristics and future role have yet to be determined.

With regard to the strategic defense forces of the Soviet Union, there is extensive deployment of aircraft defenses, as well as an AEM system deployed around Moscow. The Soviets have a large inventory of radars numbering in the thousands and a force of several thousand interceptor aircraft. There is a slight trend toward a reduction in the number of these interceptors, but the quality of the force has improved. Four new interceptors have been added since 1964, and these newer models make up a substantial part of the force. In addition, at least four different SAM systems are presently deployed for strategic air defense.

As for the strategic nuclear threat of the Peoples Republic of China, its progress toward achieving an ICBM capability is continuing. We cannot state with confidence just when China will have an ICBM capable of striking the continental United States, but it is estimated that deployment could occur in the late 1970's or early 1980's.

C. Strategic Offensive Forces

The basis for our offensive force planning is the retaliatory capability of these forces. Our forces must be capable of absorbing a surprise Soviet first-strike and still be capable of achieving a decisive reduction of the enemy power and influence and to inhibit post attack recovery. To insure high-confidence in our second-strike capability, we plan a mix of mutually supporting forces; land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and bombers. Such a force mix provides (1) assurance that a Soviet technological breakthrough against any one element will not negate the effectiveness of the entire force; (2) a hedge against failures of any element; (3) a compounding of Soviet offensive and defensive problems in attempting to defeat or defend against U.S. forces; and (4) reinforcement of the viability of each element by the presence of the other, thereby strengthening the credibility of the total deterrent posture and flexible range of attack options.

During the FY76 programming and budgeting cycle, two major changes were made which affect operation of the bomber force. First, a careful re-examination of bomber operational plans and procedures was made to determine where budgetary savings could be made with minimum additional risk. As a result of this reexamination and in consideration of the current strategic balance, it was determined that a reduction in the proportion of the bomber force to be maintained on day-to-day ground alert was appropriate. This reduction of the day-to-day ground alert force allows a similar reduction in the number of crews and maintenance personnel required to support the bomber force.

The second major action involves the transfer of some of the KC-135 refueling tankers from the active force to the air reserve components. This transfer of aircraft to the air reserve components allows a reduction in the number of active force tanker crews required to support the remaining active force KC-135s. Transfer of the initial KC-135's to the reserve components will begin during FY 1976, and will continue in FY 1977.

We are continuing development work on three new strategic offensive systems, the Trident submarine and missile, the B-1 manned bomber, and the advanced ICBM. These systems will not be deployed in FY76, however, and no operational manpower is provided for them.

As shown in the following table, strategic offensive forces remain essentially the same during the period FY 74-76, with the exception of the KC-135's being transferred to the air reserve components and the B-52 force which is programmed to be reduced slightly in FY75 due to aircraft aging and budgeting constraints.

Strategic Offensive Forces

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Bombers:				
B-52 (UE) <u>a/</u>	372	330	330	330
FB-111 (UE) <u>a/</u>	66	66	66	66
KC-135 (UE) <u>a/</u>				
Active Force	615	615	583	575
Air Reserve				
Component	-	-	32	40
Missiles:				
Titan II	54	54	54	54
Minuteman	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
Polaris/Poseidon	656	656	656	656
Ballistic Missile				
Submarines (SSBN)	41	41	41	41

a/ Unit Equipment (UE) is the basis for manning aircraft squadrons. This is less than the Total Active Inventory (TAI), which will remain level from FY 75 through FY 77 except for attrition.

The following table summarizes Strategic Offensive Forces manpower.

Strategic Offensive Forces Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Navy	17.6	17.8	18.4	18.4
Air Force	72.0	65.2	58.3	58.1
Total	<u>89.6</u>	<u>83.0</u>	<u>76.7</u>	<u>76.5</u>
<u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>				
Navy	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.3
Air Force	.6	.7	1.5	1.7
Total	<u>1.7</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>3.0</u>

Specific changes in the manpower levels are discussed in the Navy and Air Force chapters.

D. Strategic Defense, Control and Surveillance Forces

1. Ballistic Missile Defense

In light of the reduced emphasis on ballistic missile defense as a result of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, the deployment and operating costs of the Safeguard system are being minimized. The Safeguard site near Grand Forks, North Dakota, will reach operational readiness in FY76 for limited defense of the land-based retaliatory forces. After gaining a year of operational experience, the level of operations and the readiness of the site will be reduced in FY 1977. We are continuing R&D on all types of missile defense at a pace adequate to maintain our technological base and to preserve future options.

2. Air Defense

Changes in our CONUS air defense forces are continuing so that these forces will fully reflect the changes in our CONUS air defense planning which took place last year. Emphasis on defense against a strategic bomber attack is being reduced and effort is being directed to the missions of providing warning of a bomber attack and peacetime airspace surveillance and control. In peacetime and times of crises, CONUS air defense will be augmented with general purpose resources in CONUS for defense of the U.S. We will continue to pursue a broadly-based R&D program to maintain our technological capabilities in air defense and preserve future options.

3. Missile Warning and Space Systems

Early warning of a ballistic missile attack will continue to depend primarily on the satellite early warning system. The Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) radars, and SLEMM detection and warning radars will continue to provide back-up support through FY76.

Information essential to understanding foreign space activities will continue to be provided by the existing USAF Spacetrack system and the Navy's SPASUR system, both of which are tied into the North American Air Defense Command and supported by the Space Defense Center for continuous monitoring of foreign and domestic space activities.

4. Command and Control

The Advanced Airborne Command Post program, initiated in FY73, will be continued. In addition, development will continue on other programs of our strategic nuclear forces.

The programmed forces for strategic defense, and control and surveillance are shown in the table on the next page.

Strategic Defense, Control and Surveillance Forces

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Strategic Defense Forces</u>				
<u>Air Defense, Surveillance, and Warning Forces</u>				
Interceptor Squadrons				
Active (F-106)	7	6	6	6
ANG (F-101, F-106)	19	14	10	9
Surface-to-Air Missile Batteries (Nike-Hercules)				
Active	0	0	0	0
ANG	0	0	0	0
Control Centers	9	9	8	8
Radars				
Ground Based	99	90	90	90
Airborne EC-121 (Active and AFR)	21	14	7	7
<u>Ballistic Missile Defense, Surveillance and Warning Forces</u>				
ABM Sites	0	1	1	1
Missile Warning Satellites/ Ground Sta.	3/3	3/3	3/3	3/3
Radars	20	9	9	9
<u>Space Surveillance Forces</u>				
Radars	12	12	12	12
Optical Sensors	4	4	4	4
<u>Strategic Reconnaissance SR-71 (UE)</u>	8	8	8	8
<u>Strategic Command and Control</u>				
National Level Command Centers	3	3	3	3
Major Subordinate Level Commands	15	15	15	15
Major Communications Systems	12	12	15	15

The following table is a summary of Strategic Defense, Control and Surveillance Forces manpower requirements:

Strategic Defense, Control and Surveillance Forces Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Army	3.0	.9	.9	.9
Navy	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2
Air Force	27.7	24.8	23.7	23.6
Total	<u>31.8</u>	<u>26.8</u>	<u>25.8</u>	<u>25.7</u>
<u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>				
Army	4.5	1.6	.9	.6
Navy	.2	.2	.2	.2
Air Force	7.8	6.9	5.6	5.3
Defense Agencies	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1
Total	<u>13.6</u>	<u>9.8</u>	<u>7.8</u>	<u>7.2</u>

E. FY 1977 Strategic Forces Manpower

The following table displays the FY 77 requirement compared to FY 71.

Strategic Offensive Forces Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilian Direct and Indirect</u>	
	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Navy	18.4	19.1	1.3	1.6
Air Force	58.1	58.1	1.7	2.5
TOTAL	<u>76.5</u>	<u>77.2</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>4.1</u>

Strategic Defense, Control and Surveillance Forces Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilian Direct and Indirect</u>	
	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Army	.9	.8	.6	.6
Navy	1.2	1.3	.2	.2
Air Force	23.6	23.6	5.3	4.3
Defense Agencies	-	-	1.1	1.1
Total	<u>25.7</u>	<u>25.7</u>	<u>7.2</u>	<u>6.2</u>

The manpower requirement for strategic forces remains generally constant in FY 77. The increase in Navy strategic offensive forces reflects the continuing growth of the Trident program.

CHAPTER V

GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

The role of our General Purpose Forces is, together with our allies, to provide ground, air, and naval forces which will deter conflicts through a visible capability to resist aggression against any country or area vital to our interest. The size and mixture of General Purpose Forces are predicated upon the following policy judgments: (1) with the advent of nuclear parity, strategic nuclear forces, in and of themselves, cannot be relied upon to provide a credible deterrent or response to the entire spectrum of aggression which we must be prepared to face; and (2) strong conventional forces with the capability to escalate and fight at all levels of warfare add significantly to the deterrents to initiation or continuation of hostilities.

A. The Threat in Europe and Asia and U.S. Conventional Strategy to Meet It.

1. Europe/NATO

Given our long-standing political, economic and cultural ties to Western Europe, European security has very high priority in U.S. conventional and nuclear force planning. Beyond the direct defense of the United States, there is no objective more vital to U.S. national security than maintaining a Western Europe free from domination by the Soviet Union. While we recognize that a substantial commitment to Europe is necessary over the near term, our long term objective is to turn over a larger share of the responsibility for the defense of Europe to our allies.

Our strategy for NATO is based on the view that NATO must have a credible posture to deter and defend against conventional and/or theater nuclear attacks, particularly in the Central Region. Accordingly, NATO, including the U.S., retains a strong incentive to strengthen its collective military capabilities in Europe. In assessing Allied participation, we should first acknowledge that NATO defense has been far from a single-handed effort by the United States. Of the peacetime forces deployed in the European area, our allies contribute approximately 90 percent of NATO's ground forces, 80 percent of the ships, and 75 percent of the aircraft. In the critical central region of Europe, the United States contributes only 23 percent of NATO's manpower -- compared, for example with the Soviet Union's share of 46 percent of the Warsaw Pact manpower. Given the current forces and spending priorities in NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, however, it is unrealistic to expect Western Europe to defend itself against Soviet/Pact forces without a strong U.S. commitment to NATO.

a. Warsaw Pact Threat

The Warsaw Pact nuclear and conventional forces facing NATO in forward areas are designed to seize the initiative in the event of war with offensive operations employing heavily armored formations. Additional objectives are the maintenance of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and keeping political pressure on Western Europe. While these forces pose a substantial military threat to NATO, a war is not presently considered likely in Europe. This is based upon our assessment that the Soviets should be deterred from attacking NATO because the present capabilities of NATO's conventional and theater nuclear forces are sufficient to create a substantial risk of failure to achieve major gains by such an attack.

b. NATO Conventional Balance

NATO has the essential ingredients for a good conventional balance and could give a good account of itself if the NATO countries do not falter in their defense efforts. It is a force of considerable strength. It continues to improve. In many respects it is not the equal of the Warsaw Pact force opposing it -- for instance, in maneuver divisions and tanks. NATO's main reinforcements, those from the United States, are not as close as those of the Soviet Union. But NATO has some strengths of its own, such as tactical air forces, and the Warsaw Pact has some weaknesses and vulnerabilities, such as logistics and the uncertain reliability of some Pact members.

This positive assessment of NATO's conventional defense capability does not mean the existing correlation of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is satisfactory for our security. While NATO does have substantial conventional forces, objective disparities do remain. We must continue to direct our defense efforts toward providing greater effectiveness out of those systems we maintain and more thorough military cohesion and planning.

c. US and Allied Cooperation in NATO

Despite the strain occasioned by differing national interests in the Middle East, the past year has been one of stability in Allied forces in Europe with expanded cooperation within the NATO Alliance toward solving our mutual defense problems. The European countries have been experiencing substantial economic problems, however, a majority of our NATO allies will achieve real increases in defense spending in 1975 compared with 1974.

There are strong indications that there are some inefficiencies in the way the Alliance spends the resources devoted to defense. Thus greater

rationalization in the employment of these resources can provide added military capability. Rationalization can enable the Alliance to perform current tasks with lower levels of resources, and the savings can be rechanneled into other defense areas. This rechanneling of resources to make much needed improvements provides a powerful incentive to rationalization. In the spring of 1974, we recommended that NATO examine greater rationalization in a number of areas.

Based on our initial effort, the NATO Executive Working Group has selected three areas for initial study of rationalization. These are consolidation of training, consolidation of communications and host nation support for wartime lines of communication. Investigation of other areas is continuing.

d. Burdensharing

In the past we have stated that the most important form of NATO burdensharing is Allied force improvements. However, the Jackson-Nunn Amendment to the FY74 Armed Service Procurement Bill, as reflected in Section 812 of P.L. 93-155, broadened this traditional concept to include financial assistance. The Amendment requires the Allies to offset U.S. defense expenditures entering the International Balance of Payments in Europe during FY74 as the result of the deployment of forces in Europe in fulfillment of the treaty commitments and obligations of the United States. The Amendment would have required us to withdraw a percentage of U.S. forces in Europe equal to the percentage by which offset has not been provided.

Although the final accounting of the FY 1974 Balance of Payments figures is not available, we fully expect that the provisions of Section 812 will be met. These arrangements will make an important contribution to the burdensharing objectives we seek.

e. Negotiations

Formal Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations with the Warsaw Pact began on October 30, 1973, in Vienna, Austria. Our objective for MBFR is to achieve a stable military balance at lower force levels while maintaining undiminished Alliance security.

These negotiations hold a real prospect for reduction. However, we do not seek reductions at any cost, but only reductions that contribute to security in Europe. We and our Allies have put forward proposals which would achieve both a more stable balance and reduced force levels. Until agreements are reached, it is important that we and our Allies maintain and improve our forces. Any unilateral force reductions or degradation in force strength will undermine the negotiating position of the Alliance.

f. Allied Improvement Efforts

Our NATO Allies are fulfilling their end of the bargain whereby the United States would maintain and improve its forces in Europe, given a similar approach by them.

For the year 1975, almost all of our Allies are planning increases in their defense budgets above the 1974 level. Our Allies in the last few years have also taken important steps to modernize the structure and equipment of their forces. These steps are in consonance with the priorities established in the AD-70 study.

Our Allies have made clear that the maintenance of their force levels and their extensive improvement programs are worthwhile because of the continued U.S. commitment to NATO defense, the high quality of U.S. forces, and the critical part they play in NATO defense plans, as well as their link with U.S. nuclear deterrent power. Our Allies have also made clear that efforts to achieve sufficient defense capabilities is a necessary corollary to realistic negotiations on security and cooperation in Europe.

g. Improvements to U.S. Forces in Europe

The United States is continuing in FY 1976 the strong effort that was initiated in FY 1975 to improve the capability of its forces in Europe. Units will remain close to 100% of authorized manning.

We have undertaken a program of restructuring our manpower to improve the combat capability in Europe. The Nunn amendment to the 1975 Appropriation Authorization Bill required that the non-combat component of the total United States military strength in Europe be reduced by 18,000; 6,000 in FY 1975 and 12,000 in FY 1976, and that the combat component of our forces is authorized to increase in Europe by the amount of any such reduction made in non-combat personnel. The FY 1975 reductions occur in headquarters and miscellaneous supporting units and will exceed the Congressional requirement. The combat force increase includes introducing an Army brigade into Germany and increased manning and equipment in existing units. For the Air Force we are providing more tactical airlift and increased manning in combat units. The Atlantic Fleet manning is also increasing. Alternative support reductions and combat increases for FY 76 are currently under study.

Modernization of the equipment of U.S. forces is also progressing well. We will continue to make significant improvements in our anti-armor capabilities. The TOW anti-tank guided missile is being added to units in significant numbers.

Our land-based tactical air forces are composed of F-111 and F-4 aircraft. Most of the shelters authorized in the SHAPE Aircraft and Airfield Protection and the U.S. nationally-funded program for aircraft stationed in Europe have been completed. In addition, funds are being provided to shelter those aircraft that are planned for early deployment in an emergency. We are steadily increasing and improving our logistics stocks. Finally we hope to enhance force survivability by increasing the number of available dispersal bases to reduce wartime airbase loading, and are making progress in negotiations over the dispersed base locations.

2. Asia

The United States is a Pacific power. We have territories in the Western Pacific; we have significant economic interests in the region; and we are bound by common interests and treaty commitments to many nations in the area. However, unlike Europe where our allies face a common threat and are bound by a single treaty, our Asian allies face different threats, internal as well as external, and our treaty commitments in Asia are bilateral or involve small groups of allies (ANZUS and SEATO). In addition, those Asian allies who face the most immediate threats are among the developing nations and, therefore, rely heavily on United States economic and military aid. Finally, Japan -- the Asian nation most capable economically of assuming a portion of our defense burden -- is prevented by her constitution, by the political climate in Japan, and by the apprehensions of other Asian nations from assuming an expanded military role in Asia. Consequently, while we continue to encourage regional cooperation in Asia, progress in the near term will be largely confined to the economic and political spheres; and many of our allies will continue to rely heavily on the United States for defense assistance.

In Asia it has been our policy to develop the capability and commitment of Asian allies to assume a greater share of deterrence and defense against both internal and external threats. In doing this, our assistance programs have placed primary emphasis on developing the capability to meet first internal aggression and then external aggression by non-nuclear nations. Measures primarily intended to enhance allied capabilities in a joint defense against attack by a nuclear power have a lower priority.

There has been a continued broadening of contacts between the PRC and other Asian nations, as the region adjusts to the less hostile attitudes which have prevailed in recent years. However, fighting continues in Vietnam and Cambodia and relations between North Korea and South Korea have deteriorated in the last year.

a. Asian Threats and Allied Capabilities

(1) In Northeast Asia

The Threat. North Korea, the PRC and the USSR maintain large, well-equipped, well-trained forces which pose a threat to the ROK. Additionally, the USSR represents a potential threat to U.S. and allied maritime interests throughout the Pacific. In the present political climate of East-West detente and Sino-Soviet hostility, we believe both the PRC and the USSR would see aggression as contrary to their interests. In addition, North Korea could not sustain combat operations without support from one of these nations. However, although intermittent talks continue between the two Korean governments, no progress has been made, and tensions between the two have been heightened by the assassination of Mrs. Park and the discovery of North Korean tunneling activities in the DMZ.

Allied Capabilities. With our assistance, the South Koreans have developed a significant military capability especially in ground forces, which we now believe are adequate for defense against North Korea. In addition, South Korea continues to assume an increasing portion of the cost of its armed forces. They continue, however, to require our materiel assistance to accomplish the goals of the Five Year Korean Modernization Plan.

The current Japanese Five Year Defense Plan continues to improve the ability of the Japanese Self-Defense Force to defend the home islands, without developing an offensive capability which could contravene constitutional prohibitions and popular attitudes. The Japanese forces, of course, receive no financial assistance from the U.S. The Japanese forces do not have the capability to defeat a conventional attack on the home islands by the Soviet Union, and they cannot alone defend Japan's vital shipping from the Soviet submarine threat. On the other hand, we believe the Japanese forces probably are sufficient to contain a conventional attack on the home islands from North Korea or the PRC -- primarily because those two countries lack sufficient capability to project their forces across several hundred miles of ocean.

(2) In Southeast Asia

The Threat. As in Northeast Asia, we consider PRC aggression in Southeast Asia to be unlikely. However, North Vietnam continues to pose a serious threat to South Vietnam and continues to support the communist forces in Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand.

Since the total withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from South Vietnam, the GVN has made an effort to improve the quality of its armed forces. These forces currently appear capable of preventing a North Vietnamese takeover but their ability to do so in future years has been jeopardized by recent cuts in U.S. security assistance. Cambodian forces

are being severely tested by the communists and are, at best, capable only of reacting to communist initiatives. Like South Vietnam, Cambodia's capabilities in future years are questionable, given current aid levels. Thai forces are capable of coping with their present insurgent threat. The overall situation in SEA remains unstable (and is likely to grow more so) and dictates continued presence of U.S. forces and bases in Southeast Asia.

b. U.S. Forces for Asia

We continue to maintain balanced, forward deployed ground, air and naval forces in the Asian theater to serve as a deterrent, to reassure our allies, and to provide an initial response if deterrence fails. The political considerations which impact on the U.S. presence in Asia, and especially in Korea, are obviously complex and have assumed increased relative importance. We currently plan to provide materiel, logistic, and intelligence support and additional tactical air and naval support if needed for our Asian allies in contingencies not involving PRC or Soviet forces. We could provide a limited backup ground force capability should this prove necessary. We also maintain the capability to assist our allies with a full range of conventional forces against a PRC or Soviet attack provided we are not fighting in Europe.

3. Sub-Theater Conflict and Contingencies

We must face the prospect that conflicts ranging from localized insurgency or guerrilla warfare to the attack by one neighbor against another using conventional arms will continue to threaten the security of certain of our allies through the 1970s. We classify such potential conflicts separately from large-scale conflicts directly involving the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, or the PRC. The U.S. also has other interests throughout the world which could be threatened and result in a sub-theater conflict. Therefore, a portion of our active forces are maintained at high readiness for such contingencies, while the remainder are planned to be responsive to the requirements of theater level conflicts.

B. Land Forces - Forces, Capabilities, Missions and Manpower

1. Summary of Forces

The following tables summarize Land Forces and Manpower:

Land Force Levels

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Army</u>				
<u>Divisions (Brigades)</u>				
Active				
Deployed	5(16)	5(17)	5(18)	5(18)
CONUS/Hawaii	8(22)	9(25)	11(28)	11(28)
Reserve	8(24)	8(24)	8(24)	8(24)
Total	<u>21(62)</u>	<u>22(66)</u>	<u>24(70)</u>	<u>24(70)</u>
<u>Separate Brigades</u>				
Active	4 a/	5 a/	4	4
Reserve b/	20	20	20	20
<u>Marine Corps Divisions</u>				
Active				
Deployed	1	1	1	1
CONUS	2	2	2	2
Reserve	1	1	1	1
Total	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>

a/ The 194th Armored Bde at Ft Knox is provided for school support and is not included. In FY 76 this brigade becomes part of the 5th Division (Mech).

b/ The 33d Infantry Bde (Illinois National Guard) is provided for school support and is not included. This unit is in the Central Support category.

Land Forces Manpower (End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Active Military</u>				
Army	417.2	444.0	471.9	471.9
Navy	2.5	2.8	2.8	2.8
Marine Corps	74.9	82.5	84.2	81.8
Total	<u>494.6</u>	<u>529.3</u>	<u>558.9</u>	<u>556.5</u>
<u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>	41.3	42.5	42.0	42.1

Land Force levels rise significantly between FY 74 and FY 76. This is attributable to the Army's plan to increase the number of its active divisions. The details of this plan and other changes in the Land Forces manning level will be discussed in the individual Service chapters.

2. Capabilities of Land Forces

Land Forces are subdivided into two subcategories; Division Forces and Special Mission Forces. Division Forces comprise the combat divisions and the additional combat and tactical support units required in the theater of operations to sustain combat operations of the divisions. Division Forces provide the bulk of the combat power to wage land combat in the potential theaters of major warfare. Land combat capability is described in terms of Division Force Equivalents (DFE). Each DFE represents an Army or Marine division, additional combat units, and support units. The idea is to design each division force, and the division forces in total, to obtain maximum deliverable combat power. Special Mission Forces comprise the combat and support units required in the theater of operations to accomplish missions other than conventional land combat.

a. Army Division Forces

(1) The Army division is an organization which includes under a single commander all combat arms (infantry, armor, artillery, and aviation) and some of the support (engineer, signal, supply, transportation, maintenance, and administration) to fight a battle. The Army division consists of about 16,000 men. It includes from 9 to 12 maneuver battalions and four artillery battalions. There are several types of Army divisions and each is designed for a particular role on the battlefield.

Characteristics of Typical Army Divisions

	Objective Mix of Maneuver Battalions				Full TOE Strength	Remarks
	<u>Inf</u>	<u>Mech</u>	<u>Tank</u>	<u>Total</u>		
Armored		5	6	11	16,558	Shock power in attack.
Mechanized		6	4	10	16,267	Mobile defense or attack.
Infantry	8	1	1	10	16,572	All-around capability.
Airborne	9		1	10	14,890	Parachute assault; strategic mobility.
Airmobile	9			9	17,729	Battlefield mobility.

Several of our divisions will not have the objective mix of maneuver battalions. These divisions rely on affiliated Reserve Component brigades and battalions to achieve full wartime potential.

(2) The division cannot operate alone in the theater of war; additional combat units and tactical support units are necessary to allow

the division forces to operate at their intended level of combat power. Divisions are part of the larger structure of the theater of war, which includes army corps and theater army headquarters as higher command levels. Support units, over and above those organic to the divisions, are in the corps and theater organizations. Additional combat units are also in the corps and theater organizations. These additional combat and support units comprise the tactical support portion of the Division Force Equivalent.

(3) Only about 60% of the combat power of the division forces is included in the combat divisions themselves. Other combat power is found in the following organizations.

(a) Separate combat brigades are similar to divisions, except that they are smaller. A separate brigade includes from three to five maneuver battalions and one artillery battalion. Infantry, mechanized, and armored brigades differ by battalion mix. A separate brigade may be attached to a division or employed separately under a corps commander.

(b) The air cavalry combat brigade is a new organization which includes attack helicopters and air cavalry. The air cavalry combat brigade exploits the capabilities of helicopters in land warfare.

(c) The armored cavalry regiment is an organization consisting of infantry, tank, artillery, and reconnaissance elements integrated at squadron (battalion) level. An air cavalry troop is also included in each regiment. The armored cavalry regiment is designed for such roles as reconnaissance, flank protection, and screening the divisions and brigades.

(d) Separate artillery battalions comprise about one-half the total artillery of the division forces. This non-divisional artillery includes air defense and missile battalions as well as cannon artillery.

(4) For planning purposes, the DFE is divided into the division itself and two support increments. The two support increments in each DFE provide for the additional units needed behind each division in the theater of operations. The support is divided into two increments to assist in determining which part must be active and which can be in the reserve components or unmanned. Generally, one support increment must be available to the division in the theater of operations shortly after the start of hostilities to provide the additional combat and support units that will be needed. Another support increment, consisting generally of the same types of units, is needed later on to provide the capability for sustained operations.

b. Marine Division Forces

(1) The Marine Division Force is similar to the Army Division Force, allowing for the unique mission and concept of employment for the Marine Corps. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, assigns the Marine Corps the mission of providing "...Fleet Marine Forces or combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign." The Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) is the basic element for the conduct of amphibious operations or land operations ashore. The MAF is an integrated force of combined arms, consisting typically of a Marine Division, a Marine Aircraft Wing, and supporting elements from Force Troops.

(2) The Marine Division is an infantry division configured specially for amphibious operations; its strength is about 18,000 structure spaces. It includes nine infantry battalions and three artillery battalions plus units designed specifically to facilitate amphibious operations.

(3) The Marine Aircraft Wing is an integral part of the MAF and operates in conjunction with a division. Close integration of land and tactical air capabilities is an essential ingredient of the Marine Corps capability for amphibious operations. The manpower associated with the fixed-wing portion of the Marine Air Wings is in the tactical air forces category while helicopter resources are designated as land forces aviation.

(4) Force troops provide additional combat and support units not organic to the Marine Division, but needed to sustain the operations of the division and air wing. Added combat units include tank, amphibious tractor, and artillery batteries. Support units, including a force service regiment, provide transportation, supply, maintenance, and administrative support.

(5) The division, air wing, and force troops together comprise a division and one support increment under the DFE concept. An additional support increment may be considered as coming from the Navy, which provides construction, medical, and supply support for Marine forces afloat or ashore.

c. Special Mission Forces

There are four subcategories of Special Mission Forces:

(1) Theater Missile Forces include the surface-to-surface missile units and supporting ammunition supply and maintenance units which provide the theater commander a responsive theater nuclear capability. (The Division Forces also include a nuclear capability because they include dual-capable units which can wage either conventional or nuclear combat.)

(2) Theater Air Defense Forces include surface-to-air missile units and supporting supply, maintenance, and command and control units devoted to the theater-wide air defense mission under the control of the theater commander.

(3) Theater Special Operations Forces include units devoted to special missions including psychological operations, civil affairs support, and unconventional warfare on a theater-wide basis under control of the theater commander.

(4) Theater Defense Forces include Active and Reserve units provided for the defense of selected critical areas: Alaska, Berlin, Panama Canal Zone, Iceland, and the Caribbean. Provision of specific units for these essential defense missions achieve economies by allowing the units to be tailored for their missions and precludes diversion of Division Forces units from the main theaters in the event of war. The following shows the allocation of these forces:

End FY 76 Theater Defense Forces

	<u>Infantry Brigades</u>	
	<u>Active</u>	<u>Reserve</u>
Alaska	1	1
Panama	1	1
Berlin	1	-
Iceland	-	1
Caribbean	-	1
Total	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>

3. Regional Missions for Land Forces

a. NATO

The most demanding contingency for U.S. land forces is in NATO Europe. Our land force requirements are largely determined by planning for U.S. and Allied conventional forces which, after a period of warning and mobilization, would be able to defend NATO Europe against a mobilized conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact. We plan to continue in FY 75 land force deployments to Europe at their FY 74 level. However, within that level significant changes are occurring. In response to the Nunn Amendment we are improving the combat capability of the force by converting support spaces to combat spaces.

A large number of Warsaw Pact divisions located in Eastern Europe could be committed against NATO forces. These divisions are predominantly tank or motorized divisions and most are maintained in a high state of readiness. In the event of a major conflict with the Warsaw Pact, we plan on deploying most of our active divisions. The length of the NATO frontage to be defended, the European terrain and road network, and the size and high degree of mechanization in Pact forces all combine to make possible rapid advances by attacking forces. For this reason, the early arrival of large U.S. reinforcements is critical to a successful defense of NATO Europe.

b. Asia

We do not plan for the long term to maintain separate large U.S. ground combat forces specifically oriented to Asia. If a large land war involving the United States should occur in Asia, we would be prepared to mobilize, and would initially use our non-NATO-committed forces and, if required, portions of the forces based in the United States and earmarked for NATO. In the future, we expect the emphasis in Asia more and more to be placed on U.S. support to our allies who themselves will provide the required ground forces manpower.

c. Tactical Air Forces - Forces, Capabilities, Missions and Manpower

The threat discussed earlier poses a wide range of potential conflict situations in which military response might be required. The tactical air force structure described in this section provides to the National Command Authorities a variety of options, ranging from small, conventional deployments to large scale conventional and/or tactical nuclear operations. These forces are being structured to provide the responsiveness, positive control, and overall capability to meet the requirements of our strategy.

The flexible nature of tactical air forces enables elements of the combat and supporting forces to be deployed as a package to meet threats to our national interests at the level of theater or sub-theater conflict. These contingency force packages can be configured to expressly counter threats to our allies or for minor contingency situations where rapid reinforcement or force presence may be required.

1. Summary of Forces

In order to meet the tactical air portion of national strategy goals, the forces shown in the following table are planned for FY76-FY77. Forces for FY74 and FY75 are shown for comparison. As can be seen in this table, all military assets are considered in force planning. For example, the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve tactical aircraft are included in the table, and are an integral part of planned deployments.

U.S. Tactical Air Forces

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Active</u>				
Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings (TFW)	22	22	22	22
Air Force Reconnaissance Sq	13	13	9	9
Navy Fighter/Attack Sq	68	70	65	65
Recon/Early Warning Sq	30	31	32	32
CVA/CVAN/CV	14	15	13	13
Marine Fighter/Attack Sq	25	25	25	25
Marine Recon/ECM Sq	3	3	2	2
<u>Reserve</u>				
Air National Guard Fighter/Attack Sq 1/	29	31	30	30
ANG Reconnaissance Sq	7	7	9	9
Air Force Reserve Fighter/Attack Sq	7	7	7	7
Naval Air Reserve Tactical Air Sq	18	16	16	16

1/ Includes two training squadrons.

U.S. Tactical Air Forces Manpower (End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Active Military</u>				
Navy	61.4	68.6	65.9	65.7
Marine Corps	27.6	28.2	28.2	28.2
Air Force	73.9	72.9	74.6	75.0
Total	162.9	169.7	168.7	168.9
<u>Civilians (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>				
Navy	-	-	-	-
Marine Corps	-	-	-	-
Air Force	13.2	14.3	14.8	14.9

The increase in military manpower from FY 74-75 represents the introduction of three new Navy squadrons. Also the FY 74 Actual for Navy tactical air forces was below program. The Air Force increase in FY 76 results from improvement in tactical fighter crew ratio and introduction of F-5Es, partially offset by transfer of four reconnaissance squadrons to Reserve forces. The specific changes in the size, structure, and manning of tactical air forces are discussed in the appropriate Service chapters.

2. Capabilities of Tactical Air Forces

Tactical aircraft have the capabilities to carry out a variety of missions in a conflict. These capabilities include close air support, interdiction, counterair (including air defense), reconnaissance, and special purpose missions.

a. Close Air Support (CAS)

Close air support sorties are flown against enemy forces in close proximity to friendly forces. Primary goals of close air support are: (1) to destroy or neutralize enemy forces close to friendly forces; (2) to attack these enemy forces rapidly after receiving requests for close air support; and (3) to attack other enemy targets near the front line which cannot be engaged by other supporting arms due to time, location, or other constraints. CAS systems should be able to: (1) deliver accurate, lethal fire; (2) provide fire support responsive to the ground commander; (3) survive in likely enemy air defense environments; (4) maneuver well enough to employ tactics on various targets; and (5) carry ordnance in sufficient quantity and variety.

b. Interdiction

On land, interdiction sorties are flown by both land and sea based tactical aircraft against a wide range of targets including: (1) enemy forces maneuvering behind their front lines; (2) enemy lines of communication, and (3) storage and production facilities in rear areas. At sea, land based and sea based aircraft fly interdiction sorties against enemy surface ships such as surface-to-surface missile launching patrol boats, cruisers, and destroyers as well as enemy ports and naval bases.

c. Counterair

Counterair operations are conducted to gain and maintain air supremacy by destruction or neutralization of an enemy's air capability. Offensive counterair operations are normally conducted throughout enemy territory to seek out and destroy aircraft in the air or on the ground, missile and anti-aircraft artillery sites, air bases, air control systems, and other elements which constitute or support the enemy air order of battle. Defensive counterair operations are generally reactive to enemy initiative. Air defense sorties are flown to protect friendly air, sea, or ground forces from enemy air attack. The primary objective is to limit the effectiveness of enemy air efforts to a level permitting freedom of action to friendly forces of all types.

d. Reconnaissance

Tactical reconnaissance resources are a vital part of the information collection capability available to commanders engaged in unilateral, joint, or combined operation in peacetime and in all intensities of warfare. Tactical air reconnaissance operations provide timely intelligence information concerning the enemy's installations, lines of

communication, and electronic emissions, as well as the disposition, composition, and movement of enemy forces. Intelligence information is collected, and surveillance of battle areas is carried out day and night and in all kinds of weather.

e. Special Purpose

Special purpose aircraft are used in electronic warfare (detection of and countermeasures against enemy electronic emitters), special operations forces (for example, specifically tailored for unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency operations), tactical air control (enroute and terminal control of tactical aircraft), and airborne early warning (airborne search radar).

3. Tactical Air Forces Employments

a. NATO

In the NATO central region, Allied ground forces are quantitatively inferior to Warsaw Pact ground forces, especially armor. NATO, however, has a substantial tactical air capability that can assist in countering a Pact armored assault. U.S. ground attack aircraft, earmarked to NATO, possess the capabilities which could be used to advantage against Pact armored units, provided NATO tactical air forces can achieve a local numerical superiority over Pact air forces. The Warsaw Pact has developed a tactical air force with major emphasis on air defense and has combined this force with an extensive ground radar network complemented by anti-aircraft guns and surface-to-air missiles.

The NATO southern flank (Greece, Turkey, and Italy) is of increasing concern because of the Middle East situation. Both land-based U.S. Air Force and carrier-based U.S. Navy tactical aircraft would be employed on this flank. In addition, U.S. Marine Corps tactical aircraft are a reserve that could be used in any of the NATO regions.

b. Asia

The Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps would provide tactical air support for conflicts in Asia. Because of the proximity of Vietnam and Korea to open seas and the current lack of a serious naval or air threat, the utility of carriers is enhanced in Asia. Problems associated with Asian conflicts include the distance for resupply and the possibility of conflict in two theaters, Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. Tactical air provides the United States with the ability to provide rapid and significant support in these conflicts without involving substantial land forces. In addition, tactical air forces provide flexibility against the spectrum of conflicts possible in these areas.

c. Sea Lane Protection

Our dependence on sea lines of communication necessitates their protection. Tactical air for sea lane protection will be provided by the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. The mission involves defending both military and support shipping against bombers with air-to-surface missiles and cruise missiles, and from cruise missile firing surface ships and submarines. By using carriers and bases in both the United States and allied countries, U.S. tactical air can provide the defensive umbrella necessary to maintain the sea lines of communication essential in both NATO and Asian conflicts.

d. Contingencies

The high degree of readiness maintained by the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force tactical air forces enhances their value in contingency situations. Navy carriers, Marine Corps Short Airfield for Tactical Support (SATS) installations, and the Air Force forward base posture and capability to deploy to and sustain operations from bare bases provide a flexibility that will allow contingencies to be met in almost any part of the world.

D. Naval Forces - Strategy, Missions, and Threat

U.S. Naval forces planning is less tied to specific theater assumptions than is planning for land or tactical air forces. Accordingly, the strategy and threat for naval forces were not discussed earlier in the NATO and Asian sections of this report.

1. Strategy and Missions

The principal wartime mission required of U.S. general purpose naval forces is, in conjunction with NATO allied forces in a NATO war, to be able to protect naval forces at sea, military support shipping, and an austere level of economic support shipping against a Soviet conventional interdiction effort. In addition, U.S. forces in the Pacific should simultaneously be capable of supplementing the forces of our Pacific allies to insure that a minimum necessary level of supplies can be maintained against expected threats to the sea lanes.

There also exists a requirement for naval forces to be capable of projecting power ashore and responding to small-scale conflicts elsewhere. In this regard, the Navy maintains a capability with its peacetime deployed forces to respond to crisis situations anywhere in the world with appropriate forces.

2. Threat

a. The Soviet navy possesses a large submarine force including both nuclear and diesel long-range attack submarines. Included in the

Soviet submarine force are several classes of cruise-missile launching submarines which appear to have been developed to counter the U.S. and allied surface naval forces.

b. Soviet naval aviation possesses long-range, air-to-surface missile-armed bombers which can be projected against both naval forces and shipping in the sea lanes and can be augmented by similar aircraft from Soviet long-range aviation forces. The Soviets also possess a sizable force of long-range reconnaissance aircraft of sufficient range and endurance to be employed in either the Atlantic or Pacific.

c. The Soviet navy includes a substantial surface force of both combatant and support ships. Although these forces have limited access to the open ocean, they have been increasing their overseas deployments in peacetime and developing the capability for sustained operations in the open ocean. While the Soviets are fitting out their first aircraft carrier, they do not yet possess sea based tactical aircraft and, consequently, lack a strong organic air defense capability. As a result, Soviet surface ships appear most suitable for surprise attacks at the initiation of hostilities or defensive operations within interceptor range of Soviet bases.

3. Planning Assumptions

Planning for general purpose naval forces begins with estimates of U.S. and allied land and tactical air forces needed to meet planned objectives in various areas of the world. These estimates include the requirement for both naval tactical air forces and for amphibious forces. Military shipping requirements are then sized to support the U.S. and allied forces committed in each theater.

Next, the economic support shipping required to sustain the countries allied with the United States during the conflict must be determined. Economic support shipping includes oil, which has recently taken on added significance. An austere level of economic support is envisioned rather than the full peacetime level. In addition, a brief cessation of economic shipping is considered during the early stages of a conflict to allow shipping to be organized into convoys and to allow naval forces to counter the high degree of threat to the sea lanes anticipated early in a conflict.

With projection forces and military and economic shipping requirements determined, support force and sea control force requirements can be developed. Support forces (replenishment ships, tenders, and repair ships) are sized to provide logistics and materiel support to naval forces from forward sites.

Protection forces are sized to provide protection to other naval forces and mercantile shipping against the surface, submarine, and air threat in the areas where naval operations are planned and shipping must transit. The appropriate level of such forces depends on such factors as

the number of forces or ships requiring protection, the size and sophistication of the expected threat, and the geography involved. A mix of forces with different types of weapon systems, both land-based and sea-based, is employed. This mix of forces provides defense in depth, takes advantage of geographic "choke points", and achieves a realistic balance among area, barrier, and point-defense forces.

In sizing our naval forces, we must take into consideration more than just the level of wartime activity in any one land theater. This is because the Soviet Union may extend hostilities at sea into areas far removed from a concurrent land war where the United States and our allies must maintain essential sea lanes. It is necessary, therefore, to plan U.S. naval forces worldwide.

Finally, in planning U.S. naval forces, the total capabilities of both the United States and our allies must be considered. U.S. and allied land-based aircraft can contribute significantly toward countering threats to shipping and naval forces. Additionally, U.S. allies possess significant naval capabilities, including forces and equipment that have been obtained, financed, or modernized with U.S. assistance. These forces generally compare favorably with all but the newest high-technology U.S. Naval forces. Of course, the contributions of Allied naval forces depends on similar perceptions of the threat.

4. Naval Forces and Manpower

The following table shows the Naval forces existing at end FY 74 and those programmed for FY 75, FY 76, FY 77, and FY 77.

<u>Naval Forces</u> ^{1/}				
	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Active Ships</u>				
Carriers	14	15	13 ^{3/}	13 ^{3/}
Attack Submarines	73	75	78	79
Nuclear	(61)	(64)	(68)	(69)
Diesel	(12)	(11)	(10)	(10)
Surface Combatants ^{2/}	199	199	198	200
Amphibious Forces ^{2/}	66	64	66	67
Support Forces	123	114	105	105
Underway Replenishment	(49)	(45)	(41)	(41)
Major Fleet Support	(22)	(20)	(20)	(20)
Minor Fleet Support	(52)	(49)	(44)	(44)
Patrol Craft ^{2/}	14	14	15	15
Minesweepers ^{2/}	25	25	25	25
Total	<u>515</u>	<u>506</u>	<u>500</u>	<u>504</u>
<u>Active ASW Squadrons</u>				
Land Based	24	24	24	24
Ship Based	23	23	27	27
Total	<u>47</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>51</u>	<u>51</u>

^{1/} Table includes ships in other General Purpose Force categories (e.g. carriers which support Tactical Air Forces.) It excludes Strategic Force ships, PDT&E ships and the ship assigned to Central Support Forces (Individual Training).

^{2/} Naval Reserve Destroyers, Amphibious Vessels, Patrol Craft and Minesweepers are included because of their sizable active duty nucleus crews. The totals also include 2 DLG's under conversion in FY 74 and 1 in conversion in FY 75.

^{3/} Thirteenth carrier is not routinely deployed in peacetime.

The following table displays Naval forces manpower for FY 74-77.

U.S. Naval Forces Manpower

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Active Military</u>				
Navy	172.5	173.3	172.0	172.5
Marine Corps	.7	.6	.6	.5
Total	<u>173.2</u>	<u>173.9</u>	<u>172.6</u>	<u>173.0</u>
<u>Navy Civilians (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>	.3	.3	.3	.3

E. Mobility Forces - Strategy, Missions, Forces & Capabilities

1. Strategy

As part of our overall goal to maintain a realistic deterrent posture one aspect is to maintain a capability that will bring our forces to bear quickly whenever and wherever necessary. Mobility forces provide this flexibility.

2. Missions

Mobility forces could be used in a variety of situations, ranging from a show of force to an all-out conventional war. Present planning for the spectrum of possible deployments involves principally military and U.S. commercial assets. However, in the case of a war in Europe we have adjusted our planning to include NATO Allied participation in assisting U.S. deployments.

3. Forces and Capabilities

Mobility forces consist of strategic and tactical airlift, sealift, pre-positioned equipment, mobility support forces including air and sea terminals, aerospace rescue and recovery, and aeromedical evacuation units.

a. Airlift

(1) Strategic Airlift

Strategic airlift provides the capability to rapidly deploy forces or critical logistical support to any part of the world. Our military strategic airlift force consists of both Active and Reserve Associate Units. The Active force is comprised of four C-5 and thirteen C-141 squadrons.

In addition to the military assets, U.S. commercial airlines have committed 246 long-range aircraft to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program. Of these, 156 are cargo or passenger/cargo convertible aircraft and 90 are passenger-only aircraft.

(2) Tactical Airlift

In contrast to strategic airlift which provides deployment capability from CONUS to overseas areas, tactical airlift provides transportation and air logistic support for theater forces. Our active tactical airlift force consists of 15 C-130E squadrons. This active force is augmented by the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard Forces, which maintain 30 C-130, 4 C-123, and 3 C-7 squadrons.

(3) Aerospace Rescue and Recovery

The aerospace rescue and recovery forces provide a rapid global deployment capability to meet contingency or emergency rescue requirements. Additionally, this force is manned to furnish regional search and rescue coordination for the inland/CONUS region and Alaska. The active force is composed of HC-130 fixed wing aircraft and HH-53, H-3 and H-1 helicopters. As with airlift, the active force is augmented by Reserve forces operating HC-130, H-3 and H-1 aircraft.

(4) Aeromedical Evacuation

The aeromedical evacuation system provides the capability to move patients as expeditiously as possible to hospitals for care commensurate with their condition. The active force consists of a C-9 CONUS squadron and two theater C-9 squadrons in the Pacific and Europe. The CONUS unit is augmented by a Reserve Associate squadron. These units interface with the strategic airlift system to provide an overall medical evacuation capability.

b. Sealift

We rely heavily on sealift for military requirements to deploy and sustain our forces. The ships controlled by the Military Sealift Command have only a limited capability. We are reliant on U.S. flag ships, the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) and the ships of our allies to provide the necessary sealift both in a major war and in contingencies short of war.

4. Mobility Forces Manpower

The following table displays the Mobility Forces manpower requirement.

<u>Mobility Forces Manpower</u>				
	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Army	.6	.6	.6	.6
Navy	.3	.3	.3	.3
Air Force	<u>39.8</u>	<u>38.7</u>	<u>37.8</u>	<u>37.8</u>
Total	<u>40.7</u>	<u>39.6</u>	<u>38.7</u>	<u>38.7</u>
<u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>				
Army	4.0	4.0	3.7	3.7
Navy	5.4	5.2	5.6	5.6
Air Force	<u>13.7</u>	<u>14.2</u>	<u>14.5</u>	<u>14.5</u>
Total	<u>23.1</u>	<u>23.4</u>	<u>23.8</u>	<u>23.8</u>

The change in Air Force military manpower in FY 76 reflects a modest increase in the C-5 active crew ratio from 2.0 to 2.5 offset by the transfer of two C-130 squadrons to the Air Reserve Forces. Specific details of all changes are reflected in the appropriate Service chapters.

F. FY 77 General Purpose Forces Manpower

The following table displays General Purpose Forces manpower requirements for FY 77 compared to FY 77.

General Purpose Forces Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilian</u> (Direct and Indirect)	
	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Land Forces</u>	<u>556.5</u>	<u>560.5</u>	<u>42.1</u>	<u>43.6</u>
<u>Tactical Air Forces</u>	<u>168.9</u>	<u>171.3</u>	<u>14.9</u>	<u>15.0</u>
<u>Naval Forces</u>	<u>173.0</u>	<u>182.5</u>	<u>.3</u>	<u>.3</u>
<u>Mobility Forces</u>	<u>38.7</u>	<u>38.5</u>	<u>23.8</u>	<u>24.1</u>
<u>Total General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>937.1</u>	<u>952.7</u>	<u>81.1</u>	<u>83.0</u>
<u>Direct Hire Only</u>			<u>69.2</u>	<u>70.0</u>

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

Land, air, and naval forces are all planned to increase during FY 77 as part of the continuing effort to improve the combat capability of U.S. General Purpose forces. Specific details are contained in the Service chapters.

CHAPTER VI

AUXILIARY FORCES

Auxiliary Forces carry out major defense-wide programs under centralized DoD control. These programs include Intelligence and Security, Communications, Research and Development, Support to Other Nations, and Geophysical Activities. The following table shows the manpower for fiscal years FY74-7T.

DoD Auxiliary Forces Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
<u>Military Personnel</u>				
Intelligence & Security	55.6	52.6	42.5	41.8
Centrally Managed				
Communications	46.0	38.8	38.1	38.1
Research & Development	32.3	32.5	32.0	31.9
Support to Other				
Nations	4.3	3.6	3.4	3.4
Geophysical Activities	13.4	12.4	11.1	11.1
Total Military	<u>151.5</u>	<u>139.9</u>	<u>127.0</u>	<u>126.2</u>
Military in Defense				
Agencies included above	(6.5)	(5.9)	(5.6)	(5.6)
<u>Civilian Personnel</u>				
<u>(Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>				
Intelligence & Security	10.2	10.1	9.6	9.6
Centrally Managed				
Communications	16.5	14.7	14.2	14.2
Research & Development	86.0	85.2	79.6	79.9
Support to Other				
Nations	2.3	2.6	2.6	2.6
Geophysical Activities	10.4	10.3	10.5	10.5
Total Civilian	<u>125.4</u>	<u>122.9</u>	<u>116.5</u>	<u>116.8</u>
Civilians in Defense				
Agencies included above	(12.2)	(11.8)	(11.9)	(11.9)

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

A. Intelligence and Security

This category includes the centralized intelligence gathering agencies of the Department of Defense. Their operations are primarily directed toward the development of national or strategic intelligence for use in strategic planning and national intelligence estimates. In addition to their role of satisfying national intelligence requirements, intelligence units also provide some support to tactical commanders. We plan these activities on a completely integrated basis to insure that there is no unnecessary duplication of effort. As a result of centralized direction, substantial manpower efficiencies have been achieved without significant impacts on intelligence effectiveness.

Intelligence resource policies and controls are exercised by the Secretary of Defense, whose principal advisor in these matters is the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence). The specific requirements for the intelligence collection activities are established at many levels. The Services establish their requirements for intelligence to support force planning, field operations, and research and development. The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff compiles its own intelligence requirements together with those of the Unified and Specified Commands. These and other strategic guidance policy statements from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) form the basis for budget and manpower allocations. Intelligence consumers, as well as non-DoD members of the Intelligence community rely heavily on the intelligence provided by DoD.

The manning of individual intelligence units is determined by functional requirements, engineered standards, and other manning criteria. These normal manning authorizations are altered from time to time to fit unusual situations. The criteria for these authorizations have been arrived at through experience, and they are modified as broad missions of the staffs change, as science and technology impact on the methods and procedures of intelligence, and as actual combat experience requires. Combat and combat related intelligence units must, of necessity, be manned by military personnel. Also, military experience and expertise have proven essential in the various intelligence planning, management and analysis functions to bring specialized military experience to bear on the intelligence activities. A cadre of civilian personnel is essential for continuity and for specialized skills not routinely available through military sources.

The manpower of the Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program (CDIP) can be divided into two major subcategories according to program responsibility and management:

1. Cryptologic Program. Cryptologic activities are managed by the Director, National Security Agency and consist of the resources required

to carry out the mission of the National Security Agency which involves the performance of highly specialized technical functions in support of the intelligence activities of the United States. Resources included are those authorized and appropriated by the Congress for selected intelligence organizations of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Detailed management of these programs is vested in the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service, who has been assigned three basic responsibilities for this purpose under the Secretary of Defense:

- Organizing, operating, and managing certain activities and facilities for the production of intelligence information.
- Organizing and coordinating the research and engineering activities of the U.S. Government which are in support of the agency's assigned functions; and
- Regulating certain communications in support of agency missions.

At the direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director, National Security Agency, prepared a manpower reduction plan which would effect reductions in cryptologic activities over the time frame FY 74-FY 78. By consolidating certain intelligence activities world-wide, modernizing operations to a maximum degree consistent with advances in research and development, and streamlining headquarters and staff support, these manpower reductions will be achieved by holding mission reductions to the minimum possible to lessen the operational impact on the intelligence consumer.

Certain other transfer adjustments have been made to the manpower levels for Intelligence and Security since the submission of the Manpower Requirements Report for FY 1975. During the review of the FY75 Budget, Congress directed that a number of direct support spaces, which had previously been transferred to General Purpose Forces, be retained in the Intelligence and Security category. Subsequent to that decision, approval was received to proceed with the transfer beginning in FY 76. Additionally, 4,800 cryptologic training spaces have been transferred to Central Support Forces and 1,900 spaces to the Trainee account in line with the overall consolidation of training activities within Defense.

2. General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP)

General Defense Intelligence activities are under the program managership of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence). These programs contain resources for those programs that collect intelligence information by human and technical means, process such data, and produce

finished intelligence for intelligence users and decision makers throughout the Department of Defense.

Also, in response to a Deputy Secretary of Defense tasking, a manpower reduction plan was prepared for the GDIP covering the period FY74-FY78. In the FY 76-FY 78 time frame GDIP activities will be reduced approximately 1,000 spaces. These reductions will be achieved by consolidating certain activities, eliminating intelligence functions at several locations, and by reduction of remaining activities. As in the case of manpower reductions to the cryptologic activities program, the impact on mission operations dealing with intelligence production against high priority objectives will be minimal.

Intelligence and Security Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Army	18.0	17.2	10.1	9.6
Navy	11.3	10.9	9.7	9.6
Marine Corps	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.0
Air Force	<u>25.2</u>	<u>23.4</u>	<u>21.6</u>	<u>21.6</u>
Total	<u>55.6</u>	<u>52.6</u>	<u>42.5</u>	<u>41.8</u>
<u>Civilian</u> <u>(Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>				
Army	2.6	2.6	2.3	2.3
Navy	1.8	1.9	1.8	1.8
Air Force	3.0	3.0	2.8	2.8
*Defense Agencies	<u>2.7</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>2.7</u>
Total	<u>10.2</u>	<u>10.1</u>	<u>9.6</u>	<u>9.6</u>

*Excludes NSA for security reasons.

B. Centrally Managed Communications (CMC)

This category consists of the key worldwide dedicated and common-user communications systems of the Defense Department required to support and implement overall national security policy and objectives. Central management avoids duplication of effort and improves the responsiveness of these communications systems to our national command authorities. The manpower resources associated with these systems are primarily those that operate and maintain dedicated command and control networks and common-user systems for the National Command Authorities, all elements of DoD, and other governmental agencies. Additionally, CMC includes the manpower involved in communications security.

Command and control of our forces is exercised through the Defense Communications System and the Military Service Communications Systems. The communications requirements are established based on current and projected deployment of our forces, i.e., number, type and location of installations and the distances between locations. Then, based on prior experience and the expressed needs of the field commander, the required capacity for each of several modes of communications (e.g., voice, teletype, etc.) is determined. Each such operating location is manned based on the number of operating positions to be filled, maintenance manhours required, and the need for administration and support. Therefore, personnel strengths to operate and maintain the systems are not directly correlated to the size of the forces being supported. The total strength of the communications category is determined by the number of operating locations, the manning of each, and additional personnel for supervision and support of the system.

The table below reflects the functional breakout of DoD manpower in centrally managed communications:

DoD Centrally Managed Communications
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military Personnel</u>				
Defense Communications				
Sys	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3
Services' Communications				
Sys	36.9	30.0	29.5	29.5
Satellite Communications	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8
Communication Security	1.9	2.1	2.1	2.1
Engineering and				
Installation	5.0	4.5	4.3	4.3
Military Total	<u>46.0</u>	<u>38.8</u>	<u>38.1</u>	<u>38.1</u>
<u>Civilian Personnel</u>				
Defense Communications				
Sys	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
Services' Communications				
Sys	10.0	7.9	7.4	7.4
Satellite Communications	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Communication Security	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.4
Engineering and				
Installation	3.0	3.2	3.2	3.2
Civilian Total	<u>16.5</u>	<u>14.7</u>	<u>14.2</u>	<u>14.2</u>

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

The decreasing and then stabilizing trend of the Defense Departments communications manpower reflects the large drawn-down following the Vietnam conflict and the reductions in staffing of the Service Communications Management organizations. The increase in Navy manpower in FY 75 reflects the addition of previously programmed increases for FY 74 that were delayed pending availability of new equipment.

The category Centrally Managed Communications is summarized below by military department:

Centrally Managed Communications Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Army	12.1	8.3	8.3	8.3
Navy	9.6	10.8	11.0	11.0
Marine Corps	*	*	*	*
Air Force	24.3	19.7	18.8	18.8
Military Total	46.0	38.8	38.1	38.1
<u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>				
Army	4.4	3.5	3.6	3.6
Navy	4.3	4.3	4.1	4.1
Air Force	6.5	5.6	5.3	5.3
Defense Agencies	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.2
Civilian Total	16.5	14.7	14.2	14.2

*Less than 50 spaces.

Telecommunications and Command and Control Systems

The CMC category does not represent the full scope of communications management effort in DoD. To insure that reliable, survivable and cost-effective communications are available to the National Command Authorities, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has expanded the area of responsibility of the Director of Telecommunications and Command and Control Systems (DTACCS). DTACCS has organized its area of responsibility into two major functional categories: (1) the consolidated telecommunications program (CTP) and (2) the World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS).

Consolidated Telecommunications. The functional grouping known as the CTP consists of all dedicated and common user DoD communications systems except those that are integral to weapons systems or in

direct support of combat units. Specific examples of communications systems within the CTP other than those included in the CMC category are: (1) general support communications systems both organic and non-organic to military units; (2) Post, Camp and Station communications; and (3) telecommunications for command and control. CTP manpower dispersed throughout other DPPC categories in this report is based upon the size, composition, and mission of the forces supported.

CTP manpower in the Strategic Forces category includes the National Military Command System, ANMCC, NEACP, Safeguard, Fleet Ballistic Missile Control, and a number of Air Force Systems such as SAC and TITAN. General Purpose Forces include such telecommunications systems as TRI-TAC, AF Tactical Air Command and Control, and Army combat support and combat service support systems. In the Mission Support Forces are the Base Communications for SAC, TAC, MAC, ADC, operational commands for the Army both overseas and CONUS and Navy support centers in support of the Fleet. In Central Support Forces are Base Communications in support of the logistic, training, medical and administrative commands of the Services.

Command and Control. The system known as WWMCCS is a critical component of the DoD structure as it provides for command and control of US forces by the President and the Secretary of Defense during a time of national emergency. Because of the crucial nature of the system, the Secretary of Defense has vested policy and resource management in the WWMCCS Council which is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and includes the DTACCS, the ASD(I), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as members. For management purposes WWMCCS assets have been subdivided so that DTACCS manages WWMCCS Communications, ADP and NMCS and Command Posts while the ASD(I) manages the WWMCCS Warning System.

The details of these resources to include specific management concepts and trends will be addressed by the DTACCS in his testimony before the committees of the Congress.

C. Research and Development

A successful R&D effort must provide two essential products: (1) effective weapons systems to deter war and respond to aggression, and (2) a continuous flow of initiatives and options out of the base of science and advanced technology and into development projects so that we can respond to the continuously changing environment of danger and opportunity. This environment is paced by surging technological improvements the Soviet Union is aggressively making to its forces. A productive R&D process is dependent on an advanced and rigorous base of science and technology. In turn, national defense depends in the long run on the options and initiatives that can be extracted from this science and technology, and the related test and evaluation effort required for successful systems development.

This category contains the manpower responsible for carrying out the R&D programs necessary to meet the above objectives. This manpower conducts the work performed in the 110 Laboratories and Test and Evaluation facilities of the DoD and also manages contracted R&D outside the DoD. Within these functions new weapons concepts originate and progress toward becoming weapon systems. This work encompasses virtually all aspects of the physical, biomedical, environmental, and behavioral sciences, plus the engineering disciplines. It is characterized by breadth, complexity and constant change. The DoD R&D workforce is comprised of the following balance of military and civilian manpower (by Service, by function in thousands):

DoD Research and Development Activities
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>		<u>FY 75</u>		<u>FY 76</u>		<u>FY 77</u>	
	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ
<u>Army</u>								
Laboratories	2.0	8.2	2.2	8.5	2.1	7.2	2.1	7.2
Advanced & Engineering Projects	0.8	7.7	0.7	7.8	0.7	7.5	0.7	7.6
Test Activities	4.2	4.7	4.4	5.1	4.4	4.8	4.4	4.8
Other	0.8	2.9	0.4	2.1	0.4	1.9	0.4	2.1
Total	<u>7.8</u>	<u>23.5</u>	<u>7.7</u>	<u>23.5</u>	<u>7.6</u>	<u>21.4</u>	<u>7.6</u>	<u>21.7</u>
<u>Navy</u>								
Laboratories	1.9	29.0	2.2	28.3	2.3	26.6	2.3	26.6
Test Activities	3.6	9.6	3.5	9.5	3.5	9.0	3.4	9.0
RDT&E Project Ships	0.7	-	0.8	-	0.8	-	0.8	-
Other	0.2	0.8	0.1	0.8	0.1	0.8	0.1	0.8
Total	<u>6.4</u>	<u>39.5</u>	<u>6.6</u>	<u>38.6</u>	<u>6.7</u>	<u>36.4</u>	<u>6.6</u>	<u>36.4</u>
<u>Marine Corps</u>								
Combat Dev Activities	0.7	-	0.7	-	0.7	-	0.7	-
<u>Air Force</u>								
Laboratories	2.3	6.1	2.2	6.0	2.1	5.6	2.1	5.6
Divisions	4.6	7.4	4.5	7.3	4.6	6.9	4.6	6.9
Test Centers	8.2	6.2	8.8	6.6	8.4	6.3	8.4	6.3
Test Ranges (Eastern)	1.1	1.7	1.0	1.7	1.0	1.6	1.0	1.6
Other	1.2	1.3	1.0	1.2	0.9	1.1	0.9	1.1
Total	<u>17.4</u>	<u>22.7</u>	<u>17.5</u>	<u>22.8</u>	<u>17.0</u>	<u>21.5</u>	<u>17.0</u>	<u>21.5</u>

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

Military experience and expertise has proven essential in transitioning military requirements through the design, development, test and evaluation phases toward the final production of effective weapons systems. Military personnel are heavily used in test activities, where they possess and maintain operational skills and professional backgrounds which are unavailable in the civilian labor market, e.g., current experience in aircraft carrier landings.

Civilian R&D manpower is required to efficiently execute the RDT&E program, to provide essential continuity in the performance of in-house military oriented research, development, test and evaluation, to provide expertise not readily available from military resources, and to maintain an adequate in-house capability. Civilian manpower is involved in all aspects of the operation and control of the RDT&E program. Civilian scientific and engineering personnel must be available and have the capability to discover and exploit new development and ideas that will be beneficial in the efficient operation of the total R&D mission as well as improve the effectiveness of combat forces. The DoD must have enough in-house personnel qualified to adequately monitor the contractors engaged in research and development activities. They must also be able to efficiently and economically operate the R&D in-house establishment from the laboratory to the test ranges.

Reductions in R&D manpower reflect implementation of recommendations resulting from reviews of the RDT&E organizational structure. The purpose of the reductions is (1) to reverse the trend toward a larger portion of the R&D work being conducted in-house, to restore a proper balance between in-house/industrial/university R&D efforts; (2) to take advantage of gains that could be made by increased productiveness of R&D personnel; and (3) to take advantage of organization changes to increase efficiency.

Examples of organizational changes in FY 76 which will result in increased efficiencies and manpower reductions are the disestablishment of the Air Force Special Weapons Center, the Aerospace Research Laboratory, and the consolidation of Air Force flight test activities from six to three locations, thus improving utilization of aircraft and modification facilities and reducing management overhead.

A summary of R&D manpower is shown below:

Research and Development Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Army	7.8	7.7	7.6	7.6
Navy	6.4	6.6	6.7	6.6
Marine Corps	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7
Air Force	17.4	17.5	17.0	17.0
Total	<u>32.3</u>	<u>32.5</u>	<u>32.0</u>	<u>31.9</u>
<u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>				
Army	23.5	23.5	21.4	21.7
Navy/Marine Corps	39.5	38.6	36.4	36.4
Air Force	22.7	22.8	21.5	21.5
Defense Agencies	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Total	<u>86.0</u>	<u>85.2</u>	<u>79.6</u>	<u>79.9</u>

D. Support to Other Nations

Politically, security assistance provides a major contribution to the maintenance of regional stability. It is also the fundamental mechanism for implementing the concept that U.S. allies can, and should in time, become self-reliant. Self-reliance enhances stability and decreases the probability of U.S. involvement in minor conflicts.

Militarily, the security assistance program makes a significant contribution to overall U.S. national strategy by strengthening the self-defense capability of threatened allies, and thus reducing the magnitude of effort that U.S. forces would need to devote to aid in their defense. U.S. national objectives are also furthered by security assistance in that it serves to foster favorable relations with our allies thus encouraging them to pursue national objectives which are compatible with U.S. foreign policy, including joint use of various military support facilities.

The Department of Defense, in conjunction with the Department of State and the U.S. Ambassador to each host nation, individually tailors

security assistance activities to meet the needs of the country being supported. Approximately 1,800 of the military in this category (53 percent of the total) are authorized in the 44 MAAGs, Missions, and Military Groups worldwide. MAAGs, Missions, and Military Groups perform basically the same functions. Regionally this manpower is divided about 41 percent in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa; about 16 percent in Central and South America, and about 43 percent in Asia and the Western Pacific.

Of the remaining 1,600 military manpower spaces, about 800 are associated with headquarters and administrative support activities in Thailand, such as the Military Assistance Command-Thailand (MACTHAI), the U.S. Support Activities Group (SSAG), and the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC). Additionally, some 700 spaces are associated with U.S. and foreign military training activities, such as the John F. Kennedy Military Assistance Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; the School of the Americas at Fort Gulick, Canal Zone; the MACTHAI Training and Development Detachment at Udorn; and the Technical Assistance Field Teams in Iran. The remaining military personnel are associated with such diverse activities as the Inter-American Defense Board, the United Nations Palestine Truce Observer Teams, the Four Party Joint Military Team in Saigon, and miscellaneous aircraft maintenance, logistical and administrative support of larger security assistance activities.

The civilian manpower in this category provides administrative and technical support to security assistance programs. Approximately, 200 U.S. civilians are associated with MAAGs, Missions, and Military Groups. In keeping with Department of Defense policy, civilian employees fill those positions that do not require military skills.

The manpower devoted to Support to Other Nations is predicated upon the workload at each activity, which is in-turn a function of the magnitude of the security assistance effort in that country. In the following table, military decreases are due to reductions in military assistance activities. Civilian increases are for Foreign Military Sales.

The manpower associated with Support to Other Nations for FY74-7T is:

Support to Other Nations
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Army	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.7
Navy	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Marine Corps	0.1	0.1	*	*
Air Force	<u>2.0</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>1.4</u>
Total DoD	<u>4.3</u>	<u>3.6</u>	<u>3.4</u>	<u>3.4</u>

Support to Other Nations
(End Strengths In Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>				
Army	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.1
Navy	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.3
Air Force	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2
Total	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>2.6</u>

*Less than 50 spaces.

E. Geophysical Activities

This category consists of manpower associated with meteorological, topographic, oceanographic, and navigational activities. These activities provide common services involving geophysical phenomena to the DoD, as well as to other departments and agencies.

Meteorological activities include Air Force weather reconnaissance units, Navy weather centers, and Air Force base weather detachments. Also included are a small number of administrative personnel needed to control the operations of the Air Weather Service and the Navy Weather Service.

Topographic and oceanographic activities involve the preparation, production, and dissemination of maps and charts, and the investigation and evaluation of topographic and oceanographic phenomena. Also included are a small number of administrative personnel needed to control the operations of the Defense Mapping Agency and the Oceanographer of the Navy.

Navigational activities include units which provide Defense-wide navigational support via the operation of navigation satellite control facilities.

Manpower requirements for geophysical activities are predicated upon the services performed at each location and the activity level of all organizations serviced by each location. The manpower needed to provide these services is determined using standard work measurement and work week criteria. As in other categories, civilian manpower is used to provide continuity, to obtain skills not readily available from military sources and to fill billets not absolutely requiring military incumbents. Included are professional meteorologists and oceanographers who supplement the small military officer community in manning weather facilities; meteorological technicians who observe, collect, record and analyze meteorological and oceanographic data in the development of forecasts and related environmental services; technical specialists who perform diverse functions encompassing ADP operations and maintenance, atmospheric and oceanographic modeling, and environmental data product development and dissemination; and a small staff to perform supervisory clerical and logistics functions.

The reductions in active military end strengths for the Navy and the Air Force are the result of force structure changes and transferring to the Reserves a portion of the weather reconnaissance mission. This reposturing of forces provides an adequate number of units to support both the Department of Commerce requirements of providing satisfactory hurricane forecasts/warnings, and the Department of Defense requirements of providing Service oriented weather reconnaissance.

The manpower devoted to the provision of the Defense-wide services associated with geophysical activities for FY74-77 is:

Geophysical Activities
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Army	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Navy	2.3	2.4	2.0	2.0
Air Force	10.9	9.8	8.9	8.9
Total DoD	<u>13.4</u>	<u>12.4</u>	<u>11.1</u>	<u>11.1</u>
<u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>				
Navy	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7
Air Force	0.9	1.0	1.2	1.2
Defense Agencies	7.8	7.6	7.6	7.6
Total DoD	<u>10.4</u>	<u>10.3</u>	<u>10.5</u>	<u>10.5</u>

F. FY 1977 Auxiliary Forces Manpower

Auxiliary Forces Manpower Requirements
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilian</u> <u>(Direct and Indirect)</u>	
	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>				
Intelligence & Security	41.8	41.2	9.6	9.6
Centrally Managed				
Communication	38.1	36.2	14.2	14.2
Research & Development	31.9	31.7	79.9	79.9
Support to Other				
Nations	3.4	3.3	2.6	2.6
Geophysical Activities	<u>11.1</u>	<u>11.0</u>	<u>10.5</u>	<u>10.5</u>
Total	<u>126.2</u>	<u>123.3</u>	<u>116.8</u>	<u>116.8</u>
Direct Hire Only			<u>114.5</u>	<u>114.5</u>

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

2. Change from the FY 77 Request

In the Intelligence and Security area, the manpower programmed for FY 77 continues to reflect reductions attributable to efforts to modernize and consolidate cryptologic activities and a continuation of the manpower reduction plan approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Changes to CMC represent the savings from consolidation, automation, and availability of better equipment such as Optical Character Readers. These readers will eliminate the need for personnel to perform the function of entering messages into a transmission system. R&D reductions are a direct result of the Services continuing their reorganization plans of this function. Only minor changes are apparent in the remaining categories since these have already completed their post-Vietnam reductions.

CHAPTER VII

MISSION SUPPORT FORCES

Combat forces cannot survive in conflict without adequate support. During peacetime, the readiness of our mission forces and their standard of living are the direct products of the support system.

The manpower displayed in the Strategic Forces and General Purpose Forces chapters includes support manpower which is organic to the primary mission forces. Organic support activities are performed by personnel assigned to operating units. Examples include men performing maintenance, supply, and administration in an Army or Marine division or on a ship. Such men are an integral part of operating units. Each Service periodically reviews the composition of its operating units in order to increase the effectiveness per man in each such unit and to provide adequate organic support with the minimum of manpower.

Equally essential to mission accomplishment as organic support manpower are Mission Support Forces. Mission Support Forces consist of activities which are not organic to a specific kind of unit (e.g., division, squadron, or ship), but directly support a group of complementary units (e.g., fighter squadrons, reconnaissance squadrons, and tactical airlift squadrons) devoted to a common mission. Mission Support Forces are categorized separately primarily because they are not fully allocated to a specific kind of operating unit. It should be emphasized that although these forces are categorized separately for accounting purposes they are not programmed independently. Mission Support Forces are an integral part of the primary mission forces being supported.

Thus, comparisons of primary mission elements and mission support elements are of questionable value as managerial or decision-making tools. Our forces are structured to accomplish missions in support of attaining national objectives. The mix of resources required to support these forces is continuously reviewed in an attempt to provide required capability at minimum cost. The definition of what can be included in mission elements varies by Service because of differing organizations and missions: for example, the Navy and Air Force tend to be weapons systems oriented, requiring fewer men directly engaging the enemy than do the Army and Marine Corps.

Modern technology has dramatically increased the combat capability of our forces and permitted reductions in the number of personnel directly exposed to enemy fire. At the same time, more complex weapons have increased the requirements for supply, transportation, and maintenance personnel. For example, systems such as helicopter gunships have been added to the force. While they are very destructive on a per weapon basis they carry with them large support requirements. The net effect has been a decrease in the percentage of men in direct combat positions.

There are many ways to define mission and support and no simple relationship can be used as an adequate measure of whether there is a proper balance between mission forces and support. Any description of a mission to support mix merely shows a relationship between essential components of a total combat force capability. Organization and mission differences also preclude the meaningful presentation of support and combat relationships among the Services.

The remainder of this chapter will discuss the four sub-categories of Mission Support Forces: Reserve Components Support; Base Operating Support; Force Support Training; and Command.

The following table summarizes Mission Support Force manpower.

<u>DoD Mission Support Forces</u> (End-Strengths in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Reserve Components Support	13.6	14.0	13.6	13.6
Base Operating Support	208.9	206.5	199.9	199.9
Force Support Training	33.1	31.8	31.6	31.7
Command	50.5	46.2	44.4	44.2
Total DoD	<u>306.0</u>	<u>298.5</u>	<u>289.4</u>	<u>289.3</u>
<u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>				
Reserve Components Support	20.7	20.5	20.7	20.7
Base Operating Support	189.0	191.4	190.9	191.6
Force Support Training	1.9	2.1	2.1	2.1
Command	13.2	13.2	14.8	14.8
Total DoD	<u>224.8</u>	<u>227.2</u>	<u>228.5</u>	<u>229.2</u>

A. Reserve Components Support

Reserve Components Support consists of those active duty military personnel and civilians who are dedicated to the overall administration of reserve components units, facilities, training programs, and personnel. Included are activities with area responsibilities such as Army Reserve Readiness Regions and Groups, Naval Reserve Districts, Marine Corps Reserve Districts, Air Force Reserve Regions, and National Guard state headquarters. General administrative activities such as the Naval Reserve Manpower Center, and the Air Force Reserve Personnel Center are included. Personnel associated with the operations and maintenance of Army inactive installation garrisons, Army Reserve Training Centers, National Guard Armories, Naval Reserve Training Centers, Naval Reserve Air Stations, Marine Corps Reserve Training Centers, and Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve air bases are included. Manpower associated with two DoD management headquarters, Chief of Naval Reserve and Air Force Reserve, are included.

The following table summarizes Reserve Components Support manpower:

<u>Reserve Components Support</u> (End-Strengths in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Army	5.1	4.9	4.9	4.9
Navy	7.1	7.6	7.6	7.6
Marine Corps	.4	.5	.5	.5
Air Force	1.0	1.0	.6	.6
Total DoD	<u>13.6</u>	<u>14.0</u>	<u>13.6</u>	<u>13.6</u>
<u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>				
Army	10.9	10.8	11.5	11.5
Navy	3.1	3.0	3.1	3.1
Marine Corps	.1	.1	.1	.1
Air Force	6.6	6.6	6.0	6.0
Total DoD	<u>20.7</u>	<u>20.5</u>	<u>20.7</u>	<u>20.7</u>

As shown in the above table, about 63% of the Reserve Component Support manpower is civilian. These personnel provide the necessary continuity of operations by performing a variety of basic support functions in administrative and technical areas. Primarily, they work in such specialties as data programming, public works and clerical support.

In addition to the manpower shown in this sub-category, there are personnel in other categories who also support reserve component units. Most of the additional civilians involved are "technicians," who double as members of the reserve unit. They are included in the DPPC which corresponds to the mission of their unit.

B. Base Operating Support

Base Operating Support (Mission Support Forces) consists primarily of those organizations which operate installations where mission forces are the principal tenant. Occasionally, however, centrally managed support activities are conducted at these same installations. For example, approximately 50% of Navy specialized training is performed at fleet operating installations. The Base Operating Support manpower related to these centrally managed support activities is not separately identifiable from the manpower providing services to Navy mission forces.

Base Operating Support manpower frequently provides services to active duty manpower from more than one Service. For example, approximately eight thousand Marines in Base Operating Support are security guards at Naval Stations.

Many active CONUS installations are used by Reserve and National Guard units as well as active forces. For example, Air Force Reserve strategic airlift squadrons operate from Military Airlift Command (MAC) installations. The Base Operating Support manpower that provides services to Reserve units at active installations is, in most cases, not separately identifiable.

Base Operating Support includes a wide range of diverse services similar to those provided by local government, utilities, and the "service industry" segment of the civilian economy. Included are: (a) services which directly support forces, active and reserve (e.g., airfield operations, wharf operation, and base supply and transportation activities); (b) services which maintain the installation facilities (e.g., building and road construction and repair, police and fire protection, trash and sewage disposal, and utilities operation); (c) services which directly support operating personnel, military and civilian (e.g., food services, laundries, clothing issue, payroll and administrative activities, and housing); and (d) services which maintain the "standard of living" of servicemen, dependents, and retirees (e.g., commissaries, exchanges, theaters, libraries, religious activities, and sports and entertainment facilities).

The requirement for manpower to perform all of these Base Operating Support services depends upon workload. The relationship of workload and manpower for each Base Operating Support service is based on engineered standards and staffing guides which are periodically revised by the Services.

The amount of manpower required in Base Operating Support is dependent upon: (a) the number of installations; (b) the size of the population supported; (c) the composition of the population supported; and (d) the range and level of services provided. The decision to open or retain an installation generates a workload that requires a relatively "fixed" number of people. Activities such as road repair or electrical power plants are relatively insensitive to the number of people supported by the installation, but rather, depend on the existence of the installation. The "fixed" requirements can change over time because of policy decisions to change the level of service provided (e.g., shorter commissary hours, off-duty shuttle buses, etc.).


The "variable" portion of Base Operating Support manpower depends upon the size and composition of the population that is being supported. This population consists of active duty personnel and their dependents, and to a lesser extent, retirees and their dependents, Reserve and National Guard personnel, civilian Defense employees, members of other Uniformed Services (e.g., Coast Guard), and Foreign Service personnel, and their dependents. The active duty serviceman assigned to an installation and accompanied by dependents is the largest consumer of Base Operating Support services.

Organizational differences among the Services, resulting from the operational differences in the way each accomplishes its assigned missions, significantly impact upon the portion of total Service manpower which must be devoted to Base Operating Support. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps Base Operating Support manpower primarily provides "fixed-site" service (e.g., theaters, commissaries, housing, etc.) to self-supporting units. Army and Marine Corps divisions, and Navy ships, provide all "necessary" services (e.g., food services, transportation, supply, etc.) to the manpower integral to the unit. This manpower accompanies combat manpower when a unit leaves an installation to execute an operational mission, and thus is categorized as mission manpower. A portion of Base Operating Support manpower for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps is engaged in providing "necessary" services (e.g., food services, transportation, supply, etc) solely to personnel who are providing "fixed-site" services to the entire installation population.


Conversely, Air Force Base Operating Support manpower not only provides "fixed-site" services to the entire installation population, but also provides all "necessary" services (e.g., food services, transportation, supply, etc.) to the entire population. Air Force operational personnel leave an installation for only a few hours while executing an operational mission (compared to days, or weeks, for the other Services). Air Force support manpower does not accompany operational personnel on operational missions. This support manpower is aggregated into Base Operating Support because it remains at an installation, including those in combat areas; however, it is equally as essential to successful mission accomplishment as support manpower in Army divisions or on Navy ships. Air Force Base Operating Support personnel on Tactical Air Command bases are subject to deployment to combat theaters along with operational units; thus the Air Force must rely more heavily on military personnel in this category than do the Army or the Navy.

The differences in organizational structure among the Services are illustrated in the following comparison of the treatment of typical aggregation categories.

Army, Navy, Marine Corps



Air Force



The following table summarizes Base Operating Support (Mission Support Forces) for FY 74-7T.

Base Operating Support (Mission Support Forces)
(End-Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Army	25.7	26.5	25.8	25.8
Navy	34.1	37.1	36.7	36.7
Marine Corps	18.7	17.6	17.6	17.6
Air Force	130.4	125.3	119.8	119.8
Total DoD	<u>208.9</u>	<u>206.5</u>	<u>199.9</u>	<u>199.9</u>
<u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>				
Army	84.9	89.3	90.8	90.8
Navy	27.1	26.7	26.4	26.4
Marine Corps	10.5	10.7	10.7	11.1
Air Force	66.5	64.7	63.2	63.3
Total DoD	<u>189.0</u>	<u>191.4</u>	<u>190.9</u>	<u>191.6</u>

Military manpower in this sub-category remains fairly constant except for Air Force reductions from FY 1974 to FY 1976 due to force reductions, base closures, and management initiatives to reduce support costs.

Civilian manpower stays relatively constant except for an Army increase from FY 1974 to FY 1976, caused by civilianization, transfers from Centrally Managed Communications, and a mission change for Fort Ord, California, from training to host a new Division.

C. Force Support Training

Force Support Training consists largely of advanced flight training and specialized centers. It provides the necessary link between the specialized, centrally managed training activities that provide individuals the basic skills to do a job, and the operational units themselves. Here individual skills are sharpened and directed toward mission accomplishment in combat. Advanced training is provided by Combat Readiness Air Wings (Navy), Marine Combat Crew Readiness Training Groups, and Combat Crew Training Squadrons (Air Force), in the specific aircraft to be flown into combat, thus making the transition from the undergraduate training aircraft where the basic flying skills are learned to the high performance operational aircraft. When crews leave these units they are ready to join deployed operational units and can fly combat missions.

The Army operates specialized warfare centers (e.g., arctic and jungle warfare), and the Navy operates fleet training centers that perform similar types of functions for teams or entire operational units and ship crews.

In peacetime, all organizations carry out training as part of their normal unit activities. The kind of training discussed above is in addition to this normal training.

The following table summarizes Force Support Training manpower for FY 74-7T.

Force Support Training (End-Strength in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Army	.9	.4	.4	.4
Navy	13.2	12.6	12.5	12.5
Marine Corps	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.8
Air Force	16.1	16.0	15.9	16.0
Total DoD	<u>33.1</u>	<u>31.8</u>	<u>31.6</u>	<u>31.7</u>
<u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>				
Army	.2	.2	.2	.2
Navy	.5	.5	.5	.5
Air Force	1.2	1.4	1.4	1.4
Total DoD	<u>1.9</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>2.1</u>

The manpower in this sub-category is slightly reduced from FY 1974 to FY 1975, and remains relatively constant thereafter.

D. Command

The following subsections describe the various types of activities which are included in the Command (Mission Support Forces) category. It should be noted that the terms Headquarters and Command are not synonymous, as the following discussion indicates.

1. Non-Service Organizations

These organizations include international and unified headquarters and associated administrative support and special activities. The Services provide manpower to these organizations but the JCS determines the number required. Manpower requirements are based upon annual validations of manpower programs by the JCS and periodic manpower surveys based on wartime operational, rather than peacetime administrative considerations. Included are:

a. International Military Headquarters - These headquarters are responsible for the command and control of operating forces of allied nations in combined military operations. They are primarily elements of the military component of NATO. NATO headquarters included are: NATO Military Committee, Supreme Allied Commander-Atlantic, Supreme Allied Commander-Europe, Allied Forces-Northern Europe, Allied Forces-Central Europe, Allied Forces-Southern Europe, and their subsidiary headquarters. Other headquarters included are: Central Treaty Organization, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, North American Air Defense Command, and United Nations Command (Korea).

b. Unified Command Headquarters - These headquarters are responsible for the command and control of operating forces of all Services in unified and coordinated activities under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included are the headquarters of: Continental Air Defense Command, U.S. European Command, Pacific Command and subordinate headquarters, Alaskan Command, U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. Readiness Command.

c. International and Unified Headquarters Support Activities - These organizations include airborne command posts, communication centers, special intelligence activities, and administrative support activities dedicated to and under the control of commanders of international or unified commands.

2. Service Management Headquarters

These headquarters provide Service command and control of deployed (or deployable) forces and forces tasked with the defense of the United States. The headquarters elements of the following organizations are included: U.S. Army-Europe, U.S. Army Forces Command and CONUS numbered Armies, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces-Europe, Numbered Fleets, Navy type Commands (i.e., Naval Air Forces, Submarine Forces, Surface Warfare Forces and Fleet Marine Forces; Strategic Air Command, Alaskan Air Command, Aerospace Defense Command, Tactical Air Command, Pacific Air Force, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, Military Airlift Command, and Numbered Air Forces. The support squadrons associated with the above Air Force major air command headquarters are also included.

3. Service Operating Commands

The organizations provide operational and administrative control of operating forces. Organizations included are: Navy ship groups, ship squadrons, ship divisions, operating control areas, fleet air commands, fleet air wings, and carrier air wings, and Air Force air divisions.

4. Service Administrative Activities

These are separate organizations which perform administrative support activities, such as personnel, finance, data processing, judge advocate (legal), inspection, safety, etc. These organizations are differentiated from headquarters, and operating commands (which also have people performing some of these functions) in that they have no control over any force units.

5. Special Activities

The Command category also includes the following organizations:

a. Combat Developments Activities - These activities are engaged in the development testing, and evaluation of new concepts, tactics, organization structure and equipment requirements, policies, usages of equipment, etc.

b. Ceremonial Activities - These activities consist of Service bands and are primarily associated with unit morale, recruiting and public relations.

c. Mission Evaluation Activities - These organizations evaluate strategic offensive and defensive operational unit effectiveness during daily training exercises. Organizations included are: combat evaluation squadrons (SAC); strategic missile evaluation squadrons; defense systems evaluation squadrons (ADC); and radar evaluation squadrons (ADC and USAFE).

d. Mission Operations/Control Activities - These organizations operate airborne command posts, tactical warfare centers, special communications activities, specialized security activities, tactical intelligence activities and reconnaissance interpretation activities.

e. Logistical Support Activities - These organizations operate special aircraft maintenance activities, munitions activities, aircraft delivery groups, and materiel support activities.

There has been a DoD-wide effort to consolidate or eliminate functions, especially in headquarters and command areas. The following table displays the Command sub-category for FY 1974-7T. The general reduction is due to the efforts at consolidation and elimination. The increase in Navy civilians in FY 1975 is the result of converting 862 foreign nationals from contractor to in-house Navy status, under the Defense Attache Office (DAO), Vietnam. In FY 1976 the 1,800 increase is due to a functional transfer of USMACTHAI support group from the Army. This group has been in Army Strategic Land Forces.

A review of headquarters requirements was directed with the objective of achieving manpower savings which could be reprogrammed into increased combat capability. The command category is reduced by 4,000 from end FY 1974 actual strength to FY 1976 planned strength. This decrease does not include the headquarters reductions which were achieved during FY 1974, after the Secretary of Defense announced the DoD headquarters review in October 1973.

Command (Mission Support Forces)
(End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Army	11.2	9.9	9.4	9.4
Navy	12.8	13.1	12.8	12.8
Marine Corps	2.0	1.4	1.4	1.3
Air Force	<u>24.5</u>	<u>21.8</u>	<u>20.8</u>	<u>20.7</u>
Total DoD	<u>50.5</u>	<u>46.2</u>	<u>44.4</u>	<u>44.2</u>
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>				
Army	3.6	2.9	2.9	2.9
Navy	4.8	6.0	7.8	7.8
Air Force	<u>4.8</u>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>4.1</u>	<u>4.1</u>
Total DoD	<u>13.2</u>	<u>13.2</u>	<u>14.8</u>	<u>14.8</u>

E. FY 1977 Mission Support Forces Manpower

The following table displays the Mission Support Forces manpower required for FY 77 compared to FY 77.

Mission Support Forces Manpower Requirements
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>	
	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Reserve Components Support	13.6	13.6	20.7	20.6
Base Operating Support	199.9	196.8	191.6	190.6
Force Support Training	31.7	32.3	2.1	2.1
Command	<u>44.2</u>	<u>44.0</u>	<u>14.8</u>	<u>14.9</u>
Total DoD	<u>289.3</u>	<u>286.8</u>	<u>229.2</u>	<u>228.2</u>
Direct Hire Only			<u>169.0</u>	<u>167.6</u>

The only significant changes are in Air Force military manpower. The decrease in base operating support reflects anticipated downward adjustments in overseas basing structure. Increases in force support training are predicated on changes in the mix and number of tactical force training aircraft.

CHAPTER VIII

CENTRAL SUPPORT FORCES

Central Support Forces consist of those activities which are not easily associated with a single Defense mission. Included are such activities as depot level supply and maintenance, individual training, "fixed-site" medical facilities, service management headquarters, and support services to all Defense manpower, and to other persons (e.g., retirees) and organizations (e.g., the Coast Guard). By its nature, Central Support Forces manpower is not a direct function of mission force manpower or even total active duty military manpower. For example, depot maintenance manpower repairs equipment for the Reserve Components and allies, and maintains war reserve stocks, in addition to serving active forces requirements.

The remainder of this chapter will discuss the sub-categories of Central Support Forces:

1. Base Operating Support.
2. Medical Support.
3. Personnel Support.
4. Individual Training.
5. Command.
6. Logistics.
7. Federal Agency Support.

The following table summarizes Central Support Forces manpower by sub-category.

<u>DoD Central Support Forces</u> (End Strength in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Base Operating Support				
Support	50.2	46.2	44.9	44.9
Medical Support	86.7	82.4	79.4	79.4
Personnel Support	32.1	31.9	31.5	31.4
Individual Training	134.0	121.6	118.0	118.4
Command	38.3	35.8	35.4	35.3
Logistics	21.0	21.1	20.3	20.2
Federal Agency Support				
Support	3.0	3.8	3.7	3.7
Total DoD	<u>365.4</u>	<u>342.8</u>	<u>333.2</u>	<u>333.4</u>
Military in Defense Agencies included in total above	(3.5)	(3.3)	(3.3)	(3.4)

DoD Central Support Forces
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)				
Base Operating Support	103.8	102.7	99.3	98.1
Medical Support	42.4	45.2	46.5	47.0
Personnel Support	10.6	11.7	11.8	20.0
Individual Training	45.3	48.0	48.1	48.8
Command	60.9	59.1	57.5	57.6
Logistics	402.1	383.1	380.7	379.3
Total DoD	<u>665.1</u>	<u>649.8</u>	<u>624.0</u>	<u>650.7</u>
Civilians in Defense Agencies included in total above	(62.0)	(61.6)	(60.7)	(60.7)

A. Base Operating Support. Base Operating Support (Central Support Forces) manpower provides the same wide range of services as the Base Operating Support manpower discussed in Mission Support Forces. The primary distinction between these two manpower categories is in the "who" is supported rather than the services that are being provided. Therefore, the requirement for Base Operating Support manpower in Central Support is a function of the same workload factors as Base Operating Support manpower in Mission Support Forces.

The following table summarizes Base Operating Support (Central Support Forces) manpower.

Base Operating Support (Central Support Forces)
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Military				
Army	20.1	18.1	17.1	17.1
Navy	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8
Marine Corps	5.6	4.6	4.6	4.6
Air Force	21.7	20.7	20.4	20.4
Total DoD	<u>50.2</u>	<u>46.2</u>	<u>44.9</u>	<u>44.9</u>
Military in Defense Agencies included in total above	(.1)	(.1)	(.1)	(.1)
Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)				
Army	40.8	42.3	39.6	38.3
Navy	21.1	20.7	21.4	21.4
Marine Corps	1.9	1.9	1.7	1.7
Air Force	33.2	31.0	30.1	30.2
Defense Agencies	6.8	6.8	6.5	6.5
Total DoD	<u>103.8</u>	<u>102.7</u>	<u>99.3</u>	<u>98.1</u>

The reduction of Army military manpower associated with Base Operating Support from FY 1974 to FY 1975 is as a result of support reductions in the training establishment and military-to-civilian conversion. The attendant rise in Army civilian manpower during the same period is a result of these conversions, but also includes the transfer of base communications to this category. Conversion of Fort Ord from a training post to one which supports an Army division accounts for the major portion of the military and civilian reductions in FY 1976 and FY 1977. The spaces are transferred to Base Operating Support (Mission Support Forces). The reduction in Air Force military and civilian manpower throughout the period is related to management initiatives such as the reduction of support aircraft.

B. Medical Support.

Medical Support provides the resources for the operation of Department of Defense "fixed-site" medical activities. Not included are tactical medical activities, such as a Surgical Hospital, Mobile, Army.

The Department of Defense operates 204 hospitals and approximately 320 dispensaries and out-patient clinics with a current total of 30,173 operating beds. The Department of Defense operates these medical facilities to provide necessary care for injured and ill servicemen. Pursuant to Chapter 55, Title 10, U.S. Code, medical care is also provided to persons who are not in the active military on a space available basis. In addition to active duty members, 7.4 million retirees, dependents and other beneficiaries are eligible to receive medical care from the Department of Defense. Fifty-four percent of out-patient care (total out-patient visits in FY74 were 50 million) and 58% of the hospital admissions at military facilities were devoted to dependents and retirees in FY74.

Many dependents and retirees either prefer to go to civilian physicians or live in areas where they cannot receive medical care at military facilities due to distance or because of a limited capacity within the medical facility. These people (a figure approximating one million) are reimbursed for a major portion of their medical expenditures through the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS). Expansion of CHAMPUS funding over recent years (224% increase FY68 to FY76) has enabled the Defense Department to meet the medical needs of the dependent population and the increasing retiree population without significant increases in Medical Support manpower.

The following table summarizes Medical Support manpower.

<u>Medical Support</u> (End Strengths in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Army	35.5	32.1	29.9	29.9
Navy	20.0	19.7	19.7	19.7
Air Force	31.2	30.6	29.8	29.8
Total DoD	<u>86.7</u>	<u>82.4</u>	<u>79.4</u>	<u>79.4</u>
Military in Defense				
Agencies included				
in total above	--	--	(.1)	(.2)
<u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>				
Army	25.7	27.3	28.7	29.2
Navy	9.8	10.1	10.0	10.0
Air Force	6.9	7.8	7.4	7.4
Defense Agencies	--	--	.4	.4
Total DoD	<u>42.4</u>	<u>45.2</u>	<u>46.5</u>	<u>47.0</u>

The overall decline in military medical personnel is attributed to substitutions of civilian for military personnel and reductions made possible through consolidation and realignment of headquarters. Civilian increases reflect these conversions and also provides for staffing the new hospital at Walter Reed Army Medical Center.

The manpower for Defense Agency support, beginning in FY 1976, is for CHAMPUS and the Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences, which is discussed more fully in Chapter XIV.

C. Personnel Support

Personnel Support includes manpower to provide miscellaneous services and functions related to active duty military personnel. The major components of this category are: Recruiting and Examining; Counterintelligence and Investigative Activities; Overseas Dependents Education Programs; and Other Personnel Support.

1. Recruiting and Examining

a. Recruiting and Examining manpower operates about 4,800 recruiting offices, and offices which manage recruiting and the 66 Armed Forces Entrance and Examination Stations.

b. Recruiting manpower has increased about 64% since FY70 (the last fiscal year prior to the decision by the President to establish an All Volunteer Force). In FY76, there are approximately 21,100 military personnel and 1,600 civilians associated with recruiting and examining.

2. Counterintelligence and Investigative Activities

Counterintelligence and Investigative Activities manpower performs investigations of applicants for Defense positions requiring security clearance, and operates various programs designed to prevent the compromise of classified information. Included is the manpower for the operation of the Defense Investigative Service.

3. Overseas Dependent Education Program

Overseas Dependent Education Program manpower operates the elementary and secondary school systems for the children of military and Defense civilian personnel stationed outside of the United States. Because of the change in fiscal years end from 30 June to 30 September, some 8,200 personnel associated with this program, who are not employed during summer months, will be included in the end strength beginning FY 1977.

4. Other Personnel Support

Other Personnel Support Manpower is mainly involved in the operation of Army Reception Centers, Disciplinary Barracks (including Rehabilitation and Retraining activities), centrally funded Welfare and Morale Service programs, and the Armed Forces Information Program. In FY76, this category contains approximately 5,300 military personnel and 1,800 civilians.

The following table summarizes Personnel Support manpower.

<u>Personnel Support</u> (End Strengths in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Army	15.2	13.9	13.6	13.6
Navy	6.8	8.1	8.2	8.2
Marine Corps	3.1	2.9	2.9	2.9
Air Force	7.0	7.0	6.8	6.7
Total DoD	<u>32.1</u>	<u>31.9</u>	<u>31.5</u>	<u>31.4</u>
Military in Defense				
Agencies included in				
total above	(.1)	(.1)	(.1)	(.1)

Personnel Support
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
<u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>				
Army	5.5	6.0	6.0	11.9
Navy	1.6	1.8	1.9	2.3
Marine Corps	.1	.1	.1	.1
Air Force	2.0	2.2	2.1	4.0
Defense Agencies	1.4	1.5	1.7	1.7
Total DoD	10.6	11.7	11.8	20.0

The civilian increase in FY 197T is caused by the new fiscal year end: teachers are on the rolls on September 30, but were not on June 30.

D. Individual Training

1. Individual Training manpower consists of the manpower conducting and supporting the formal training and education of officers, enlisted personnel, Service academy cadets, and civilian students in ROTC and similar programs. The purpose of the individual training function is to impart required skills and knowledge to individuals so that they are prepared to apply these skills in later assignments as qualified members of operational organizations. This focus on the individual distinguishes Individual Training from Force Support Training; a sub-category of Mission Support Forces, and training conducted by operational units in order to achieve and maintain a state of combat readiness. This section will present only a short overview of Individual Training in the Department of Defense. A more detailed analysis of Individual Training will be presented to the Congress, as required by 10 U.S.C. 138(d)(2) in the Military Manpower Training Report for FY 1976.

2. In order to have a smoothly functioning, efficient and ready military establishment, it must be manned with the right number of personnel, with the proper skills, at the right time. Producing these trained personnel is the task of the training establishment. The rate at which personnel must be trained in a given skill is a function of projected skill requirements versus projected skill inventories. If the inventory of qualified personnel in a skill is forecast to be less than the need, replacements must be trained to fill the projected vacancies.

3. Individual Training is subdivided into five categories, each of which is briefly described in the following paragraphs. In addition, some manpower is related to more than one type of training and is considered to be overall training support.

a. Recruit Training

Recruit training includes all basic introductory and indoctrination training given to all enlisted personnel immediately after entrance into a Service. Reserve enlisted personnel coming on

active duty for initial training also undergo recruit training and form a considerable proportion of the training workload. The length of recruit training varies from six weeks in the Air Force to eleven weeks in the Marine Corps. Most graduates of recruit training proceed to initial specialized skill training, where they learn the skills associated with a particular military specialty and become qualified to be productive members of operational units.

b. Officer Acquisition Training

This category includes all types of education and training leading to a commission in one of the Services. The associated manpower includes the faculties and staffs of the Service academies, ROTC instructors, and instructors and staffs in officer candidate schools.

c. Specialized Skill Training

Specialized skill training provides individuals with new or higher degrees of skill in military specialties to match specific job requirements. Participants include graduates from recruit or officer acquisition training learning skills at the basic level and, at the more advanced level, officers and enlisted personnel with some operational experience who are being prepared for jobs of greater responsibility or technical complexity.

d. Flight Training

Flight training includes all training of pilots and navigators, exclusive of combat crew training. Course lengths vary considerably according to the needs of each Service and, in the case of pilot training, the type of aircraft -- jet, propeller-driven, or helicopter -- the student is being trained to fly.

e. Professional Development Education

This category includes educational courses conducted at the higher-level Service schools or civilian institutions to broaden the outlook and knowledge of senior military personnel or to impart knowledge in advanced academic disciplines to meet Service and joint requirements. Almost all of the associated manpower is involved in operating the intermediate and senior Service schools (i.e., command and staff colleges and war colleges) and Service graduate schools (i.e., Air Force Institute of Technology, Navy Postgraduate School).

4. Individual Training manpower includes only manpower involved in the conduct or support of training. Active manpower undergoing training -- trainees, students, and cadets -- is carried under Individuals. Requirements for those personnel are discussed in Chapter IX.

In general the requirement for Individual Training manpower is based on the number of personnel being trained. The number of personnel required to instruct and support a given student/trainee load is based on work measurement studies and historical experience, codified into staffing guides and similar manning documents. The overall size of the training establishment is sensitive to the number of new active and Reserve accessions and the rate of retention of experienced personnel.

5. The following table summarizes Individual Training manpower.

DoD Individual Training Active Manpower 1/
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Army	55.9	47.6	44.3	44.3
Navy	40.6	38.3	38.6	39.0
Marine Corps	8.8	8.0	8.0	8.0
Air Force	28.7	27.7	27.1	27.1
Total	<u>134.0</u>	<u>121.6</u>	<u>118.0</u>	<u>118.4</u>
<u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>				
Army	21.3	23.0	23.8	24.4
Navy	14.2	14.8	14.5	14.5
Marine Corps	2.4	2.5	2.4	2.5
Air Force	7.4	7.7	7.4	7.4
Total	<u>45.3</u>	<u>48.0</u>	<u>48.1</u>	<u>48.8</u>

1/ Does not include Active trainees, students or cadets (see Chapter IX); Reserve Component trainees or students; or ROTC cadets.

The Army's combined military and civilian manpower in this function decreased by 2,500 from FY 75 to FY 76. This change is composed of reductions totalling 4,400 offset by an accounting transfer of 1,900 manpower spaces for Intelligence training. This activity was formerly carried under Auxiliary Forces (Intelligence & Security).

E. Command

1. Command (Central Support Forces) differs from Command (Mission Support Forces) only in the type of forces managed. Manpower in this category is provided for: (1) Non-Service management headquarters; (2) Service management headquarters; (3) Service Administrative activities; and (4) Special activities. A review of headquarters requirements was directed with the objective of achieving manpower savings which could be reprogrammed into increased combat capability.

2. The command category is reduced by 2,900 military and 3,300 civilians from end FY 1974 actual strength to FY 1976 planned strength. This decrease does not include the headquarters reductions which were achieved during FY 1974, after the Secretary of Defense announced the DoD headquarters review in October 1973.

3. The following subsections describe in greater detail the various types of activities which are included in the Command (Central Support Forces) category. As previously noted, the term headquarters and command are not synonymous.

a. Non-Service Management Headquarters

The category contains manpower assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS). These headquarters are engaged in the overall policy formulation; planning, programming, and budgeting; and administration and operational control of the Department of Defense. The Services provide military personnel to the organizations, but the requirement is established by OSD/OJCS.

b. Service Management Headquarters

These headquarters provide overall policy formulation; planning, programming, and budgeting; and administration of the entire Service. Also included are headquarters which are responsible for the administration of individual training and depot-level logistics activities.

c. Administrative Activities

These are separate organizations which perform centralized administrative support activities, such as: personnel; finance; data processing; judge advocate (legal); inspection; safety; etc.

d. Special Activities in Command

The Command category contains miscellaneous organizations which because of the nature of the mission of the organization or the overall organizational structure of the Services, do not fit into any other category. Included are:

(1) Ceremonial Activities - The requirements for this manpower are primarily related to public interest in specific activities.

(2) Civil Air Patrol - The Department of the Air Force has the mission of providing support to the Civil Air Patrol. The requirements for manpower in this activity are related to the organization of the Civil Air Patrol, currently one wing for each state.

(3) Criminal Investigation Activities - These organizations investigate crimes committed on DoD property (including leased space) and assist federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in investigations of alleged crimes involving defense personnel. The manpower requirements are a function of workload and the geographic dispersion of defense installations.

(4) Postal/Courier Activities - These organizations transport classified and official correspondence between military installations world-wide.

(5) Intelligence Support Activities - Included is the Air Force Intelligence Service which provides specialized intelligence services to Headquarters USAF and USAF commanders world-wide.

(6) Logistic Support Activities - Included for the Air Force are special aircraft maintenance activities, munitions maintenance activities, explosive ordnance disposal activities, and the Air Force Civil Engineering Center. Included for the Navy are organizations which support the Naval District of Washington.

(7) Operational Evaluation Activities - Included is the administration and operational evaluation of new Navy weapon systems. These services are performed by the Operational Test and Evaluation Force.

4. The following table summarizes Command (Central Support Forces) for FY74-7T:

<u>Command (Central Support Forces)</u> (End Strengths in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Army	10.2	9.0	8.9	8.9
Navy	8.5	8.1	8.0	8.0
Marine Corps	4.8	4.5	4.5	4.5
Air Force	14.8	14.2	14.0	13.9
Total DoD	<u>38.3</u>	<u>35.8</u>	<u>35.4</u>	<u>35.3</u>
Military in Defense Agencies included in total above	(1.7)	(1.7)	(1.7)	(1.7)
<u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>				
Army	23.5	23.0	21.9	22.0
Navy	17.2	15.9	15.9	15.9
Marine Corps	1.8	2.0	2.0	2.0
Air Force	12.3	12.1	11.6	11.6
Defense Agencies	6.1	6.1	6.1	6.1
Total DoD	<u>60.9</u>	<u>59.1</u>	<u>57.5</u>	<u>57.6</u>

Both military and civilian manpower continue to decline after FY 75, as further headquarters reductions are accomplished.

F. Logistics

1. Logistics includes those centrally managed supply, maintenance, and support activities needed to: (1) procure equipment and supplies; (2) store supplies used by the combat forces and keep centralized inventory control of major equipment and spare parts; (3) maintain the approved equipment inventory by repairing, modernizing and overhauling major systems and components (aircraft, tanks, engines, etc.); (4) provide support services such as preparing and printing equipment repair manuals and cargo shipment.

2. The combat capability of the weapons systems employed by our forces, especially those which are technologically complex, is directly dependent upon the quality and timeliness of their maintenance. While depot maintenance is fundamental to the structural integrity and long term reliability of primary equipments, it is also essential that an adequate supply system be maintained to provide the repair parts required for maintenance.

3. The following table summarizes FY74-7T logistics manpower by type of logistics operations:

Logistics (End Strength in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Supply	7.6	7.6	7.2	7.3
Maintenance	8.5	8.2	7.8	7.8
Logistics Support	4.9	5.3	5.3	5.2
Total	<u>21.0</u>	<u>21.1</u>	<u>20.3</u>	<u>20.2</u>
<u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>				
Supply	133.3	129.3	125.0	124.0
Maintenance	233.6	220.7	221.7	220.0
Logistics Support	35.2	32.9	34.0	35.2
Total	<u>402.1</u>	<u>383.1</u>	<u>380.7</u>	<u>379.3</u>

4. In FY76, 401,000 people will conduct central supply and maintenance operations for DoD. This work force is composed mainly of civilian employees (95%). Military personnel fill primarily supervisory positions throughout the supply and maintenance system.

a. Supply Operations

(1) The personnel employed in supply operations are required to buy, store, distribute, manage, and control the supplies and spare parts used by the Services. In FY76, approximately 132,200 men and women will perform these operations (7,200 military; 125,000 civilians). The Services' supply manpower needs are based on the size and activity of the equipment inventories and the amount of maintenance performed on these equipments (aircraft, ships, tanks). That is, equipment inventory size and maintenance levels determine the number of parts and supplies needed by the operating units and the repair depots.

(2) Using standard work measures, the Services translate parts and maintenance demands into manpower needs to manage and control the supply system.

(3) Since FY69 (peak-Vietnam), inventory levels and maintenance demands have declined. The number of civilian employees needed for supply operations has therefore been reduced. The FY76 supply operation civilian manpower level (125,000) is 30% below the FY69 level.

b. Maintenance Operations

(1) The personnel employed in maintenance operations repair, overhaul, and modify the Services' major weapon systems and equipment. In FY76, approximately 229,500 men and women will perform these operations (7,800 military and 221,700 civilians). Maintenance operations manpower requirements are based on the size and activity of the equipment inventories and the maintenance repair/overhaul criteria established for each type of equipment. Each of the Services has criteria which state the frequency of overhaul/repair for each piece of equipment based on engineering standards and past experience. The total demand for maintenance manpower is determined by summing the individual maintenance demands for all equipment to be repaired or overhauled by the Services during the year.

(2) Since the peak-Vietnam year (FY69), inventory and activity levels of our forces have been decreasing. Thus, maintenance demands have declined and maintenance operations manpower requirements have been reduced. The FY76 maintenance operations civilian manpower level of 221,700 is 23% below the FY69 level.

c. Logistics Support Operations

These support personnel perform a wide variety of tasks throughout the logistics establishment. Major tasks include writing and publishing the documents and manuals which describe in detail how to repair/overhaul each piece of equipment in the DoD and overseeing the shipment of cargo from CONUS and overseas ports. Civilian employees perform the basic work; military personnel manage and supervise the various service organizations. In FY76, approximately 39,300 men and women will perform these operations (5,300 military and 34,000 civilians).

5. The following table summarizes FY74-7T logistics manpower by Service. Total Defense Agency supply and maintenance manpower is also shown.

<u>Logistics</u> (End Strengths in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Army	7.7	7.4	7.1	7.1
Navy	7.2	8.0	7.8	7.7
Marine Corps	.9	.9	.8	.8
Air Force	5.2	4.8	4.6	4.6
Total DoD	<u>21.0</u>	<u>21.1</u>	<u>20.3</u>	<u>20.2</u>
Military in Defense Agencies included in total above	(1.5)	(1.4)	(1.3)	(1.3)
<u>Civilian (Direct & Indirect Hire)</u>				
Army	110.7	102.3	101.5	100.1
Navy	160.5	155.8	159.7	159.7
Marine Corps	3.0	3.1	3.0	3.0
Air Force	80.1	74.7	70.5	70.4
Defense Agencies	47.8	47.2	46.0	46.1
Total DoD	<u>402.1</u>	<u>383.1</u>	<u>380.7</u>	<u>379.3</u>

6. Logistics manpower in the Army, Air Force and Defense Agencies (Defense Supply Agency) is reduced during this period as a result of vigorous management actions to achieve economies in the operation of the supply and maintenance complex. In FY 76, Army depot maintenance activities increase 4,800 civilian spaces to perform work which will improve combat readiness. This increase is more than offset by savings resulting from logistics activity closures and realignments discussed in the Army chapter. Air Force reductions occurring between FY 75 and FY 76 are the result of aircraft flying hour and inventory reductions. Navy civilians are increased by nearly 3,700 in Navy shipyards in order to reduce the serious backlog in ship maintenance. The details of this significant programming decision are discussed in the Navy chapter.

G. Federal Agency Support

1. The Department of Defense assigns personnel to these organizations (normally on a reimbursable basis) based upon the requests of the receiving organization and when there is a clear national security interest involved or at the request of the President. Although some of the military personnel assigned outside of DoD are occupying administrative positions, the bulk are associated with operational tasks.

2. The following table summarizes Federal Agency Support for FY74-77:

Federal Agency Support
(Military End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Army	.3	.6	.6	.6
Navy	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1
Marine Corps	1.1	1.6	1.6	1.6
Air Force	.4	.5	.4	.4
Total DoD	<u>3.0</u>	<u>3.8</u>	<u>3.7</u>	<u>3.7</u>

Manpower requirements for Federal Agency Support remains relatively constant from FY75 to FY76. The increase in Marine Corps from FY 74 to FY 75 represents an increase in Marine security guards.

H. FY 77 Manpower Requirements

The following table shows Central Support Forces military and civilian manpower requirements for FY77 compared with FY77.

Central Support Forces Manpower Requirements FY77
(In Thousands)

	<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilian</u> <u>Direct and Indirect</u>	
	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Base Operating Support	44.9	45.0	98.1	98.4
Medical Support	79.4	78.1	47.0	47.3
Personnel Support	31.4	31.2	20.0	19.9
Individual Training	118.4	118.1	48.8	49.1
Command	35.3	35.1	57.6	57.8
Logistics	20.2	20.3	379.3	381.7
Federal Agency Support	3.7	3.7	--	--
	<u>333.4</u>	<u>331.5</u>	<u>630.7</u>	<u>634.4</u>
Defense Agencies				
included above	(3.4)	(3.5)	(60.7)	(60.8)

Between FY 77 and FY 77, military manpower in Central Support is stable. Civilian manpower increases because Naval shipyard employment continues to expand by an additional 3,800 positions. The planned growth in shipyard employment, starting in FY 76 is aimed at reducing the backlog of ship overhauls.

CHAPTER IX

INDIVIDUALS

Military manpower requirements in each of the Services can be separated into two broad categories: force structure manpower and individuals. This chapter discusses the differences between these two types and describes the Individuals category.

To this point, we have discussed "structure" manpower requirements for Strategic Forces, General Purpose Forces, Auxiliary Forces, Mission Support Forces, and Central Support Forces. The word "forces" implies a structure; i.e., force manpower requirements are composed of clusters of jobs organized into units. The number of jobs depends on the mission, structure, and manning criteria of each unit. This chapter will discuss non-structure manpower requirements: the Individuals category.

The following hypothetical case illustrates the requirement for Individuals. Let us suppose that the Services were authorized only enough manpower to fill their structure, or force requirements. Let us further suppose that all of these people were fully trained and present in units. Under those assumptions, the Services would have enough people to perform their assigned missions. But this would be a snapshot, a moment in time, and military forces are dynamic organizations. A man completes his overseas tour and returns home; both he and his replacement are unavailable to perform unit missions while they are traveling. Another man is injured and admitted to a hospital; still another is sentenced to confinement; another is recruited to replace a man leaving service and assigned full-time to a Service school to acquire necessary skills. To not recognize these personnel requirements would result in shortages within force structure units and adversely affect readiness. Therefore, each Service has an established set of Individuals accounts to keep the units within the forces manned at their authorized strength. The Individuals accounts are Transients; Patients and Prisoners; Trainees/Students; and Service Academy cadets.

The principal difference between force structure manpower and individuals is that while the structure may be planned in advance, Individuals accounts can only be estimated. Those estimates are based partly on historical data (e.g., average days per move, or casualty rates) and partly on current manpower plans (e.g., number of enlistments by month). Therefore, while structure can be planned with precision, Individuals must be estimated using averages or ranges.

It is important to note that Individuals are not a subset of support. In fact, since the Services draw on their Individuals accounts to replace people in each of the types of forces, shortages in the Individuals accounts will result in manpower shortages in both mission and support force units.

The following table summarizes Individuals military manpower.

	Individuals (Military End-Strengths in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
Transients	110.7	95.7	94.8	92.3
Patients/Prisoners	12.5	9.3	9.3	9.5
Trainees/Students	211.4	209.1	193.4	216.1
Cadets	10.5	11.5	11.6	12.9
Total DoD	<u>345.1</u>	<u>325.6</u>	<u>309.1</u>	<u>330.7</u>

A. Transients

Transient requirements are largely a function of the Permanent Change of Station (PCS) move program. Transient manpower spaces are provided to account for time consumed during PCS travel which includes travel, leave enroute, and temporary duty enroute. Of these three factors, approximately two-thirds to three-quarters of transient manpower requirements result from leave taken enroute. PCS move requirements are driven primarily by annual losses, imbalances between the supply and demand of specific skills, and manpower levels. Secondary PCS move determinants are tour length policies (particularly for unaccompanied tour zones), career development objectives, and equity considerations.

The following table summarizes Transients military manpower.

	Transients (Military End-Strengths in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
Army	34.2	34.5	34.0	29.4
Navy	39.5	24.4	24.9	27.2
Marine Corps	11.8	11.8	11.7	11.8
Air Force	25.2	25.0	24.2	23.9
Total DoD	<u>110.7</u>	<u>95.7</u>	<u>94.8</u>	<u>92.3</u>

Projected transient strengths for FY 75, 76, and beyond are based upon recent historical experience for the average enroute time per PCS move and the projected PCS move program for the fiscal year. The FY 74 transient strengths reflect those persons reported as transients by the Service personnel system on the last day of the fiscal year. The general downward trend is due to continuing DoD actions to reduce unnecessary personnel turbulence and stabilize or lengthen tours. These actions include reducing the number of PCS moves and, where possible, reassigning personnel within the same theater to reduce the time and expense involved. The large Navy deviation FY 74-75 is due to reporting actual end-year strength for FY 74, and programming average strength figures for the following years.

B. Patients and Prisoners

Patients manpower spaces are provided to offset lost time in units resulting from hospitalization for extended periods. Patient requirements are based upon historical incidence of non-combat casualties and illness relative to the total active duty manpower.

Prisoners manpower spaces are provided to offset lost time in units resulting from confinement in a military disciplinary facility in excess of 30 days. Prisoner requirements are based upon historical incidence of confinement resulting from a conviction and sentencing by a court martial relative to the total active duty strength.

The following table summarizes Patients and Prisoners military manpower by Service for FY 74-7T. Because of its low incidence of long-term confinement, the Air Force does not utilize a prisoner account; therefore, Air Force figures shown reflect only patients.

	<u>Patients and Prisoners</u> (Military End-Strengths in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
Army	4.4	3.9	3.9	4.0
Navy	5.7	3.3	3.3	3.4
Marine Corps	1.6	1.3	1.3	1.3
Air Force	.8	.8	.8	.8
Total DoD	12.5	9.3	9.3	9.5

C. Trainees, Students, and Cadets

Trainee, student, and cadet manpower spaces represent present investment for future trained individuals. Trainees are individuals who have not yet received a basic skill identifier in their service. They are not deployable for at least their first 120 days of service by law. Students are individuals undergoing specialized (including initial skill training, skill progression training, functional training, and officer candidate school), flight, and professional training. Cadets are individuals attending the United States Military Academy, the United States Naval Academy (midshipmen), and the United States Air Force Academy.

The number of trainee and student spaces is a function of enlistment patterns, course lengths, and training plans. It should be noted that the trainees and students shown represent only active duty personnel undergoing training while in permanent change of station (PCS) status. A comprehensive discussion of the determination of trainee and student loads is included in the FY 76 Military Manpower Training Report. Trainee and student loads discussed in that report also include reserve and guard personnel on active duty for training and personnel undergoing training on a temporary duty (TDY) basis.

The following table shows Trainee and Student strengths:

	Trainees & Students			
	(Military End-Strengths in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Army	92.7	92.6	80.9	96.2
Navy	57.8	52.7	50.3	54.3
Marine Corps	22.0	25.3	23.9	26.6
Air Force	38.9	38.5	38.3	39.0
Total DoD	<u>211.4</u>	<u>209.1</u>	<u>193.4</u>	<u>216.1</u>

The reduction of 16,000 trainee and student spaces between FY 1975 and 1976 is largely the result of lower accession requirements in the Army and Marine Corps in the latter year. The large increase in the three months from the end of FY 1976 to the end of FY 1977 (that is, from June 30 to September 30, 1976) is caused by the normal surge in enlistments which occurs each summer, rather than by a long-term increase in accession requirements. Since the Services recruit most heavily in the summer months, it can be anticipated that student-trainee strengths will be consistently higher in September than in June. The following table displays Cadet/Midshipman strengths:

	Cadets/Midshipman			
	(Military End-Strengths in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Army	2.9	2.9	3.0	4.3
Navy	3.2	4.2	4.2	4.4
Air Force	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.2
Total DoD	<u>10.5</u>	<u>11.5</u>	<u>11.6</u>	<u>12.9</u>

There is no real change in the planned size of the student enrollment from FY 1974 and beyond. Each of the academies has planned enrollment of 4,400. The apparent enrollment differences between services, and between years for an individual service, is caused by differences in enrollment dates and reporting procedures. For example the Army figures for FY 1974, 75 and 76 reflect the fact that seniors graduating in June have departed, but incoming freshmen do not arrive until after the end of the fiscal year in July. For FY 1977, which ends on September 30, the Army reflects the entire student body. The Navy figures are lower in the FY 1974 actual strength column because seniors have graduated and freshmen have not arrived. The Navy figures for the succeeding years represent programmed average strength.

D. Temporary Over (+) or Understrength (-) in Units

Beginning in FY 77, the Army will be using a new accounting entry, the strength deviation adjustment. This will reflect the difference between the number of authorized spaces in the units in the force and the number of men expected to actually be in those units on the last day of the fiscal year. This deviation is related to the flow of accessions during the year. A more complete explanation is in the Army chapter.

E. FY 1977 Manpower Requirements

Authorization Request:	<u>Military</u>	
	<u>(End Strengths in Thousands)</u>	
	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Transients	92.3	89.5
Patients & Prisoners	9.5	9.5
Trainees/Students	216.1	223.0
Cadets	12.9	12.9
Total	<u>330.7</u>	<u>334.8</u>

Transient, student, and trainee strengths all fluctuate during the year due to inventory and accession considerations. In the Navy, fewer PCS moves are being made, reducing the need for transients. The increase in the size of the Navy combat forces from FY 76-80 calls for higher accessions, increasing the number of trainees. An Air Force transient reduction is also due to a reduced PCS move program in FY 77.

PART C - MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS BY SERVICE

**PART C DESCRIBES THE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS AND
ACHIEVEMENTS OF EACH OF THE INDIVIDUAL SERVICES
AND THE DEFENSE AGENCIES.**

CHAPTER X - ARMY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

CHAPTER XI - NAVY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

**CHAPTER XII - MARINE CORPS MANPOWER
REQUIREMENTS**

**CHAPTER XIII - AIR FORCE MANPOWER
REQUIREMENTS**

**CHAPTER XIV - DEFENSE AGENCY MANPOWER
REQUIREMENTS**

CHAPTER X

ARMY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

A. Introduction

Since the force reductions which followed the Vietnam war, the Army's conventional combat forces, as measured by the number of divisions, have been too small and the attendant risk was greater than the nation could accept. The Army now proposes to reverse that trend and to increase its deterrent and war fighting capability by shifting the emphasis to more readily useable combat power. It will do that by adding three much needed divisions without the cost of additional manpower. It can do so by shifting the manpower from its support establishment into more visible combat units and by more fully integrating the Reserve Components with the active Army.

The world situation and, hence, the Army's role in it has changed dramatically. Strategic nuclear parity places a much greater demand on the General Purpose Forces and their ability to provide a quick and more flexible response with conventional force and tactical nuclear weapons. Sixteen active divisions will enable the U.S. to reinforce NATO while retaining a powerful and responsive strategic reserve in the United States. Three additional divisions will increase the chances of stopping Warsaw Pact conventional aggression without recourse to nuclear weapons. General Purpose Forces capability is a product of qualitative and quantitative force factors. Previously, the qualitative advantages of NATO air and land forces were judged to offset the quantitative advantages of the Warsaw Pact Land Forces. However, the Warsaw Pact has made substantial improvements to its ground forces particularly in the quality of its equipment, as highlighted by the 1973 Arab/Israeli War. The U.S. must and is continuing to improve not only the quality but the quantity of its forces as resources become available.

The Army has been able to propose a move from 13 to 16 active divisions because of the environment created by a stabilized end strength. During the immediate post-Vietnam period, the Army end strength was reduced 49% in 5 years. In contrast to this turbulent situation, the Army can now fully devote its attention to developing the maximum deterrent conventional force that is even more important in this era of nuclear parity. The importance of this stability in producing a well organized, well trained and ready Army cannot be overestimated. The creation of much more readily visible and useable combat power at the expense of many units which would be needed subsequent to mobilization represents a major shift in the Army's manpower program. That program has cut back or placed in an unmanned category those units that are required later in a major conflict. It has redirected manpower into new combat units and more adequately manned its deployed combat units. Equipment procurement and distribution programs are also emphasizing the improved readiness of our combat units. Thus, the 16 division active force, as it builds in readiness, will represent a major improvement in the deterrent value of the nation's armed strength.

Army Manpower Requirement

The Army request for both active duty military and civilian personnel end strengths for Fiscal Years 1976, 1977 and 1978 is as follows:

Army Manpower Requirements (End Strengths)

	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Active Military Personnel</u>	<u>785,000</u>	<u>793,000</u>	<u>793,000</u>
<u>Civilian Personnel</u>			
Direct Hire, Military Functions	334,133	337,787	337,295
Indirect Hire Foreign Nationals	67,657	68,660	70,366
TOTAL CIVILIAN	<u>401,790</u>	<u>406,447</u>	<u>407,661</u>

B. Significant Highlights.

1. Sixteen Active Divisions.

a. Requirement for a 16 Division Active Force. The Army's proposed program to increase its combat power from 13 active and 8 Reserve Component divisions to 16 active and 8 Reserve Component divisions was prompted by several practical considerations. The fundamental consideration is that U.S. General Purpose Forces should be sufficient to deter war and to protect our vital interests. The 16 division active force will support both of these objectives.

(1) Sixteen active divisions will give NATO a much better chance of winning the first and possibly decisive battle in Europe without having to resort to nuclear weapons and will provide a concurrent capability to cope with a minor contingency elsewhere.

(2) Strategic nuclear weapons alone are no longer a credible deterrent to conventional war. Nuclear parity between the two superpowers and the increase in the number of nations possessing a nuclear capability have changed the balance of power. The focus of deterrence has shifted to more flexible capabilities and more emphasis is placed on conventional forces. Our strategy for Europe centers around an initial response with conventional weapons. The strategy is based on the knowledge that the United States will not initiate strategic nuclear war except in the gravest of military situations, only after all other diplomatic and military recourses having failed, and with the concurrence of allies on whose territories nuclear war would be waged. However a conventional response and the attendant deterrent it provides depend directly on the strength of our General Purpose Land Forces and their timely application. Weak General Purpose Forces increase the likelihood of war and at the same

time increase the possibility of having to resort to tactical nuclear weapons to stop enemy advances. Escalation to a strategic nuclear exchange is then a real possibility.

(3) Maintenance of a force of any lesser size than is required entails a risk. The 21 division (13 active and 8 Reserve Component) total force was a high risk force, one that left no margin for error. While 24 divisions are still less than the Army's objective force requirement, they do represent a more realistic deterrent. The 24 divisions will constitute a force which, within the reality of resource constraints, will provide the United States a General Purpose Land Force which can be considered a prudent risk force.

b. Decision to Accelerate. The reduction of European support forces directed in the FY 75 Military Authorization Act was the catalyst for the decision to accelerate the attainment of 16 active divisions in FY 76 rather than in FY 78 as planned last spring. The Army's share of the reduction is 5,200 support spaces by 30 June 1975 and an additional 6,000 support spaces by 30 June 1976. The Act allows a combat force increase in Europe equal to the reduction in support. Other management initiatives already underway at the time of the signing of the FY 75 Military Authorization Bill provided the manpower resources for the newly activated divisions.

c. Increased Combat Power in Europe. The Army program provides for an increased combat capability in Europe. This increased combat capability will result from raising the Manning level of selected combat units now in Europe, by deploying two combat brigades from the Continental United States (CONUS), and by converting existing Construction Engineer battalions to Heavy Combat Engineer battalions.

The two additional forward deployed brigades from CONUS based divisions, in addition to providing essential early combat power, will provide a planning and reception capability which will assist the early deployment of the remainder of those divisions in time of crisis. Besides reassuring our NATO allies, these new deployments will increase deterrence to war in the area and signal the Warsaw Pact that force reductions must be mutual and balanced and will not result from unilateral U.S. action. The 16 division force will provide the Army a more adequate peacetime rotation base from which to support these forward deployments.

d. The New Divisions. The following chart shows the composition and location of the three new Army divisions. Two are infantry divisions (the 7th Infantry and the 24th Infantry); the third is a mechanized division (the 5th Infantry (Mech)).

New FY 76 Army Divisions

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Battalions</u>		
		<u>Inf</u>	<u>Arm</u>	<u>Inf(Mech)</u>
7th Inf Div	Ft Ord, CA			
Bde	Ft Ord, CA	3		
Bde	Ft Ord, CA	3		
(Res Comp Bde)	To be announced			
24th Inf Div	Hunter/Stewart, GA			
Bde	Hunter/Stewart, GA	3		
Bde	Ft Benning, GA	1	1	1
(Res Comp Bde)	To be announced			
5th Inf Div (M)	Ft Polk, LA			
Bde	Ft Knox, KY		2	1
Bde	Ft Polk, LA		2	1
(Res Comp Bde)	To be announced			

Two existing separate brigades will become brigades of two of the new divisions but will remain at their current stations. The 197th Infantry Brigade at Fort Benning, GA. already a fully capable combat unit, will become the 2d Brigade of the 24th Infantry Division. The 194th School Troops Brigade, currently austere tailored to support the Armor School at Fort Knox, KY, will be augmented with additional combat and tactical support units and be reorganized as the 2d Brigade of the 5th Infantry (Mech). This brigade when reorganized will have a dual mission--a combat ready deployable unit (primary) and support of the Armor School (secondary). In the event this unit is required to deploy in time of crisis, a reserve unit will be required to assume its school support mission.

Stationing of the new divisions requires new construction for troop facilities and family housing.

e. Emphasis on Early Combat Power. Since the Army reorganization in 1973, when Continental Army Command and the Combat Developments Command were eliminated and replaced by the Training and Doctrine Command and the Forces Command, much has been said about numerous initiatives in the non-combat areas of the Army force structure and the so-called savings these initiatives generated. In retrospect, the Army may have overstated its case.

The activities scheduled for reduction or elimination are not over-staffed, redundant or in some other way a waste of resource; rather the Army is changing its combat and support structure with an increasing need for a force that will serve to deter a more capable potential adversary. A conflict in Europe is likely to be more violent and of much shorter duration than past wars. The phenomenal increases in firepower will produce such intense conflict that it may well be decided in the first few days. Therefore, the Army has embarked on a major effort to convert much of its supporting forces and activities into combat forces. This will provide that added combat power which will be required in the early days of a European conflict.

The Army is not eliminating things it does not need; it is converting units and activities less critical in the early period of a violent war to combat units which it will need immediately after mobilization. Support forces and missions are being shifted to the Reserve Components, which will be able to deploy in time to meet the support requirements as the conflict continues. For example, some general support maintenance units would not be required in the early days of an intense conflict since the maintenance units integral to combat forces and direct support maintenance units could handle the required level of effort initially.

In the Pacific Theater, given the improvement in logistical operations, it became apparent that major reductions could be made in headquarters and logistical support activities there. Resources developed in this area are being converted into increased combat capability.

The Army's training base will be reduced by such actions as the conversion of the 194th School Troop Brigade at Fort Knox to the 2d Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division (Mech), described above.

As stated earlier in conjunction with the Nunn Amendment to the FY 75 Authorization Act, substantial conversions of tactical support units will occur in Europe. Supply and service battalions, finance sections, psychological operations battalions, maintenance battalions, and transportation battalions are the types of units being reduced or eliminated to obtain manpower spaces for the early combat power of the two additional brigades that will be deployed to Europe and for increased manning of the combat units already in Europe.

Other actions like the ones described above are planned throughout the Army, all with the idea of increasing the Army's ability to respond rapidly to any contingency.

f. Role of Reserve Components. Even though the new divisions will be active Army units, the Reserve Components figure prominently in Army plans to add three divisions without an increase in manpower. Each of the new divisions will have one Reserve Component brigade, as the 25th Division in Hawaii does today. These brigades will be organized and equipped in the

same manner as their active Army counterparts. Their readiness will be evaluated in the same way. They will be part of their divisions in every respect possible, and their close affiliation will result in better combat preparedness.

The "affiliation" concept is sound and will be applied wherever possible in the future. There are currently 36 Reserve Component battalions in the Army Affiliation Program. These battalions are in addition to the three Reserve Component brigades which are to be affiliated with the new divisions.

The Reserve Components are critical to the new divisions in another important way. They contain tactical support units needed at mobilization by the active Army divisions. Indeed, improvements in the Army's visible combat power are in large measure due to our capability to rely on the Reserves. Thus, only by this increased reliance on the Reserve Components could 16 active divisions be achieved within a manpower strength of 785,000.

g. Force Challenges. The decision to increase the total number of combat units was reached after due consideration of several challenging problems which will face the Army in the years to come. The primary concern is to avoid a degradation in short term combat readiness. The activations, inactivations and reorganizations caused by increasing combat units and decreasing support units will cause short term turbulence within the force structure. This means that the Army's management of diverse personnel and equipment assets is critical to achievement and attainment of the 16 active divisions.

(1) Personnel. Because of increased combat arms requirements, the Army faces the continuing challenge of recruiting quality personnel to serve in the combat arms. Achieving a 16 division force will require re-allocation of personnel with administrative and technical MOS's to those requiring combat arms MOS's. Reorientation of recruiting emphasis, re-training, and reclassification will result. With the increasing number of combat spaces in the Army, enlistment options are being revised to accommodate the increasing requirements of the combat arms.

(2) Equipment. Analyses indicate that any possible equipment shortages will remain within acceptable limits. When examined with the companion problems of modernizing the Reserve Components and meeting demands for foreign military sales, the distribution problems are very complex and temporary shortages of selected items (notably tanks) will occur. Production lead times preclude increasing our inventory of these items in the near future. Thus, some delay in modernizing the Reserve Components will be unavoidable.

2. Manpower Requirements Determination. The Army has stressed continuously the need for a balanced combat and support force. The Army needs combat forces, those units which engage the enemy; tactical support forces to deploy with those combat units, and without which combat forces would become useless; and a sustaining base from which to prepare for the future. This last category primarily consists of our base operations activities, the training establishment, research and development, equipment procurement and distribution base, and management headquarters. The following table provides examples of units in each category:

Examples of Combat and Tactical Support
Units and the Sustaining Base

<u>DPFC</u>	<u>COMBAT</u>	<u>TACTICAL SUPPORT</u>	<u>SUSTAINING BASE</u>
Strategic Forces	None	None	Natl Level Cmd Ctrs
General Purpose Forces	Divisions Sep Bdes Armd Cav Regt Arty Bns Cbt Engr Bns	Maint Bns Truck Cos Field Hosp Sig Bns Ammo Cos	None
Auxiliary Forces	None	None	R&D Labs
Mission Support Forces	None	None	Mgmt Hqs Cold Weather and Jungle Indoctrination Ctrs Army Readiness Regions
Central Support Forces	None	None	Arsenals Fixed Hosp Service Schools

As is evident in the example above, all Army combat and tactical support units are in the General Purpose Forces category while the sustaining base lies outside that category and is found in each of the other DPFC's.

It should be noted that the proportion of combat-to-tactical support forces results from a detailed force requirements analysis, and not from some preconceived ratio. The requirements for tactical support units are dependent primarily on the number of units of all types in the force to be supported, and the intensity and duration of the conflict which, in turn, determines the consumption rate of resources. Recognizing that its principal likely adversary stresses a doctrine of maximum combat power early, the Army is reallocating its manpower from many tactical support units needed in the later phases of a conflict to combat power more useful earlier. The Army plans to activate and train these types of tactical support units after mobilization and to deploy them as needed.

a. Combat Manpower Requirements. Manpower for combat units is determined by a result of an annual review and analysis which begins with guidance from the Secretary of Defense. Requirements for units by type are first determined without constraints. The result is a force built to meet the most likely simultaneous or closely sequential crises arising from the threat and the extent to which our allies will be able to or are committed to counter that threat. The U.S. combat unit requirements are the balance needed, not to overcome aggression militarily, but to control the conflict so as to make nuclear war unlikely and continued effort on the part of the aggressor too costly.

The Army's request for a 24 division force (16 Active and 8 Reserve Component divisions) is a fiscally constrained force that can accomplish the task of conflict control.

Combat unit manpower authorizations are controlled centrally by means of Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE). They undergo an almost continuous review and updating to get the most combat effective unit for the manpower and equipment authorized. An ongoing update to the TOE's for maneuver battalions (infantry, armor, mechanized infantry) adds manpower and equipment authorizations for the anti-armor, wire guided missile (TOW). This update will improve significantly the anti-tank capabilities of those maneuver battalions. Our war fighting analyses on which the force structure is based take these added capabilities into account.

For some units that will be deploying late, the Army economized on manpower authorizations by specifying that they be manned at less than full authorization. There are relatively few combat units in this category, but there is a substantial number of the later deploying support units. Upon mobilization, those units will be filled with trained individuals. The primary source of such individuals is the Ready Reserve.

b. Manpower Requirements for Tactical Support Forces

Tactical support forces can be accurately determined once our combat force requirements are known. Combat forces represent our best estimate based on threat and strategy environment while tactical support units are workload oriented and can be based on the number and type of combat units included in the force.

Combat forces (e.g., divisions and separate brigades) contain predominately fighting units, with organic support adequate for only a few days of intense combat. Tactical support forces include the support units which sustain the combat forces beyond this period. The requirements for tactical support units are the result of detailed analyses which project force demands for support such as transportation and resupply of ammunition, food, repair parts and petroleum, maintenance of equipment such as tanks and aircraft, medical facilities, and military construction, based on the combat force and the theater of war in which it will most probably fight. Once

demands are projected, unit equipment and personnel capabilities are analyzed and units capable of performing the required support are placed in the force structure as required. It is important to note that support units themselves create additional support requirements. The following example shows how a requirement for a support unit is determined:

Transportation terminal service companies operate water and air terminals to load and unload ships and aircraft. The number of companies in the force is determined by both the anticipated amount of cargo passing through the ports and the units' cargo handling capacities. One company of 260 men can handle 1,000 short tons of bulk cargo daily. The total tonnage of cargo expected to be handled dictates the number of companies in the force.

This example can be extended to show how technology can impact upon the size of the support structure and therefore on Army manpower requirements. The Army is studying the feasibility of putting cargo in standard-sized containers and equipping the terminal service and associated transportation companies with required cranes and forklifts and special purpose container transporters. This would increase the cargo handling capability of the terminal service company tenfold. While not all cargo can be containerized, such a breakthrough, once the necessary handling equipment is available, will reduce the number of terminal service companies in the Army force structure and also reduces the requirements for 16 other types of support units which exist in part to support terminal service companies. For instance, with fewer men, there is a reduced need for medical and personnel administration units and with less equipment, we need fewer maintenance and quartermaster units.

This type of analysis for Army tactical support forces is continuous and results in time-phased requirements for units based on anticipated deployment to a theater of war. This allows the Army to manage its constrained resources better and to phase units properly into and out of the force structure. Early deploying tactical support units are in the active force. Units required somewhat later (although early by past standards) are allocated to the Reserve Components. The Army is careful to insure that the type of unit that is allocated to the Reserve Components can be properly equipped and trained. Although significant efforts are underway to further integrate Reserve Components into the Total Force to improve their readiness posture, certain types of units requiring specialized training and equipment can only be properly maintained in the active force.

Existing fiscal and manpower constraints do not allow the Army to maintain the force structure it considers essential for sustained operations. Therefore, tactical support units which cannot be accommodated in the active or reserve force structure due to resource constraints are placed in an unmanned category. This category consists of units which can be activated after mobilization and subsequently deployed. In this manner, the requirement for these support forces for a sustained war is recognized and established. The Army tries to insure that the type units left unmanned can be manned and

equipped as needed by resources projected to be available after mobilization. Equipment is procured for these unmanned units on a highly selective basis, so that "off-the-shelf" items are neither purchased nor stockpiled. Only long lead time items (those which cannot be procured prior to the unit's wartime deployment requirements) are programmed. Placing more of the Army's required tactical support force units in the unmanned force structure is recognition of the emphasis on creating combat units at the expense of tactical support. However, there is considerable risk associated with unbalancing our combat and support forces beyond a reasonable point. On-going analyses will define more precisely, down to number and type unit, that point where the risk becomes unacceptable because the combat force cannot be supported adequately. This assessment will be reflected in future Army programming actions.

c. Sustaining Base Manpower Requirements

The sustaining base is composed of units and manpower tailored to perform a specific mission. The manpower requirements for these specially tailored units are determined using staffing standards, work analyses and manpower surveys based on workload and tasks necessary to be performed to accomplish the unit's mission. Typical workload of a sustaining base unit might be reflected by the number of trainees to be trained, tons of supplies to be moved, number of vehicles to be overhauled or the number of patients to be evacuated to CONUS for care. The sustaining base, except for the base operations overseas, is located almost exclusively in the United States. It has wartime missions that differ from those in peacetime only in volume of workload and scope of management. Thus, upon mobilization, the school system must be able to handle more trainees, the depots more supplies, and the hospitals more patients in the form of combat casualties.

As the Army continues to reorganize and reduce headquarters and support forces, refinements in sustaining base operations are made. The dichotomy between peacetime needs and a wartime sustaining base which is expandable to accommodate mobilization workload is a prime consideration as attempts are made to determine properly sustaining base manpower requirements.

3. Management Initiatives

The Army has made significant progress in eliminating headquarters and sustaining support activities of marginal benefit. Seven major headquarters, five overseas and two in the US, have been eliminated since last year's budget was submitted. In addition, the Army Staff underwent an extensive reorganization and reduction in size in 1974 which resulted in 432 military and 828 civilian manpower space eliminations as measured from the FY 74 President's Budget.

The Army is implementing its new long-range installation utilization and stationing plan which is aimed at improving combat readiness and stationing while arriving at the most prudent size and number of installations which the Army will operate over the long run.

The Army's training program now includes "one station training" which is a system for the management of initial entry training. This system supports the "professional home" concept which provides for the consolidation of initial entry training at the minimum number of installations and assures that the majority of new enlistees receive this training at one location. For example, artillery basic training and all subsequent artillery training for soldiers in the artillery career field, will be at Fort Sill, while soldiers enlisting for armor service will receive basic training and specialized armor training at Fort Knox. The program is resulting in training improvements and efficiencies in the force and is making available two training installations, Fort Polk and Fort Ord, for conversion to a combat forces mission.

In the area of logistics, Brooklyn Army Terminal is being closed and Frankford Arsenal is scheduled to be closed by end FY 77. Lexington-Blue Grass, Savanna, and Pueblo Army Depots are being reduced to depot activities by end FY 76 and placed under command and control of other already existing Army Depots. The Army Materiel Command has revised its repair parts distribution by concentrating distribution at three regional depots. The three designated depots are Sharpe Army Depot for the West Coast and Pacific area, Red River Army Depot for the Central United States, and New Cumberland Army Depot for the East Coast and European area. This action is being accomplished to provide improved customer support and more efficient depot operations in terms of reduced costs, fuel requirements, and materiel in-transit times.

The phasedown of the NIKE HERCULES air defense system in CONUS permits the closure of four Army installations dedicated to Army Air Defense Command support.

These Army initiatives will free 2,200 military manpower spaces by end FY 76 which will be applied to the attainment of 16 divisions.

In addition to manpower made available for additional combat units, these management actions permit annual cost reductions in functions which constitute "overhead" and allow reallocation of funds for procurement of equipment and for operating the additional combat forces. Management actions already implemented or scheduled for implementation during the FY 75-FY 76 time frame should result in significant resources being made available for reallocation. One time costs of implementation reduce the near term benefits, but the long term goal is an Army with minimum operation and maintenance costs, viable procurement and R&D programs, and greater combat power.

4. Civilian Manpower

The Army's sustaining support organization is manned principally by civilians. This is in accordance with the general policy to employ civilians rather than military personnel except where prohibited by law, training, security, discipline, rotation base, combat effectiveness, or where other than military incumbency would be inappropriate. This policy permits some latitude in position delineation. When the draft provided

the Army's military manpower needs, optional cases were often decided in favor of military incumbency since military personnel were generally less expensive than civilian workers. Now, in a volunteer environment with relatively expensive military personnel, the cost differential between military and civilians is significantly different. With military and civilian salaries somewhat comparable, and with less of a Service-funded training requirement for civilians, they are frequently less costly to employ. Where this is clearly the case, the Army has taken steps to employ civilians rather than military personnel. There are, however, many exceptions to the "less costly civilian" rule. These lie primarily in technical fields such as research and development, communications and heavy construction where pay comparability does not exist. In these areas, the question of using a military or civilian must be decided on a case-by-case basis. The already complex situation of attempting to determine the comparable cost is further complicated by military and civilian end strength constraints. These constraints may inhibit or preclude transferring incumbency for particular jobs since the transfer would involve changing the total Service military or civilian end strength.

In addition to the trade-offs possible between military and civilian personnel, it is also possible to contract functions. All the problems of determining true cost, end strength constraints and number of funded man-years that complicate the problem of whether to employ a military or civilian also complicate the decision to contract. Additionally, there exists the problem of finding a contractor who is both capable and willing to assume the function. In attempting to analyze these problems, the Army is reviewing its installation operations, and in FY 76 proposes to test at four installations the use of contractors to perform partial, and in two cases complete, installation support. The test would be two years in duration beginning in FY 76. The Army is also considering a test of completely civilian in-house management of installation support, with only selected functions performed by contract.

During FY 73-FY 75, a review of the Army's sustaining support base resulted in substitution of direct hire civilians in 14,000 formerly military positions. There is a potential to decrease further the number of military in the support organizations, but the constraints of manpower ceilings and mandated reductions of civilian manpower programs without reduction in mission remove initiatives to recommend civilian substitution programs.

5. End Strength Change

The Army is asking that it remain at the same size throughout the authorization period, FY 76-77. A stable end strength has been requested for FY 75 and 76. However, with a change in the accountability date, i.e., the new fiscal period ending on 30 September each year, the Army requests a change

to its end strength beginning with FY 7T. This will allow the Army to show the same total strength on 30 June of succeeding years as would have occurred without a change in the current cycle of the fiscal year. The authorized level of manpower in units which make up the active Army force at end FY 76 will be the same in FY 7T and beyond. However, because of the seasonal surges in recruiting during each June-September, 8000 more people will be required. This means that the end strength for FY 7T and beyond should be 793,000 in order to provide a constant level of authorized manpower in units during the fiscal periods of the future.

The change in end strength which results from shifting the year end from 30 June to 30 September is a function of the seasonal variations in the individuals accounts. It is primarily an increase in newly accessed trainees. The five months preceding 30 September are much more productive for recruiting than the five months preceding 30 June. Hence, more trainees are undergoing training on 30 September each year than on 30 June. Additionally, a comparatively small number of extra students and Military Academy Cadets will be in the Army at end September. The increase in Cadets is due to four classes being in session at end September while at end June only three are in session. Some increase in students is experienced due to the higher accessions undergoing skill training requiring special schooling.

6. Changes in the Manpower Categories

In accordance with the text accompanying the FY 75 Authorization Act to better align the Defense Planning and Programing Categories with units in the field, the Army is undertaking to use these categories as its internal manpower management language. Previously, Army manpower and forces had been managed by the Land Forces Classification System (LFCS) and then re-aggregated into the Defense Planning and Programing Categories (DPPC) only for this report. This created additional effort for the Army Staff to prepare the report, and to answer the ensuing questions from readers of the report. However, the substructure of Land Forces of the DPPC's did not provide an adequate display of Army units, hence, was not usable for internal Army management. The Army has changed this substructure by including Division and Special Mission Forces, thus putting mission designation into the Land Forces category. This makes the Defense Planning and Programing Categories suitable for use in managing as well as reporting Army manpower and forces.

C. Army Manpower Requirements by Defense Planning and Programing.

The following tables display by DPPC Army manpower requirements for the period FY 74-FY 77. This section describes the significant features of the FY 75-FY 7T program. Section D will describe the FY 77 program.

Army Military Manpower Requirements
(Active Duty End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 75</u> <u>(FY 1976 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>.9</u>	<u>.9</u>	<u>.9</u>	<u>.8</u>
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>417.8</u>	<u>444.6</u>	<u>472.5</u>	<u>472.5</u>	<u>475.2</u>
Land Forces	417.2	444.0	471.9	471.9	474.6
Mobility Forces	.6	.6	.6	.6	.6
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>40.1</u>	<u>35.2</u>	<u>27.9</u>	<u>27.4</u>	<u>27.3</u>
Intelligence & Security	18.0	17.2	10.1	9.6	9.5
Centrally Managed					
Communication	12.1	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3
Research & Development	7.8	7.7	7.6	7.6	7.6
Support to Other Nations	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.7
Geophysical Activities	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>42.9</u>	<u>41.7</u>	<u>40.5</u>	<u>40.5</u>	<u>39.7</u>
Reserve Component Support	5.1	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9
Base Operating Support	25.7	26.5	25.8	25.8	25.0
Force Support Training	.9	.4	.4	.4	.4
Command	11.2	9.9	9.4	9.4	9.4
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>144.9</u>	<u>128.7</u>	<u>121.5</u>	<u>121.5</u>	<u>120.6</u>
Base Operating Support	20.1	18.1	17.1	17.1	17.1
Medical Support	35.5	32.1	29.9	29.9	29.0
Personnel Support	15.2	13.9	13.6	13.6	13.6
Individual Training	55.9	47.6	44.3	44.3	44.3
Command	10.2	9.0	8.9	8.9	8.9
Logistics	7.7	7.4	7.1	7.1	7.1
Federal Agency Support	.3	.6	.6	.6	.6
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>134.2</u>	<u>133.9</u>	<u>121.8</u>	<u>133.9</u>	<u>134.8</u>
Transients	34.2	34.5	34.0	29.4	30.4
Patients & Prisoners	4.4	3.9	3.9	4.0	4.0
Trainees & Students	92.7	92.6	80.9	96.2	96.1
Cadets	2.9	2.9	3.0	4.3	4.3
Temporary Over (+) or Under- strength (-) in Units <u>1/</u>				-3.7	-5.3
<u>Total Army</u>	<u>782.9</u>	<u>785.0</u>	<u>785.0</u>	<u>793.0</u>	<u>793.0</u>

1/ See page X-28.

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

Army Civilian Manpower Requirements
(Direct & Indirect Hire End Strengths in Thousands)

	FY 74 Actual	FY 75	FY 76 (FY 1976 Budget)	FY 77 Auth.
Strategic Forces	<u>4.5 (-)</u>	<u>1.6 (-)</u>	<u>.9 (-)</u>	<u>.6 (-)</u>
General Purpose Forces	<u>45.3 (9.6)</u>	<u>46.5 (10.4)</u>	<u>45.7 (10.5)</u>	<u>47.3 (11.9)</u>
Land Forces	<u>41.3 (9.6)</u>	<u>42.5 (10.4)</u>	<u>42.0 (10.5)</u>	<u>43.6 (11.9)</u>
Mobility Forces	<u>4.0 (-)</u>	<u>4.0 (-)</u>	<u>3.7 (-)</u>	<u>3.7 (-)</u>
Auxiliary Forces	<u>31.6 (.6)</u>	<u>30.8 (.6)</u>	<u>28.4 (.6)</u>	<u>28.7 (.6)</u>
Intelligence & Security	<u>2.6 (.3)</u>	<u>2.6 (.3)</u>	<u>2.3 (.3)</u>	<u>2.3 (.3)</u>
Centrally Management				
Communication	<u>4.4 (.3)</u>	<u>3.5 (.3)</u>	<u>3.6 (.3)</u>	<u>3.6 (.3)</u>
Research & Development	<u>23.5 (-)</u>	<u>23.5 (-)</u>	<u>21.4 (-)</u>	<u>21.7 (-)</u>
Support to Other Nations	<u>1.1 (-)</u>	<u>1.2 (-)</u>	<u>1.1 (-)</u>	<u>1.1 (-)</u>
Mission Support Forces	<u>99.6 (39.2)</u>	<u>103.2 (42.1)</u>	<u>105.3 (41.5)</u>	<u>105.5 (41.9)</u>
Base Operating Support	<u>84.9 (39.0)</u>	<u>89.3 (41.8)</u>	<u>90.8 (41.2)</u>	<u>90.8 (41.6)</u>
Force Support Training	<u>.2 (.1)</u>	<u>.2 (.1)</u>	<u>.2 (.1)</u>	<u>.2 (.1)</u>
Command	<u>3.6 (.1)</u>	<u>2.9 (.2)</u>	<u>2.9 (.2)</u>	<u>2.9 (.2)</u>
Central Support Forces	<u>227.6 (17.1)</u>	<u>224.0 (16.1)</u>	<u>221.5 (15.1)</u>	<u>225.9 (15.3)</u>
Base Operating Support	<u>40.8 (.9)</u>	<u>42.3 (1.0)</u>	<u>39.6 (1.0)</u>	<u>38.3 (1.0)</u>
Medical Support	<u>25.7 (3.1)</u>	<u>27.3 (3.5)</u>	<u>28.7 (3.9)</u>	<u>29.2 (4.0)</u>
Personnel Support	<u>5.5 (.9)</u>	<u>6.0 (1.3)</u>	<u>6.0 (1.4)</u>	<u>11.9 (1.4)</u>
Individual Training	<u>21.3 (.1)</u>	<u>23.0 (.2)</u>	<u>23.8 (.2)</u>	<u>24.4 (.2)</u>
Command	<u>23.5 (.3)</u>	<u>23.0 (.6)</u>	<u>21.9 (.4)</u>	<u>22.0 (.4)</u>
Logistics	<u>110.7 (11.6)</u>	<u>102.3 (9.5)</u>	<u>101.5 (8.2)</u>	<u>100.1 (8.3)</u>
Total	<u>408.6 (66.4)</u>	<u>406.1 (69.3)</u>	<u>401.7 (67.7)</u>	<u>407.7 (70.4)</u>
Direct Hire Only	<u>342.2</u>	<u>336.8</u>	<u>337.1</u>	<u>337.8</u>
				<u>337.3</u>

() Indirect hire included.

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

1. Army Strategic Forces

The following table displays Army Strategic Forces manpower.

Army Strategic Forces Manpower (End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	3.0	.9	.9	.9
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	4.5	1.6	.9	.6

Army Strategic Forces manpower is devoted to the Army Ballistic Missile Defense program and support of national level command centers.

The reductions from FY 74 to FY 75 reflect the elimination of the Army's role in CONUS surface-to-air defense against manned bomber attack. There is a 400-man civilian reduction from FY 75 to FY 76 caused by the transfer of some Army civil preparedness functions to the General Services Administration. The decision to limit ballistic missile defense to one site permits an additional reduction of 300 civilians between FY 75 and FY 76 and another 300 civilians between FY 76 and FY 77.

2. General Purpose Forces

a. Land Forces

The following table displays Army Land Forces manpower.

Army Land Forces Manpower (End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	417.2	444.0	471.9	471.9
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	41.3	42.5	42.0	42.1

This category includes the Army's combat divisions, separate combat brigades, and tactical support units. The continuing increase in Land Forces reflects the Army's efforts to attain a 16 division force, thereby increasing its combat capability and effectiveness.

In FY 75, the Army will activate three brigades as the nuclei of the additional three divisions. These brigades are the initial brigades of the following divisions: the 5th Mechanized Infantry Division (Ft Polk, LA), the 7th Infantry Division (Ft Ord, CA); and the 24th Infantry Division (Ft Hunter/Stewart, GA).

In addition, the 1st Cavalry Division at Ft Hood, TX, will be reorganized as an armored division by making the Air Cavalry Combat Brigade (ACCB) a separate brigade and replacing it with an armored brigade (2 battalions). A brigade of the 2d Armored Division at Ft Hood will be deployed to Europe. An identical brigade will be reconstituted at Ft Hood in late FY 75 giving the 2d Armored Division four active brigades. Other programmed increases in Land Forces in FY 75 include: one ranger battalion, one target acquisition battery, and one attack helicopter company.

During FY 76 we plan to activate two new Army combat brigades. One of these brigades will be activated at Fort Ord, California and become the 2d Brigade of the 7th Infantry Division. The second brigade to be activated will be added as the 4th Brigade, 4th Division (Mechanized) at Fort Carson, Colorado. This brigade will be activated concurrent with the deployment of a brigade of the 4th Division (Mechanized) to Europe.

As mentioned earlier, the 194th School Troops Brigade will become the 2d Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division in FY 76. The 197th Infantry Brigade (separate) which is now a non-divisional Land Forces brigade, will be reorganized and redesignated as the 2d Brigade, 24th Infantry Division at Fort Benning, Georgia. Additionally, the following tactical support combat units are programmed for activation in FY 76:

- Three combat engineer battalions (one delayed from FY 75).
- Two field artillery battalions, 155mm.
- Two field artillery battalions, 8" (delayed from FY 75).
- One air defense battalion (HAWK).
- One ranger battalion (delayed from FY 75).

The 2d Infantry Division in Korea is programed for a manpower increase during FY 76 thus placing it in a better posture for deployment outside Korea. The following chart summarizes the end FY 76 major combat forces.

COMBINED ARMS ORGANIZATIONS IN LAND FORCES END FY 76

	<u>Active Army</u>	<u>Reserve Components</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Divisions</u>			
Armored	4	2	6
Mechanized	5 1/	1	6
Infantry	5 1/	5	10
Air Assault	1		1
Airborne	1	-	1
	<u>16</u>	<u>-8</u>	<u>24</u>
<u>Separate Brigades</u>			
Armored		3	3
Mechanized		7	7
Infantry	3	11 2/	14
Air Cavalry	1	-	1
	<u>4</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>25</u>
<u>Armored Cavalry</u>			
<u>Regiments</u>	3	4	7

1/ Three active Infantry Divisions and one Infantry (Mech) Division will each be rounded out by one Reserve Component separate brigade. This will mean that these four active divisions will each have two active brigades and one Reserve Component brigade in FY 76.

2/ One brigade is a non-deploying school troops brigade.

Also during FY 76 4,229 tactical signal intelligence military spaces are transferred to Land Forces from the Intelligence and Security account in Auxiliary Forces. This change places all of the Army's combat and tactical support forces (see paragraph B2 above) in Land Forces and is one part of an effort to make the Defense Planning and Programing Categories a better reflection of the Army's force structure.

The increase of 1,100 civilians from FY 74 to FY 75 is an increase in the number of National Guard and Army Reserve technicians to improve equipment maintenance capabilities. The civilian decrease between FY 75 and FY 76 is a result of transferring 2,000 spaces to the Navy for assuming the budgeting and funding responsibility for US forces in Thailand, offset by 1,200 additional Army Reserve and National Guard technicians for Reserve units with a Land Forces mission and 800 additional indirect hire personnel to perform support functions in Europe which will release soldiers for combat units. Other small changes result in a net reduction of 500 spaces.

b. Mobility Forces

The following table displays Army Mobility Forces manpower.

Army Mobility Forces Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
<u>Military</u>	.6	.6	.6	.6
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	4.0	4.0	3.7	3.7

Army manpower required for Mobility Forces is for operation of Department of Defense water ports, which provide traffic management services for moving DOD cargo and passengers within CONUS to overseas commands. The civilian reduction between FY 75 and FY 76 is a result of management economies and anticipation of a small workload reduction.

3. Auxiliary Forces

a. Intelligence and Security

Intelligence and Security manpower requirements are displayed in the following table.

Army Intelligence and Security Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
<u>Military</u>	18.0	17.2	10.1	9.6
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	2.6	2.6	2.3	2.3

The Army manpower in this category shows a continuing decline. This category includes manpower in both the Consolidated Cryptologic Activities (CCP) and the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP). There is a transfer in FY 76 of 2,710 military and 160 civilian personnel engaged in the conduct of intelligence training. These positions have been transferred to the Individual Training category of Central Support Forces and to the Students category to reflect more accurately the manpower committed to training.

There will also be a transfer of 4,229 tactical signal intelligence military spaces to Land Forces during FY 76. These units will now perform direct support missions for combat units and are more accurately reflected in the Land Forces category. The remaining military and civilian reductions during both FY 76 and FY 7T result primarily from continued implementation of the CCP and GDIP reduction plans.

b. Centrally Managed Communications

The following table displays Army support of centrally managed DOD communications activities.

Centrally Managed Communications
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	12.1	8.3	8.3	8.3
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	4.4	3.5	3.6	3.6

This category includes manpower in support of Defense Consolidated Telecommunications and the Worldwide Military Command and Control System. It excludes communications in support of tactical units (included under Land Forces) and that which is involved in installation support (included in Base Operating Support). The military decrease from FY 74 to FY 75 is due essentially to the transfer of approximately 3,000 base communication spaces from this category to Base Operating Support, Mission and Central Support Forces. The civilian reduction from FY 74 to FY 75 reflects a transfer of approximately 800 base communication spaces to Base Operating Support which more correctly reflects their mission. The FY 76 increase of one hundred civilians was required to support increased tasks and the introduction of new communications security equipment.

c. Research and Development

The following table displays Army Research and Development manpower.

Army Research and Development Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	7.8	7.7	7.6	7.6
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	23.5	23.5	21.4	21.7

Army manpower is allocated to Research and Development to: (1) direct contractor efforts and carry on in-house programs in the areas of basic and applied research; (2) engineer, design, and fabricate experimental prototype articles and systems; (3) conduct testing and evaluation; and (4) operate and maintain Army R&D facilities. The downward trend results from management reorganizations and contracting for new projects in the research and exploratory development categories rather than undertaking them as in-house R&D projects.

d. Support to Other Nations

Army manpower contained in the Support to Other Nations category is shown below.

Army Support to Other Nations Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.7
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.1

Army manpower in this category includes international military headquarters and agencies, Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG), missions and military groups, and such activities as the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, and the School of the Americas. The civilian reduction during FY 76 is a transfer to the Navy for assumption of the budgeting and funding for US forces in Thailand.

e. Geophysical Activities

The manpower in this category is assigned to the Defense Mapping Agency. The table below reflects a constant level of support.

Army Geophysical Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	.2	.2	.2	.2

4. Mission Support Forces

a. Reserve Components Support

The following table displays Army Reserve Component Support manpower.

Army Reserve Component Support Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	5.1	4.9	4.9	4.9
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	10.9	10.8	11.5	11.5

The manpower in this category consists of active military and civilian personnel who provide training, administrative and logistical support to the Reserve Components. Not included are civilian technicians who directly support reserve units with a Land Forces mission. These technicians are accounted for under the Land Forces category.

The civilian increase from FY 75 to FY 76 is for 100 additional technicians for the National Guard to perform administrative, supply, and maintenance activities and 600 civilians for the Army Reserve to perform base operations at USAR installations.

b. Base Operating Support (Mission Support Forces)

Base Operating Support manpower is displayed in the following table.

<u>Army Base Operating Support Manpower</u> (End Strengths in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	25.7	26.5	25.8	25.8
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	84.9	89.3	90.8	90.8

Army manpower in this category is in support of the Army's mission commands--US Army Europe, US Army Japan, Eighth Army Korea, and US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). The military increase in FY 75 is primarily the result of the transfer of base communications from the Centrally Managed Communications category. This is offset in FY 76 by actions which convert supporting forces into combat forces. The civilian increases in FY 75 are from military-to-civilian conversions and the transfer of base communications from Centrally Managed Communications. The civilian increases in FY 76 and FY 77 result from the transfer of Fort Ord, California to Mission Support Forces from Central Support Forces as it becomes a division post; and additional indirect hire civilians to perform support functions in Europe replacing military personnel who have been transferred to combat units.

c. Force Support Training

This includes the Army's Jungle Warfare School in the Canal Zone and the Northern Warfare Training Center in Alaska. As can be seen from the following table, a constant level of effort is planned. Students attending these schools are reflected in the Students account of the Individuals category.

Army Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	.9	.4	.4	.4
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	.2	.2	.2	.2

d. Command (Mission Support Forces)

The following table includes Army elements of international military headquarters and agencies, joint headquarters, and major Army mission commands.

Army Command (Mission Support) Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	11.2	9.9	9.4	9.4
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	3.6	2.9	2.9	2.9

The decreasing trend reflects the continuing effort to reduce headquarters related manpower. The military and civilian reductions from FY 74 to FY 75 are a result of the elimination of the Army's role in CONUS surface-to-air defense against manned bombers and general headquarters reductions.

5. Central Support Forces

a. Base Operating Support

Army manpower committed to Base Operating Support (Central Support Forces) is displayed in the following table.

Army Base Operating Support Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	20.1	18.1	17.1	17.1
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	40.8	42.3	39.6	38.3

This category includes the base support for the Army's support oriented commands: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, US Army Materiel Command, and US Army Communications Command. The military reductions from FY 74 to FY 75 are primarily the result of military-to-civilian conversions and support reductions in the training establishment. The conversion of Fort Ord, California from a training post to one which supports an Army division accounts for the major portion of the military and civilian reduction during FY 76 and FY 77. In FY 76, Fort Ord's Base Operating Forces are included in Mission Support Forces. The civilian increase from FY 74 to FY 75 results from the transfer of base communications from Centrally Managed Communications and the military-to-civilian conversion program.

b. Medical Support

The medical support manpower displayed in the following table includes all Army non-tactical medical care activities.

Army Medical Support Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	35.5	32.1	29.9	29.9
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	25.7	27.3	28.7	29.2

Army Medical Support military personnel strengths declined 5.6 thousand over the period. The major portion of this decline is attributed to substitution of civilians for military personnel and reductions made possible by consolidation of headquarters functions. Civilian personnel strength increases of 3.5 thousand during the same period are required to effect the conversions previously mentioned, and to meet essential priority requirements; e.g., staffing of the new hospital at Walter Reed Army Medical Center.

c. Personnel Support

The manpower displayed in the following table includes primarily the US Army Recruiting Command, the Army Junior ROTC program, the personnel investigative function, the Army Personnel Centers and the dependent school systems.

Army Personnel Support Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	15.2	13.9	13.6	13.6
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	5.5	6.0	6.0	11.9

The military reduction from FY 75 to FY 76 reflects: (1) a reduction of the headquarters element of personnel centers at Oakland Army Terminal, Fort Jackson, and Fort Dix. (This function is being absorbed jointly by the respective installations and the Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN)); and (2) a reduction in the personnel investigative function. The 5,900 civilian increase in FY 7T reflects school teachers who are employed on 30 September of the new fiscal year structure. In prior years, they were not counted since at the end of the fiscal year (30 June); the school year had been completed and the school teachers were not on the rolls.

d. Individual Training

Manpower required to conduct Individual Training is displayed in the following table. The individuals actually undergoing training are carried in the Student/Trainee account of the Individuals Category.

<u>Army Individual Training Manpower</u> (End Strengths in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
<u>Military</u>	55.9	47.6	44.3	44.3
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	21.3	23.0	23.8	24.4

The 8,300 reduction reflected from FY 74 to FY 75 is the result of a program wide reduction in the training establishment. The major reductions were: military to civilian conversion; reduction in instructors and school support; and a reduction in the number of Basic training companies from 207 to 198.

In FY 76 another 3,300 positions will be eliminated as part of the continuing effort to convert support spaces into combat spaces. Reduced training load requirements also permit this further reduction. For example, in FY 76 the Army will be able to save 800 military spaces by dropping from 198 Basic Training Companies to 189 Basic Training Companies. The net reduction shown for FY 76 includes the transfer to this category of 1,200 military spaces from the Intelligence and Security category.

The civilian increase from FY 74-FY 75 is principally the result of the military-to-civilian conversion described above. Nine hundred Army Reserve technicians are added in FY 76 to improve the capability of reserve units with an Individual Training mission. In FY 7T an additional 500 civilian positions are programmed to support further military-to-civilian conversions.

e. Command (Central Support Forces)

This category includes the Department of Army Headquarters, Army support to Defense agencies, major Army support related headquarters, and the criminal investigation function. The reductions reflected in the following table are part of the Army's continuing effort to reduce headquarters.

Army Command (Central Support) Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
<u>Military</u>	10.2	9.0	8.9	8.9
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	23.5	23.0	21.9	22.0

f. Logistics

Army manpower in this category is required for centralized logistics management. It includes primarily the Army Materiel Command and various logistic units at installation level. The following table displays Army manpower committed to these activities.

Army Logistics Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
<u>Military</u>	7.7	7.4	7.1	7.1
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	110.7	102.3	101.5	100..1

FY75 civilian requirements decrease 2,400 in Operation and Maintenance Army (OMA) and industrial funded activities due to reduced inventories and realignment and consolidation actions.

In FY76, industrial funded depot maintenance activities increase 4,800 spaces to reduce maintenance backlogs of required equipment, primarily combat vehicles, aircraft and communication electronics. This increase will reduce backlogs \$101 million by end FY7T. A further increase of 600 spaces is due to requirements for MCA and family housing construction.

These FY76 increases are more than offset by 5,000 savings from the depot realignments discussed on page 10 of this chapter and a 1,300 indirect hire decrease in OMA funded supply and maintenance activities in the Pacific logistic complex.

The FY77 civilian reduction reflects further savings from base closures and realignments.

g. Federal Agency Support

The following table reflects military manpower assigned outside the Department of Defense on a reimbursable basis.

Army Federal Agency Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	.3	.6	.6	.6

6. Individuals

a. Transients

The following table summarizes Army Transients manpower requirements.

Army Transients Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	34.2	34.5	34.0	29.4

Projected transient strengths for FY 75 and FY 76 are based upon recent experience, modified to reflect the impacts of policy decisions, for the average en route time per PCS move and the projected PCS move program for the fiscal year. The FY 74 transient strength reflects those persons reported by the personnel system on the last day of the fiscal year. The transient end strength is stable through FY 76. The decrease in transients in FY 77 is due to the seasonality of PCS moves. Fewer moves occur in September than in June because of summer cycles and school start dates.

b. Patients and Prisoners

The following table displays the average programmed levels of patients and prisoners.

Army Patients/Prisoners Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	4.4	3.9	3.9	4.0

c. Trainees, Students, and Cadets

Manpower requirements for these accounts are shown in the following table.

Army Trainee, Students and Cadets Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Trainees/Students</u>	92.7	92.6	80.9	96.2
<u>Cadets</u>	2.9	2.9	3.0	4.3

Army trainee strength for FY 74 exceeded planned strength by ten thousand. This was due to the great success the Army achieved in its recruiting and all Volunteer Force Programs. The decrease in FY 76 is a reflection of lower Army accession requirements in FY 76 than in FY 75. The increase in FY 77 reflects the seasonality of accessions and late summer inputs to schools.

The increase in West Point cadets in FY 77 reflects all four classes being in session on 30 September. Only three classes are enrolled on 30 June.

d. Temporary Over (+) or Understrength (-) in Units

This entry is not a category but an accounting adjustment as shown in the following table.

Army Strength Deviation

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	N/A	N/A	N/A	-3.7

The Army will use a strength deviation adjustment beginning in FY 77 to reflect the differences between the number of authorized spaces in the units in the force and the number of men expected to actually be in those units on the last day of the fiscal year.

Assuming no units enter or leave the force, the number of authorized positions remains constant throughout the fiscal year. The requested end strength is for the purpose of manning the units at their authorized level.

On any one day in the fiscal year, however, units will be at, over or under their authorized strength. This is due principally to the seasonality of accessions. The late summer months have historically been the best

recruiting months for the Army. As a result, in the August-September time frame there tends to be a larger number of men in basic training than there would be in late spring or early summer. Units in the force tend to be temporarily undermanned at this time while awaiting replacements to finish their initial training. As shown in the above table, the Army expects that on 30 September 1976, the units in the structure will temporarily be 3,700 men under their authorized strength. The replacements needed are in training and will shortly be joining their units.

A positive adjustment (e.g., +3,700) would mean that the units are temporarily overstrength. This indicates that replacements have already arrived for men who will be leaving soon.

The Army believes that the use of this adjustment more accurately reflects the dynamic nature of the manpower program and the actual distribution of manpower at the end of the fiscal year. The adjustment provides a much better vehicle for explaining and justifying the differences between structure strength requirements and actual manning levels.

D. FY 1977 Army Manpower Requirements

The following table displays Army manpower requirements for FY 77 compared to FY 7T.

Army Manpower Requirements

	Military		Civilian (Direct and Indirect)	
	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Strategic Force</u>	<u>.9</u>	<u>.8</u>	<u>.6 (--)</u>	<u>.6 (--)</u>
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>472.5</u>	<u>475.2</u>	<u>45.8 (10.8)</u>	<u>47.3 (11.9)</u>
Land Forces	471.9	474.6	42.1 (10.8)	43.6 (11.9)
Mobility Forces	.6	.6	3.7 (--)	3.7 (--)
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>27.4</u>	<u>27.3</u>	<u>28.7 (.6)</u>	<u>28.7 (.6)</u>
Intelligence & Security	9.6	9.5	2.3 (.3)	2.3 (.3)
Centrally Managed Communications	8.3	8.3	3.6 (.3)	3.6 (.3)
Research & Development	7.6	7.6	21.7 (--)	21.7 (--)
Support to Other Nations	1.7	1.7	1.1 (--)	1.1 (--)
Geophysical Activities	.2	.2	-- (--)	-- (--)
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>40.5</u>	<u>39.7</u>	<u>105.5 (41.9)</u>	<u>105.9 (42.2)</u>
Reserve Component				
Support	4.9	4.9	11.5 (--)	11.4 (--)
Base Operating Support	25.8	25.0	90.8 (41.6)	91.3 (41.9)
Force Support Training	.4	.4	.2 (.1)	.2 (.1)
Command	9.4	9.4	2.9 (.2)	3.0 (.2)
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>121.5</u>	<u>120.6</u>	<u>225.9 (15.3)</u>	<u>225.2 (15.6)</u>
Base Operating Support	17.1	17.1	38.3 (1.0)	38.2 (1.1)
Medical Support	29.9	29.0	29.2 (4.0)	29.7 (4.6)
Personnel Support	13.6	13.6	11.9 (1.4)	11.9 (1.4)
Individual Training	44.3	44.3	24.4 (.2)	24.7 (.1)
Command	8.9	8.9	22.0 (.4)	22.0 (.4)
Logistics	7.1	7.1	100.1 (8.3)	98.7 (7.9)
Federal Agency Support	.6	.6	-- (--)	-- (--)
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>133.9</u>	<u>134.8</u>	--	--
Transients	29.4	30.4	-- (--)	-- (--)
Patients & Prisoners	4.0	4.0	-- (--)	-- (--)
Trainees & Students	96.2	96.1	-- (--)	-- (--)
Cadets	4.3	4.3	-- (--)	-- (--)
Temporary Over (+) or Understrength (-) in Units 1/	-3.7	-5.3		
<u>Total</u>	<u>793.0</u>	<u>793.0</u>	<u>406.5 (68.7)</u>	<u>407.7 (70.4)</u>
<u>Direct Hire Only</u>			<u>337.8</u>	<u>337.3</u>

1/ See p. X-28.

() Indirect hire included.

E. Changes From the FY 77 Request

From the preceding table, it is apparent that FY 77 will be a year of relative stability with only a few major changes occurring. The units newly formed in FY 76 and the transition period will be intensively engaged in unit training in order to reach the prescribed readiness state. Other economies in sustaining support units in the United States and overseas (primarily in the Western Pacific) will be used to fine tune the balance of the force as more combat and tactical support units are added to General Purpose Land Forces. The changes in FY 77 will be much less dramatic than those in FY 75 and FY 76 since the Army will find it increasingly difficult to identify units or manpower which can be shifted to combat units without degrading the Army's early combat capability.

CHAPTER XI

NAVY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

A. Introduction

This chapter describes the Navy's military and civilian manpower requirements for FY's 1976, 1977 and 1978. It depicts manpower requirement trends over these fiscal years and discusses the rationale underlying significant changes in manpower requirements from year to year. Finally, the chapter describes the missions and functions of Navy elements within the various Defense Planning and Programming Categories.

The Navy requests authority for both active duty military and civilian personnel end-strengths for the fiscal years 1976, 1977, and 1978. These strength requests are as follows:

<u>Navy Manpower Requirement</u> (End Strengths)			
	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Active Military Personnel</u>	<u>528,651</u>	<u>531,860</u>	<u>546,005</u>
<u>Civilian Personnel</u>			
<u>Direct Hire, Military</u>			
Functions	304,432	304,772	310,363
<u>Indirect Hire Foreign</u>			
Nationals	9,424	9,424	9,424
Total Civilian	<u>313,856</u>	<u>314,196</u>	<u>319,787</u>

B. Significant Trends

1. Military Manpower

The following table compares the military manpower requested for Active forces in FY 76 with strength in selected prior years.

<u>ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL</u> (End Strength in 000's)	
<u>End Fiscal Year</u>	
1950 (pre-Korea)	381.5
1952 (peak Korea)	824.3
1964 (pre-Vietnam)	667.6
1969 (peak Vietnam)	775.6
1976	528.7

Within the limitations of reduced military strengths, the Department of the Navy has undertaken significant initiatives to increase combat structure and combat readiness by reductions in the support establishment, including headquarters, that are not critical to overall national security. Combat readiness is being improved by retirements of obsolescent World War II hulls and replacing them with new, multi-mission modern weapon platforms. For several years more ships have been leaving the fleet than have been entering. In FY 77, this downward trend will be reversed when the Navy will be adding as many new ships to the fleet as are being retired. Military manpower end-strength trends match these changes in force levels. Manpower generally declines from FY 74 through end FY 76. When force levels increase in FY 77, manpower end-strengths likewise begin to rise. Most of the increase occurring in FY 77 is due to the change in the end date of the fiscal year. A slightly higher end strength is required on 30 September to support the same level of manning that existed on 30 June.

Officer strength, however, will continue to decline in the out-years since it is planned to increase the number of enlisted sailors per officer.

The combat-to-support ratio is programmed to improve since additional force increases will not be matched by support increases.

2. Civilian Manpower

Navy direct-hire civilian manpower has also been reduced significantly in recent years. From a level of 318,300 in FY 1964, civilian employment rose to a peak of 398,600 in FY 69. From this level, it declines by 94,200 to 304,400 in FY 76, or a decrease of 23.6% from FY 69. It should also be noted that the actual decline based on FY 69 workload is somewhat greater, as a total of 10,000 military billets were converted to civilian status in 1973-75.

The period FY 74-'75 shows a moderate decline of 5,900 direct-hire civilian positions based on Congressional funding and end-strength reductions. An increase of 10,000 civilians from FY 75 to FY 77 is related primarily to expansion of the following programs.

- TRIDENT
- Naval Air Rework
- Naval Shipyards
- Public Works Centers
- Support of activities in Thailand (functional transfer from Army)

C. Manpower Requirements Determination Process

The Navy employs a systematic process to determine structure manpower requirements for both the operating and support forces. A brief description of the processes for developing operating force requirements is presented below, followed by a description of the shore-based support manpower requirements determination system.

1. Operating Force Manpower Requirements

After the operating force levels and mixes have been determined, the associated force manpower is derived on the basis of workload requirements for specific ship and aircraft types. The primary device for measuring the workload is the Navy Manpower Documentation Program. Using accepted work study techniques and manpower productivity criteria the manpower needed to permit a given class of ship or aircraft squadron to perform its mission is established. These manpower levels are reflected in Ship Manpower Documents and Squadron Manpower Documents for each type of squadron or ship.

The Ship Manpower Documentation Program was initiated in 1966 to provide a rigorous, analytical process for determining manpower requirements afloat. By the end of FY 74, documentation efforts on a ship class basis were essentially completed, and sufficient data had been acquired to permit an orderly and evolutionary expansion of the program's scope. Since a ship class manpower document is not as discriminating as one tailored to an individual ship, and because of equipment and configuration modifications and differences between ships of the same class, the logical progression for the program was to provide manpower documentation on an individual ship basis. The expanded program was implemented in FY 75, with approximately 20% of Navy's active ships scheduled for manpower documentation each year. Since ship alterations accomplished during overhaul and conversion are the prime contributing factor to changes in manpower requirements over the life of a ship, requirements determination and refinement are scheduled incident to and concurrent with ship overhaul schedules.

Military manpower requirements for ships amount to approximately 190,000. Navy has not been able to support completely the documented requirements because of resource constraints, and about 95% of total requirements are authorized. In order to decrease the authorization shortfall, manpower savings realized through reductions in staff and support components are reprogrammed to combat forces as they become available. As new ships with full manning programmed enter the fleet and older ships with less than full manning authorized are decommissioned, the percentage of funded requirements will increase.

The following illustration is presented in order to demonstrate the manhour computations which are involved in developing Navy manpower documents.

Through the application of work sampling and other industrial engineering techniques, the standard Navy workweek aboard ship in the "at sea-at war" condition has been determined to include the following elements:

	<u>Watchstander</u>	<u>Non-Watchstander</u>
Watch	56 hours	0
Training	2 hours	3 hours
Service Diversion	2.5 hours	3 hours
Scheduled Work	13.5 hours	40.5 hours
Unscheduled Work	0	19.5 hours
Total Workweek	<u>74.0 hours</u>	<u>66.0 hours</u>

The uniqueness of a naval ship at sea under wartime conditions defines the parameters of these elements. Space constraints which cause a ship to have a limited number of sleeping accommodations, a limited water supply, and limited food storage and refrigeration space, combine with the necessity to operate seven days a week, to rule out a simple industrial 40-hour week. Thus, the watchstanders who operate the propulsion equipment, steer the ship, and man the weapons systems rotate through eight hours each day of the week, for a total of 56 hours per watchstander.

In order for everyone in the Navy to prepare for a more responsible position, and to maintain the ship in a proper state of readiness, a two-hour allowance for watchstanders and a three-hour allowance for non-watchstanders are included for either formal or on-the-job training.

The "Service Diversion" allowance covers items which normally are accomplished during off-watch hours and, as a result, must be deducted from the individual's capacity to do productive work. It covers items required by regulations and by the nature of the shipboard routine, such as: inspections, time in the pay line, sick call, haircuts, and administrative requirements.

"Scheduled Work" is routine work which is to be accomplished during normal working hours. Non-watchstanders perform the bulk of their work during this period.

"Unscheduled Work" provides for personnel to be available for equipment repair and other items of an unpredictable nature.

Both the elements of scheduled and unscheduled work include the industrial engineering practice of providing allowance for delays arising due to fatigue, environmental effects, personal needs, and unavoidable interruptions (Productive Allowance Factors), and for drawing tools and publications, entering equipment, closing equipment, returning tools, etc. (Make-ready, put-away factor.)

Manpower requirements are determined by:

- a. Identifying all watch stations.
- b. Providing watchstander billets to cover all watch stations 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, at a rate of 56 hours per billet.
- c. Determining the number of hours of work required each week through work measurement techniques (including productive and make-ready, put-away factors), and designating it for accomplishment in either the scheduled or unscheduled work category.
- d. Dividing the identified work by the appropriate watchstander (13.5 hours) or non-watchstander (40.5 or 19.5 hours) factors to determine the total number of billets.
- e. Stating the requirements in terms of Navy skill categories and paygrades.

The Aviation Squadron Manpower Documentation Program is presently capable of determining the manpower requirements for all types of aircraft squadrons. The flexibility of the Squadron Manpower Documentation Program is being increased with the development of aviation manpower standards which equate specific manpower required for each hour of aircraft operation. The development of aviation standards will provide the capability of responding to variances of aircraft inventory and/or changes in operating tempo.

Squadron Manpower Documents currently cover approximately 74% of operating force aircraft squadrons. The end FY 75 manpower numbers required by the Squadron Manpower Documentation Program are 44,229. Authorized billets for documented squadrons are 39,736. Therefore, authorized billets will equal only 90% of documented minimum requirements.

In addition to ships and aircraft squadrons, manpower requirements must be documented and substantiated for such combat support units as Mobile Construction Battalions (Seabees), Underwater Demolition Teams, Fleet Maintenance Assistance Groups (FMAGs) and Fleet Support Squadrons. These requirements are based on the tasks to be performed in each unit and their assigned missions.

2. Shore Based Support Manpower Requirements

Determining support manpower requirements for shore-based activities is a far more complex process. Since the previous manpower survey program provided limited coverage, a dynamic and predictive methodology for determination of military and civilian support manpower requirements has been implemented by Navy. This program, entitled Shore Requirements, Standards, and Manpower Planning System (SHORSTAMPS), is comprised of a standard tasking subsystem and a corresponding set of Navy-wide staffing standards. An improvement in manpower requirements determination and resource management ashore is being achieved by forging a positive link between operational capability and functionally oriented manpower requirements based on workload measurement.

The development of staffing standards by professionals at the two Navy Manpower and Material Analysis Centers is proceeding according to plan. Accepted industrial engineering methodologies and statistical analysis techniques are applied to on-site workload measurements. The resultant standard is an objective statement of minimum manpower requirements to perform specified tasks over a range of workload values.

These procedures for determining Navy's support manpower needs are currently being applied to the areas of Training, Aircraft Maintenance, Berthing, Food Service, and a number of other functions. A comprehensive plan is underway to develop and apply staffing standards to the balance of the support establishment over the next five years. Although this complete SHORSTAMPS coverage will not be achieved until FY 79, each staffing standard is being implemented as soon as final approval is obtained.

Historically, civilian manpower requirements have been determined by a variety of workload planning systems developed for specific types of activities. These systems, in turn, are constrained by customer or program funding availability and local labor market conditions. This is especially pertinent in the Navy Industrial Fund activities, which are customer-oriented, and which employ over half of the Navy's civilians. Because of the multiplicity of factors involved in determining civilian staffing requirements, current systems will be addressed in appropriate sections of the chapter.

D. Manpower Requirements By Defense Planning and Programming Category

The following tables display by DPPC Navy manpower requirements for the period FY 74 to FY 77. This section describes the significant features of the FY 75-FY 77 program. Section E will describe the FY 77 program.

Navy Military Manpower Requirements
(Active Duty End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 75</u> <u>(FY 1976 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>18.6</u>	<u>18.9</u>	<u>19.6</u>	<u>19.7</u>	<u>20.4</u>
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>236.8</u>	<u>245.1</u>	<u>241.1</u>	<u>241.3</u>	<u>249.2</u>
Land Forces	2.5	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.9
Tactical Air Forces	61.4	68.6	65.9	65.7	64.1
Naval Forces	172.5	173.3	172.0	172.5	182.0
Mobility Forces	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>29.7</u>	<u>31.0</u>	<u>29.5</u>	<u>29.5</u>	<u>26.8</u>
Intelligence & Security	11.3	10.9	9.7	9.6	9.4
Centrally Managed					
Communication	9.6	10.8	11.0	11.0	9.0
Research & Development	6.4	6.6	6.7	6.6	6.3
Support to Other Nations	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2
Geophysical Activities	2.3	2.4	2.0	2.0	2.0
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>67.1</u>	<u>70.4</u>	<u>69.5</u>	<u>69.5</u>	<u>69.5</u>
Reserve Components Support	7.1	7.6	7.6	7.6	7.6
Base Operating Support	34.1	37.1	36.7	36.7	36.6
Force Support Training	13.2	12.6	12.5	12.5	12.6
Command	12.8	13.1	12.8	12.8	12.7
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>87.2</u>	<u>86.1</u>	<u>86.2</u>	<u>86.6</u>	<u>85.8</u>
Base Operating Support	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8
Medical Support	20.0	19.7	19.7	19.7	19.6
Personnel Support	6.8	8.1	8.2	8.2	8.2
Individual Training	40.6	38.3	38.6	39.0	38.5
Command	8.5	8.1	8.0	8.0	7.8
Logistics	7.2	8.0	7.8	7.7	7.8
Federal Agency Support	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>106.2</u>	<u>84.6</u>	<u>82.7</u>	<u>89.2</u>	<u>94.3</u>
Transients	39.5	24.4	24.9	27.2	25.5
Patients & Prisoners	5.7	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.4
Trainees & Students	57.8	52.7	50.3	54.3	61.1
Midshipmen	3.2	4.2	4.2	4.4	4.4
<u>Total Navy</u>	<u>545.7</u>	<u>536.1</u>	<u>528.7</u>	<u>535.9</u>	<u>546.0</u>

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

Navy Civilian Manpower Requirements
(Direct & Indirect Hire and Strengths in Thousands)

	FY 74 Actual	FY 75	FY 76 (FY 1976 Budget)	FY 77	FY 77 Auth.
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	1.3 (-)	1.4 (-)	1.5 (-)	1.5 (-)	1.2 (-)
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	5.7 (.1)	5.5 (.1)	5.9 (.1)	5.9 (.1)	6.1 (.1)
Naval Forces	<u>.3 (*)</u>	<u>.3 (*)</u>	<u>.3 (*)</u>	<u>.3 (*)</u>	<u>.3 (*)</u>
Mobility Forces	5.4 (.1)	5.2 (.1)	5.6 (.1)	5.6 (.1)	5.8 (.1)
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	48.5 (.9)	47.8 (.9)	45.2 (.9)	45.2 (.9)	45.2 (.9)
<u>Intelligence & Security</u>	<u>1.8 (.1)</u>	<u>1.9 (.1)</u>	<u>1.8 (.1)</u>	<u>1.8 (.1)</u>	<u>1.8 (.1)</u>
Centrally Managed					
Communication	4.3 (.8)	4.3 (.8)	4.1 (.8)	4.1 (.8)	4.1 (.8)
Research & Development	39.5 (-)	38.6 (-)	36.4 (-)	36.4 (-)	36.4 (-)
Support to Other Nations	1.1 (*)	1.3 (*)	1.3 (*)	1.3 (*)	1.3 (*)
Geophysical Activities	1.7 (*)	1.7 (*)	1.7 (*)	1.7 (*)	1.7 (*)
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	35.5 (4.0)	36.2 (4.0)	37.8 (3.7)	37.8 (3.7)	37.8 (3.7)
Reserve Components Support	<u>3.1 (-)</u>	<u>3.0 (-)</u>	<u>3.1 (-)</u>	<u>3.1 (-)</u>	<u>3.1 (-)</u>
Base Operating Support	27.1 (3.9)	26.7 (4.0)	26.4 (3.7)	26.4 (3.7)	26.4 (3.7)
Force Support Training	.5 (-)	.5 (-)	.5 (-)	.5 (-)	.5 (-)
Command	4.8 (*)	6.0 (*)	7.8 (*)	7.8 (*)	7.8 (*)
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	224.3 (4.2)	219.1 (4.7)	223.4 (4.7)	223.7 (4.7)	228.8 (4.7)
Base Operating Support	<u>21.1 (1.3)</u>	<u>20.7 (1.5)</u>	<u>21.4 (1.5)</u>	<u>21.4 (1.5)</u>	<u>21.7 (1.5)</u>
Medical Support	9.8 (.1)	10.1 (.2)	10.0 (.2)	10.0 (.2)	9.9 (.2)
Personnel Support	1.6 (-)	1.8 (-)	1.9 (-)	2.3 (-)	2.2 (-)
Individual Training	14.2 (-)	14.8 (-)	14.5 (-)	14.5 (-)	14.5 (-)
Command	17.2 (*)	15.9 (*)	15.9 (*)	15.9 (-)	16.1 (-)
Logistics	160.5 (2.8)	155.8 (3.0)	159.7 (3.0)	159.7 (3.0)	164.2 (3.0)
<u>Total Navy</u>	<u>315.4 (9.2)</u>	<u>310.0 (9.7)</u>	<u>313.9 (9.4)</u>	<u>314.2 (9.4)</u>	<u>319.8 (9.4)</u>
<u>Direct Hire Only</u>	<u>306.2</u>	<u>300.3</u>	<u>304.4</u>	<u>304.8</u>	<u>310.4</u>

* Indicates less than 50 spaces.

() Indirect hire included.

NOTE: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

1. Strategic Forces. The following table summarizes Navy strategic force requirements.

	<u>Navy Strategic Forces</u>			
	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Missiles</u>				
(Polaris/Poseidon)	656	656	656	656
<u>Ballistic Missile</u>				
<u>Submarines (SSBN)</u>	41	41	41	41
<u>Submarine Tenders</u>	5	5	5	5
<u>Navy Strategic Forces Manpower</u> (End Strengths in Thousands)				
<u>Military</u>	18.6	18.9	19.6	19.7
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect-Hire)</u>	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.5

Navy strategic offensive forces consist primarily of the 41 Polaris/Poseidon ballistic missile submarines and their five supporting tenders. Also included are support personnel who provide technical assistance, material support, and program management.

The ships are manned on the basis of the operating, maintenance, and administrative workloads to which Navy manning criteria are applied. The average funded manpower is 24 officers and 250 enlisted men (12 officers and 125 men in each of the two crews for an SSBN). Reduced manpower authorizations are provided for SSBN's in overhaul or conversion.

Given these standard factors, the military manpower requirements for strategic forces are computed as follows:

	<u>Strategic Force Ship Manning</u>		
<u>Type of Ship 1/</u>	<u>Number Of Ships</u>	<u>Average Manning</u>	<u>Total Manpower</u>
SSBN	41	271	11,111
Tenders	5	1,179	5,895

1/ Includes active ships and those in overhaul and under conversion. Ships in overhaul and under conversion are manned at a lower level than active ships.

In addition to the ship's crews described above, additional personnel are needed for maintenance support systems, missile control systems, communications support, and dedicated weather reconnaissance support.

Military manpower in Strategic Forces rises by approximately 1,100 and civilian manpower rises by 200 from FY '74 and FY '76. This trend is directly attributable to the TRIDENT program which is in its developmental stages. Increases are related to management and engineering support and establishment of the TRIDENT Support Site at Bangor, Washington.

2. General Purpose Forces.

a. Land Forces.

Navy Land Forces personnel consists of doctors, chaplains, hospital corpsmen and dental technicians assigned to Marine Corps divisions, regiments and air stations. The Marine Corps does not have such personnel. The following table shows Navy manpower committed to Land Forces.

<u>Navy Land Forces</u> (End Strengths in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
<u>Military</u>	2.5	2.8	2.8	2.8

b. Tactical Air Forces.

The following table summarizes Navy Tactical Air Force requirements.

<u>Navy Tactical Air Forces</u>				
	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
<u>Active</u>				
Navy Fighter/				
Attack Squadron	68	70	65	65
Navy Reconnaissance &				
Early Warning Sqs.	30	31	32	32
Carriers (CVA/CVAN/				
CV)	14	15	13	13
<u>Reserve</u>				
Naval Air Reserve				
Tactical Air Sqs.	18	16	16	16

Navy Tactical Air Forces Manpower 1/
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	61.4	68.6	65.9	65.7

1/ Includes manpower for attack/multi-purpose carriers and associated air wings.

To perform the Navy's Tactical Air Force mission in FY 76, there are 13 aircraft carriers and 12 carrier air wings assigned to the active forces. Each carrier air wing includes the various types of aircraft required. Within the carrier air wing, the squadron is the basic command organization. Squadrons are organized to operate and support the assigned number of a single type of aircraft.

For each type of aircraft squadron, criteria have been established to determine the numbers of aircrew and support personnel required. the at-sea standard work weeks for aviation personnel are used. These manpower requirements are expressed in published form in a Squadron Manpower Document (SQMD) for each type of aircraft squadron.

The rise in military manpower from FY 74 to FY 75 was attributable to two factors: (1) Actual forces in FY 74 were lower than had been programmed, and (2) three squadrons were introduced into the fleet between FY 74 and FY 75. The downward trend in programmed billets from FY 75 to FY 77 stems from the retirement of other aviation squadrons and two aircraft carriers.

c. Naval Forces.

The following table summarizes Naval Forces manpower requirements.

<u>Naval Forces 1/</u>				
	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Active Ships</u>				
Carriers	14	15	13	13
Attack Submarines	73	75	78	79
Nuclear	(61)	(64)	(68)	(69)
Diesel	(12)	(11)	(10)	(10)
Surface Combatants 2/	200	199	198	200
Amphibious Forces 2/	66	65	66	67
Support Forces	123	114	105	105
Underway Replenishment	(49)	(45)	(41)	(41)
Major Fleet Support	(22)	(20)	(20)	(20)
Minor Fleet Support	(52)	(49)	(44)	(44)
Patrol Craft 2/	14	14	15	15
Minesweepers 2/	25	25	25	25
Total	<u>515</u>	<u>506</u>	<u>500</u>	<u>504</u>
<u>Active ASW Squadrons</u>				
Land Based	24	24	24	24
Ship Based	23	23	27	27
Total	<u>47</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>51</u>	<u>51</u>

1/ Table includes ships in other General Purpose Force categories (e.g. carriers which support Tactical Air Forces.) It excludes Strategic Force ships, RDT&E ships and the ship assigned to Central Support Forces (Individual Training).

2/ Naval Reserve Destroyers, Amphibious Vessels, Patrol Craft and Minesweepers are included because of their sizable active duty nucleus crews. The totals also include 2 DLG's under conversion in FY 74 and 1 in conversion in FY 75.

Naval Forces Manpower 1/
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	172.5	173.3	172.0	172.5
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	.3	.3	.3	.3

1/ Manpower for attack/multi-purpose carriers and associated air wings is included with Tactical Air Forces.

Each of the ship and squadron classes are described below.

(1) Carriers

(a) In recent years, carrier forces have been undergoing transition. Single-purpose Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) carriers (CVSs) dedicated to broad ocean ASW have been phased out. The attack carriers (CVAs) are being converted to multi-purpose platforms (CVs) combining attack and ASW capabilities. In FY 76, seven carriers will be multi-purpose CVs, the remainder CVAs. All CVAs will eventually be converted to CVs, with the exception of the USS Midway.

(b) Attack and multi-purpose carriers contribute to the protection of vital sea lanes. Carriers provide air defense against guided missiles as well as enemy bomber and reconnaissance aircraft employed against naval forces, convoys, and unescorted shipping. They also provide aircraft for surveillance and reconnaissance roles and to search out and attack enemy surface naval forces. In addition, multi-purpose carriers provide ASW protection.

(2) Submarines

The submarine force continues to be modernized in FY 76 as new SSNs enter the fleet and diesel submarines are retired. General purpose submarines are designed primarily to perform anti-submarine warfare (ASW) missions. Because of their unique capabilities, attack submarines in wartime will be employed in anti-submarine operations in open oceans, in area clearance, in forward patrol and barrier operations, and in operations in direct support of high value ships.

(3) Surface Combatants

(a) Surface combatants can perform a number of additional missions in combat including shore bombardment, search and rescue, air surveillance and control, offensive and defensive patrol, and naval blockade.

(b) The principal mission of surface combatants is to provide defense of other naval forces and convoys. In this role they provide, in conjunction with other sea control forces, protection against submarine and air attack. Some protection against surface attack is currently provided by the conventional guns on most surface combatants.

(4) Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Aircraft

ASW aircraft forces include squadrons of carrier-based aircraft (fixed wing and helicopters) and squadrons of land-based P-3 maritime patrol aircraft. These aircraft, like submarines, can be used in a variety of roles in the control of the sea lanes in advanced ASW barriers; as area search and destroy forces; and as escorts.

(5) Amphibious Forces

These forces provide the capability to perform amphibious assaults. Equally important, amphibious assault forces provide a high-readiness contingency force for landings with men, equipment, and aircraft integrated for combat. To carry out their missions, amphibious forces generate a requirement for other naval forces for protection (ASW, anti-surface), ancillary missions (mine warfare, close air support, naval gunfire support), and logistic support (replenishment and repair).

(6) Support Ships

(a) Support ships include underway replenishment ships; repair ships and tenders; and tugs, salvage vessels, and miscellaneous auxiliary ships. These forces increase the endurance of naval forces at sea, provide for logistics and material support of naval forces from forward undeveloped sites, and perform various auxiliary roles.

(b) The Navy has taken several steps to increase the efficiency of its support forces as their overall number is reduced. An increasing number have been homeported overseas and are being transferred to the Military Sealift Command (MSC). Under MSC operation, these ships are manned with U.S. Civil Service crews with a small Navy detachment aboard for communications purposes.

From the peak strength Vietnam years, Naval forces have been steadily purged of obsolescent, WW II vintage ships. Because of these declining force levels, Naval forces manpower requirements have likewise decreased. The decline in military manpower requirements for FY 75 to FY 76 reflect

this downward trend in force requirements. In FY 77, total ship numbers will commence to rise as new weapons platforms are introduced into the fleet. The military manpower rise between FY 76 and FY 77 is caused by new ships beginning to be introduced into the fleet at an increased rate.

d. Mobility Forces

The following table summarizes Navy Mobility Force requirements.

<u>Navy Mobility Forces</u>				
	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Active Ships in the Strategic Sealift 1/ Force</u>	20	19	19	19
<u>Navy Mobility Forces Manpower (End Strengths in Thousands)</u>				
<u>Military</u>	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	5.4	5.2	5.6	5.6

1/ Excludes ships under charter.

The Navy relies heavily on sealift to move the bulk of equipment and supplies. For example, the equipment for an Army infantry division weighs about 30,000 tons, the equipment required for the supporting units for the division weighs about 86,000 tons.

To meet wartime needs, the Department of Defense relies heavily on U.S. commercial shipping which can be mobilized under Presidential authority. During a NATO contingency, the Department of Defense would also rely on the commercial shipping assets of our NATO allies. Specific agreements have been reached to provide U.S. commercial and NATO ships in contingency situations.

Total Military Sealift Command (MSC) manpower is reflected in this category. Over 75% of the civilians are U.S. Civil Service seamen under the Navy Industrial Fund who crew the MSC nucleus fleet. Their on-board number fluctuates with the number of MSC ships in operating status at any given time. The remainder, also industrially funded, provide shoreside operational support to the fleet and ocean transportation management functions. MSC work requirements are determined by the Department of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and other agencies in meeting their overseas transportation requirements. Using FY 74 as an example, the Army contributed 36% to the total MSC

Industrial Fund Income of nearly \$651.7 million, Navy/Marine Corps 26%, Air Force 14%, and other DoD and Federal Agencies 24%.

In addition to Sealift ships, MSC also operates 17 Naval Forces support ships and 22 Special Project ships in FY 76. Manpower levels reflect a drop from a total of 56 MSC-manned ships in FY 74 to 55 in FY 75, with an increase to 58 ships in FY 76-77.

3. Auxiliary Forces.

Auxiliary Forces carry out Department of the Navy programs which come under centralized DoD control. These various programs include Intelligence and Security, Centrally Managed Communications, Research and Development, Support to Other Nations, and Geophysical Activities. The following sections display military and civilian personnel requirements for each of these programs.

a. Intelligence and Security.

Navy manpower requirements for centralized Intelligence and Security activities are shown below.

Navy Intelligence and Security Manpower (End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military 1/</u>	11.3	10.9	9.7	9.6
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	1.8	1.9	1.8	1.8

1/ Military in defense agencies are included in the above totals.

Not included in the above totals are military personnel in combat or combat-related intelligence units.

The reduction of 1,200 military personnel between FY 75 and FY 76 represents a transfer of these positions to the Individual Training sub-category of Central Support Forces. These persons are involved in the conduct of intelligence training and they are more accurately reflected in the Individual Training sub-category.

b. Centrally Managed Communications.

The Navy's manpower contribution to the Centrally Managed Communications activities of the DoD is shown below.

Navy Centrally Managed Communications Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military 1/</u>	9.4	10.8	11.0	11.0
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	4.3	4.3	4.1	4.1

1/ Military in Defense Agencies included in above total.

Approximately 11,000 military and 4,100 civilians are employed in support of Navy centrally managed communications. The Navy manpower program for this function remains generally constant over the period FY 74 to FY 77.

c. Research and Development.

Navy Research and Development manpower requirements are shown below.

Navy Research and Development Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	6.4	6.6	6.7	6.6
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	39.5	38.6	36.4	36.4

The Navy's R&D community consists of headquarters, laboratories, RDT&E project ships, test and evaluation activities, and support offices, staffed as follows:

	<u>FY 74</u>		<u>FY 75</u>		<u>FY 76</u>		<u>FY 77</u>	
	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Civ</u>	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Civ</u>	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Civ</u>	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Civ</u>
Headquarters	-	0.4	-	0.4	-	0.4	-	0.4
Laboratories	1.9	29.0	2.2	28.3	2.3	26.6	2.3	26.6
T&E Activities	3.6	9.6	3.5	9.5	3.5	9.0	3.4	9.0
RDT&E Project Ships	0.7	-	0.8	-	0.8	-	0.8	-
Other Support	0.2	0.4	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.4

The largest segment of the Navy's R&D establishment consists of R&D laboratories. The Navy's R&D efforts are comprehensive, since they must deal with land, sea, air, and undersea operations. In addition, the Navy is

very equipment intensive and requires a substantial in-house RDT&E capability. In-house work is performed at 28 Navy RDT&E installations, including 11 medical laboratories and such industrially funded laboratories as the Naval Research Laboratory, the Navy Ship Research and Development Center, and the Naval Air Development Center.

As a part of a DoD policy to shift more R&D effort from military laboratories to civilian industry, a reduction of 3,000 civilian employees from the end-year FY 74 level of R&D employment will be achieved by the end of FY 76. The purpose of this policy is to shift effort from in-house to industry. Approximately 2,400 of the planned 3,000 reductions in civilians for R&D are in the laboratories. The remainder of the civilian reduction (approximately 500) is planned for test and evaluation activities.

d. Support to Other Nations

Navy manpower in this category is displayed in the following table.

Navy Support to Other Nations Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.3

Navy military and civilian personnel in this category provide a wide range of administrative, supply and logistics support through the Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) and other Military Assistance Programs.

Civilian Foreign Military Sales support is also included in this category. These personnel represent continuing effort in administrative, clerical, financial, supply, and technical support of foreign military sales agreements. Their salaries are fully reimbursed by foreign governments either through a direct citation to the FMS agreement or through an administrative surcharge. The FMS program has grown from \$343 million in FY 71 to \$3.85 billion in FY 74. Requirements at industrially funded activities, which fluctuate sharply from year to year and are usually not known until the fiscal year begins, are not included in the Support to Other Nations category. In FY 75, 1,433 civilians at Naval Shipyards (in Central Support - Logistics) will be performing FMS ship overhaul and repair work.

e. Geophysical Activities.

Navy manpower committed to Geophysical Activities is shown below.

Navy Geophysical Activities Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
<u>Military</u>	2.3	2.4	2.0	2.0
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7

The Navy's geophysical effort includes activities under the Naval Weather Service and Oceanographer of the Navy. The Navy employs approximately 1,600 military and 250 civilian personnel in the Naval Weather Service. Included are professional meteorologists, meteorological technicians, technical specialists, and a small Departmental Staff.

The Oceanographic effort, under the Oceanographer of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations, accounts for approximately 400 military and 1,450 civilians, and includes professional civilian oceanographers, geophysicists, mathematicians and engineers.

The decline in military end-strength between FY 75 and FY 76 is attributable to the elimination of one weather squadron (VW-4) and one detachment each from two helicopter squadrons (HSL 30 and HSL 31).

4. Mission Support Forces.

Mission Support Forces consist of activities which are not organic to a specific kind of unit (e.g., squadron or ship) but directly support a group of complementary units that are dedicated to a common mission. The various categories of mission support forces consist of reserve components support, base operating support, force support training, and command.

a. Reserve Components Support.

Navy manpower included in the Reserve Component category is shown below.

Navy Reserve Components Support Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
<u>Military</u>	7.1	7.6	7.6	7.6
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	3.1	3.0	3.1	3.1

Reserve Components Support consists of those active duty military personnel and civilians who are dedicated to the overall administration of reserve component units, facilities, training programs, and personnel. Not included are active duty personnel directly supporting a specific Naval or Tactical Air Force reserve unit and who are counted in the appropriate mission categories.

Approximately 4,200 military and 2,100 civilian personnel support Air Reserve operations, with the majority being employed at seven Naval Air Stations under the command of the Chief of Naval Reserve. Surface Reserve training installations employ approximately 3,187 military and 531 civilians. A total of 168 military and 96 civilians provide administrative support at Naval Reserve Headquarters. An additional 20 military and 333 civilians are employed at activities under the command of the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

b. Base Operating Support (Mission Support Forces)

Navy manpower required for this category is shown below.

Navy Base Operating Support (Mission Support Forces) Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	34.1	37.1	36.7	36.7
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	27.1	26.7	26.4	26.4

Navy personnel in this category provide technical, maintenance and administrative support needed to operate naval stations, naval air stations, and related operating force bases around the world. Staffing requirements are influenced by the number of bases, their mission, geographical location, type and size of forces support, tempo of operating force and specific services provided.

The reduction of military manpower spaces between FY 75 and FY 76 primarily stems from the base realignment at Sasebo, Japan and the cancellation of the planned forward deployment of a destroyer squadron in Guam.

c. Force Support Training.

The manpower required to conduct Force Support Training is shown below.

Navy Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
<u>Military</u>	13.2	12.6	12.5	12.5
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	.5	.5	.5	.5

Force Support Training is conducted by units which provide training to or evaluation of organized crews and units in conjunction with the performance of a specific mission. Navy civilian support in this area consists primarily of maintenance and clerical support to Fleet Air Training Units located at Fleet Naval Air Stations.

The student pipeline programmed for Force Support Training is included in the Students sub-category of the Individuals category (approximately 3,100 in FY 76).

The reduction of 600 military end-strength between FY 74 and FY 75 is a result of a photographic squadron being disestablished as well as a reduction in the scope of Combat Readiness Air Wing training for various attack and fighter squadrons.

d. Command (Mission Support Forces)

The following table displays Navy manpower contained in this category.

Navy Command (Mission Support Forces) Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
<u>Military</u>	12.8	13.1	12.8	12.8
<u>Civilians (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	4.8	6.0	7.8	7.8

This category includes international and unified headquarters and support activities, Navy fleet management headquarters, fleet operating commands, and related support staffs and ceremonial and combat development activities.

The civilian increase between FY 74-75 is primarily the result of the conversion of approximately 862 foreign nationals from contractor to in-house Navy status at the Defense Attache Office, Saigon for commissary and

motor pool functions, at a projected annual savings of \$286,000. No increase in total (contractor, Navy military, and Navy civilian) manpower is involved. In fact, improved performance and a management review of staffing needs reduced the original requirement from 1,000 to 862.

The additional increase of 1,700 in FY 76 is a functional transfer of the USMACTHAI Support Group, Thailand from the Army (41,800 civilians), partially offset by other Command decreases. Again, no increase in total DoD manpower is involved.

Navy efforts to control the size of headquarters and support staffs are discussed in more detail in Appendix B.

5. Central Support Forces.

Central Support Forces consist of those activities which are not easily associated with a single Navy mission, and are therefore normally centrally programmed and managed. The various categories of central support forces consist of Base Operating Support, Medical, Personnel Support, Individual Support, Command, Logistics, and Federal Agency Support.

a. Base Operating Support (Central Support Forces).

The following table displays the manpower requirement for Base Operating Support (Central Support Forces).

Navy Base Operating Support (Central Support Forces) Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	21.1	20.7	21.4	21.4

Base Operating Support is composed of Public Works Centers, Construction Battalion Centers, Commissaries, and other support activities. The following table shows the distribution of manpower among the activities at end FY 76.

Base Operating Support (Central Support)
(FY 76 End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>
Public Works Centers	.3	13.8
Construction Battalion Centers	.4	2.4
Commissaries	1.3	4.0
Other	.7	1.1
	<u>2.8</u>	<u>21.4</u>

Navy Public Works Centers provide services which include utilities, housing, transportation support, engineering services, facilities planning, and other logistic support required by operating forces. The FY 76 request includes an increase of 800 civilians over FY 75, which will reduce a current funded backlog of 204 shop days of effort to a more acceptable level of 150 days. A plan to contract 15% of all maintenance and repair work has also been instituted to reduce backlog.

The Construction Battalion Centers perform a variety of public works equipment maintenance, supply, and training functions. A reduction of 449 civilian positions in FY 75 is associated with the mission reduction of the Construction Battalion Center at Davisville, R.I. A further reduction of approximately 120 civilian positions in FY 76 is the result of a reduction of 2 active and 10 reserve Naval Mobile Construction Battalions during FY 76.

b. Medical Support.

The following table displays Medical Support manpower requirements.

	<u>Navy Medical Support Manpower</u> (End Strength in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	20.0	19.7	19.7	19.7
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	9.8	10.1	10.0	10.0

The number of people needed to staff medical activities is based on detailed workload studies and manpower surveys for each facility. A contractual study designed to determine physicians and other health professional requirements more precisely is underway. The rapidly shrinking number of health care personnel makes such a determination extremely important.

The civilian increase in FY 75 reflects transfers of local health centers in other categories to the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery under the regionalization program.

c. Personnel Support.

The following table displays Personnel Support manpower requirements.

	<u>Navy Personnel Support Manpower</u> (End Strength in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military 1/</u>	6.8	8.1	8.2	8.2
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	1.6	1.8	1.9	2.3

1/ Military in Defense Agencies is included in the above figures.

The major components of this category are: Recruiting and Examining; Counterintelligence Activities; Overseas Dependents Education Programs; and Other Personnel Support.

(1) Recruiting and Examining.

A total of 5,588 military and 592 civilians are authorized in Navy Recruiting Command activities. The recruiting mission is accomplished at the Recruiting Command Headquarters as well as seven Recruiting Areas, 45 Recruiting Districts, 23 Class "A" Stations and 1,420 Navy recruiting stations. Navy personnel also support the various Armed Forces Entrance and Examining Stations.

An additional 147 military recruiters were authorized in FY 75. Recruiting organizations were increased in size and scope in order to insure the accession of required numbers of competent and qualified personnel into the Navy. Civilian support of the recruiting effort also increased by 89 positions.

(2) Counterintelligence and Investigative Activities.

Approximately 168 military and 827 civilians are assigned to the Naval Investigative Service. They provide a professional capability to investigate criminal violations occurring in the Navy and Marine Corps. These personnel also perform counterintelligence operations. Civilian end strength increases by 95 from FY 75 to FY 76 to provide for new agents in the Naval Investigative Service.

(3) Overseas Dependents Education Program.

Personnel in this category staff schools for dependents of Naval personnel overseas. A total of 346 civilians, including school teachers, are included. School teachers, who are not on the rolls on 30 June of each year, appear in the end-strength beginning in FY 77, when the fiscal year-end changes to 30 September, causing an increase of approximately 270 in that year.

(4) Other Personnel Support.

Approximately 3,300 military and 190 civilians are involved in a variety of personnel support activities. Also included in this category is the U.S. Naval Home, which will be relocated from Philadelphia to Gulfport, Mississippi in FY 76. This facility provides an honorable and comfortable home for elderly and disabled naval veterans.

d. Individual Training.

The following table displays the manpower supporting Individual Training activities.

Navy Individual Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	40.6	38.3	38.6	39.0
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	14.2	14.8	14.5	14.5

An in-depth treatment of Navy Individual Training is contained in the FY 76 Military Manpower Training Report.

Individual Training manpower includes only manpower involved in the conduct or support of training. Active manpower undergoing training -- trainees, students, and midshipmen -- is carried under Individuals.

The 2,300 reduction in military personnel dedicated to the Individual Training sub-category between end FY 74 and end FY 75 is directly attributable to substantive management and training methodology improvements in training instruction and support.

e. Command (Central Support Forces).

Navy Command (Central Support Forces) manpower is displayed in the following table.

Navy Command (Central Support Forces) Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military 1/</u>	8.5	8.1	8.0	8.0
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	17.2	15.9	15.9	15.9

1/ Military in OSD/OJCS included in above.

While Navy manpower in Command (Central Support) consists primarily of Navy Management Headquarters and Administrative Activities, there are also personnel assigned to OSD, JCS, Ceremonial, Logistical Support, and Operational Evaluation Activities.

There are 497 Navy military personnel assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The majority of Navy Management Headquarters activities are in the Central Support - Command area. Of these, the largest aggregation - some 438 military and 4,375 civilians - are employed in the Naval Material Command headquarters components, which include three hardware commands - Sea, Air, and Electronics - and the Naval Supply Systems Command and Naval Facilities Engineering Command. There is also a staff of approximately 79 military and 245 civilians in the immediate Office of the Chief of Naval Material who provide overall coordination, direction, and review of Systems Command activities.

The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, which employs approximately 130 military and 277 civilians, and the Chief of Naval Education and Training, with approximately 140 military and 466 civilians, are included in the Command category.

The Bureau of Naval Personnel Headquarters and the Naval Personnel Program Support Activity are also included in the Command category. They employ 1,034 military and 2,354 civilians.

The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations employs approximately 1,044 military and 2,313 civilians in its departmental headquarters and district commandants.

Other administrative activities employ approximately 4,500 military and 5,800 civilians in a wide range of field support functions. They include such activities as the Naval Safety Center, Naval Support Activities, Regional Finance Centers, Audit Service branches, and field offices of the Office of Civilian Manpower Management.

There are also 376 Navy military in ceremonial activities, including the Navy Band, Washington; USS Constitution, and the Ceremonial Guard.

As indicated by the gradual decline in strength from FY 74 through FY 7T, this sub-category is being methodically reduced in size through consolidations of functions and command realignments.

f. Logistics.

Navy Logistics manpower is displayed in the following table.

	<u>Navy Logistics Manpower</u> (End Strength in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
<u>Military</u>	7.2	8.0	7.8	7.7
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	160.5	155.8	150.7	159.7

The logistics area of Central Support is civilian intensive employing 159,700 civilians in FY 76, almost one-half of the Navy civilian work force. A total of 5,900 military, primarily in key supervisory and technical positions are also in this category, which also includes supply operations, maintenance and production activities, and other logistics and technical support.

The military reductions from end FY 75 through end FY 7T are attributable to management economies and internal realignments. The civilian increase of 3,900 during this period is primarily due to workload increases in Naval Shipyards, Public Work Centers, and Naval Air Rework Facilities.

The following table summarizes FY 74-7T logistics manpower by type of logistics operations.

<u>Logistics</u> (End Strength in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Supply	1.2	1.4	1.5	1.5
Maintenance/Logistic				
Support	6.0	6.6	6.3	6.3
Total	<u>7.2</u>	<u>8.0</u>	<u>7.8</u>	<u>7.7</u>
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>				
Supply	21.9	21.8	21.9	21.9
Maintenance/Logistic				
Support	138.6	134.1	137.8	137.8
Total	<u>160.5</u>	<u>155.8</u>	<u>159.7</u>	<u>159.7</u>

(1) Supply

In FY 76, approximately 1,500 military and 21,900 civilians are employed in Supply Depots, Regional Procurement Offices, Inventory Control Points, and Contract Administration Offices.

(2) Maintenance and Production/Logistics and Technical Support

These activities are summarized in the following table and discussed in greater detail below:

Maintenance and Production/Logistic and Technical Support
(FY 76 End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>
Naval Air Rework Facilities	0.2	25.9
Naval Avionics Facility	-	2.4
Missile Facilities	0.4	0.6
Naval Shipyards	0.9	64.4
Ordnance Plants	1.4	21.0
Printing Plants	-	1.5
Pacific Fleet Logistics	1.7	10.0
Logistics/Technical Support		
Activities	1.7	12.0
Total	6.3	137.8

(a) Naval Air Rework Facilities.

The Air Rework Facilities perform depot level maintenance of aircraft and components, manufacture of critical nonavailable parts, and provide technical assistance to intermediate maintenance organizations. Staffing requirements are largely based on standard workload procedures for the types of jobs being performed. Aircraft and engine requirements are converted to man-hours by multiplying the number of units by negotiated program production norms. The applicable overhead hours associated with the direct hour base are then added to derive the total productive hours required. Productive hours required are then converted to man-years. A total of 152 military and 25,936 civilians are planned for FY 76, representing a small increase of 60 civilians over FY 75.

(b) Naval Avionics Facility.

An additional eight military and 2,426 civilians are employed at the Naval Avionics Facility (NAFI) which conducts a variety of engineering and manufacturing functions. Engineering jobs being worked on at NAFI are not yet ready to be transferred to industry. The few manufacturing-type jobs are there because of some emergency situation which precluded their being placed in industry in the first place. Capacity for this type of situation must be available to satisfy the need for a quick and flexible response. An essentially level program is planned.

(c) Missile Facilities.

The Polaris Missile Facility, Atlantic, and Strategic Weapons Facility, Pacific, which employ 353 military and 613 civilians,

provide maintenance for the POLARIS/POSEIDON Fleet. The Strategic Weapons Facility, Pacific, will also service the new TRIDENT Fleet. An essentially level program is planned through FY 7T.

(d) Naval Shipyards.

The Naval Shipyards, which employ 892 military and 64,428 civilians in FY 76, provide logistic support for assigned ships and service craft; perform authorized work in connection with construction, conversion, overhaul, repair, alteration, drydocking, and outfitting of ships and craft; and perform manufacturing, research, development, and test work.

The naval shipyard workload is determined and monitored on a three year cycle. Naval shipyard workload is developed from customer's budget dollars (including non-DoD customers) and distributed to the naval and private shipyards in accordance with homeport policy, shipyard capabilities and employment potentials. Based on the projected ship workload average manyears of employment, end of fiscal year employment is determined for individual naval shipyards in terms of productive shop and support manpower requirements.

An increase of 3,743 civilians from the end FY 75 level of 60,685 to the end FY 76 level of 64,428 is associated with significant increases in Naval Shipyard workload in the Fleet Repair and Alteration Programs. The primary emphasis is to reduce the Navy's ship overhaul deferral level, which currently exceeds 50 ships, to a more acceptable level during FY 76 and subsequent years.

Improvement in the material condition of Naval ships in future fiscal years is one of the priority programs of the Secretary of Defense. The increase in shipyard manpower is essential to accomplishing that objective.

(e) Ordnance Activities.

Civilian employment will decrease from 21,634 in FY 75 to 20,972 in FY 76-7T. The decrease of 662 civilians is associated with the decrease in bomb production in support of stock replenishment related to Southeast Asia operations.

(f) Printing Plants.

The Navy Publications and Printing Service provides printing, duplicating, and reproduction services throughout the Navy, and employs approximately 1,478 civilians. A level program is planned through FY 76.

(g) Pacific Fleet Logistics.

1,700 military and 10,000 civilians are located at Ship Repair Facilities, Naval Magazines, and other logistics support activities in the Western Pacific, engaged in ship repair, ordnance storage and handling, and other maintenance and supply functions. A decline of approximately 1,000 civilian positions in FY 75 reflects a generally declining workload. A small increase of approximately 160 positions occurs in FY 76 due to projected workload increases at the Ship Repair Facility, Subic Bay, Philippines.

(h) Other Non-Industrial Logistics/Technical Support Activities

Besides industrial activities there are also 1,700 military and 12,000 civilians employed in miscellaneous Logistics/Technical Support activities. Examples are the Engineering Field Divisions, the Naval Ship Engineering Center, and the Inactive Ship Maintenance Facilities.

The Navy Engineering Field Divisions employ about 200 military and 4,300 civilians in FY 76. They perform a variety of facilities management, technical support, utilities and transportation, family housing, pollution abatement, and energy conservation tasks. FY 76 civilian employment increases by 413, and is related to a 33% increase in military construction work-in-place and increased support of energy conservation, ocean engineering, and Occupational Safety and Health Act implementation.

The Naval Ship Engineering Center, which employs approximately 108 military and 3,500 civilians in FY 76, performs assigned engineering and material management functions for ship, system, equipment and material requirements in support of the Naval Sea Systems Command. A level effort is currently planned through FY 77.

The Inactive Ships Maintenance Facilities are dedicated to the upkeep, support and preservation of the Navy's "mothball" fleet. There are 456 military and 250 civilian positions assigned to perform these functions.

g. Federal Agency Support

Navy manpower committed to this support is shown on the following table.

Navy Federal Agency Support Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1

Federal Agency Support includes Naval military manpower assigned to other Federal Departments and independent agencies, normally on a reimbursable basis.

6. Individuals

To this point, we have discussed structure requirements for the five force categories. Where requirements exist for nonstructure manpower, they are reflected in the Individuals account. Navy has an established set of individuals accounts to keep the units within the forces manned at their authorized strengths. The Individuals account consists of estimates of the numbers of transients, patients, prisoners, trainees, students, and Naval Academy midshipmen.

a. Transients

Navy transient manpower is as shown below.

	<u>Navy Transients</u> (End Strengths in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
<u>Military</u>	39.5	24.4	24.9	27.2

Transients requirements are a function of the Permanent Change of Station move program. Transient manpower spaces are provided to account for time consumed during PCS travel which includes travel, leave enroute, and temporary duty enroute. Of these three factors, approximately two-thirds to three-quarters of transient manpower requirements result from leave taken enroute.

The number of transients programmed for the period FY 75 to FY 7T is substantially lower than the actual transient strength in FY 74. The Navy's programmed transient strength for FY 75 to FY 7T represents the average strength for each year instead of a forecasted end strength. The actual strength at the end of the fiscal year is higher because of the large number of accessions and personnel moves which occur at the end of June and September.

b. Patients/Prisoners

The following table displays the manpower required for the Patients/Prisoners account.

	<u>Navy Patients/Prisoners Manpower</u> (End Strengths in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
<u>Military</u>	<u>5.7</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>3.4</u>

Patients manpower spaces are provided to offset lost time in units resulting from hospitalization for extended periods.

Prisoners manpower spaces are provided to offset lost time in units resulting from confinement in a military disciplinary facility in excess of 30 days.

c. Trainees/Students/Midshipmen

Manpower required for this account is displayed below.

Navy Trainees/Students/Midshipmen Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Trainees/Students	57.8	52.7	50.3	54.3
Midshipmen	3.2	4.2	4.2	4.4
Total	<u>61.0</u>	<u>56.9</u>	<u>54.5</u>	<u>58.7</u>

Trainees, students and midshipmen manpower spaces represent present investment for future trained individuals.

Trainees are individuals undergoing basic military training and initial skill training.

Students are individuals undergoing specialized flight and professional training. Midshipmen are individuals attending the United States Naval Academy.

The number of trainee and student spaces is a function of enlistment patterns, course lengths, and training plans. A comprehensive discussion of the determination of trainee and student loads is included in the Military Manpower Training Report.

The fluctuations in actual FY 74 end strength and the various intervening fiscal periods through the end of FY 7T are caused by differing accession rates necessary to replace structure personnel attrition. Personnel inventory considerations require that programmed trainees, students, and midshipmen numbers vary on an annual basis so as to equal planned and unplanned personnel losses.

D. FY 1977 Navy Manpower Requirements

The following table displays Navy manpower requirements for FY 77 compared to FY 7T.

Navy Manpower Requirements (End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilian</u> (Direct and Indirect)	
	<u>FY 7T</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>19.7</u>	<u>20.4</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.8</u>
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>241.3</u>	<u>249.2</u>	<u>5.9 (.1)</u>	<u>6.1 (.1)</u>
Land Forces	2.8	2.9	-	-
Tactical Air Force	65.7	64.1	-	-
Naval Forces	172.5	182.0	.3 (*)	.3 (*)
Mobility Forces	.3	.3	5.6 (.1)	5.8 (.1)
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>29.5</u>	<u>26.8</u>	<u>45.2 (.9)</u>	<u>45.2 (.9)</u>
Intelligence & Security	9.6	9.4	1.8 (.1)	1.8 (.1)
Centrally Managed				
Communication	11.0	9.0	4.1 (.8)	4.1 (.8)
Research & Development	6.6	6.3	36.4	36.4
Support to Other Nations	.3	.2	1.3 (*)	1.3 (*)
Geophysical Activities	2.0	2.0	1.7 (*)	1.7 (*)
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>69.5</u>	<u>69.5</u>	<u>37.8 (3.7)</u>	<u>37.8 (3.7)</u>
Reserve Components Support	7.6	7.6	3.1	3.1
Base Operating Support	36.7	36.6	26.4 (3.7)	26.4 (3.7)
Force Support Training	12.5	12.6	.5	.5
Command	12.8	12.7	7.8 (*)	7.8 (*)
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>86.6</u>	<u>85.8</u>	<u>223.7 (4.7)</u>	<u>228.8 (4.7)</u>
Base Operating Support	2.8	2.8	21.4 (1.5)	21.7 (1.5)
Medical Support	19.7	19.6	10.0 (.2)	9.9 (.2)
Personnel Support	8.2	8.2	2.3	2.2
Individual Training	39.0	38.5	14.5	14.5
Command	8.0	7.8	15.9	16.1
Logistics	7.7	7.8	159.7 (3.0)	164.2 (3.0)
Federal Agency Support	1.1	1.1	-	-
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>89.2</u>	<u>94.3</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Transients	27.2	25.5	-	-
Patients & Prisoners	3.4	3.4	-	-
Trainees/Students	54.3	61.1	-	-
Midshipmen	4.4	4.4	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>535.9</u>	<u>546.0</u>	<u>314.2 (9.4)</u>	<u>319.8 (9.4)</u>
<u>Direct Hire Only</u>			<u>304.8</u>	<u>310.4</u>

* Less than 50.

() Indirect hire included.

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

2. Changes from the FY 77 Request

a. Overall

The FY 77 request represents a projected increase of about 10,145 military and 5,600 civilians above the FY 77 level. These figures are only preliminary estimates, based on out-year projections contained in the Department of the Navy Five Year Defense Program, and may be substantially revised prior to the submission of next year's budget.

Civilian increases are primarily at Navy Industrial Fund activities in the Central Support - Base Operations and Central Support - Logistics categories. Military increases stem primarily from increasing force levels in the General Purpose Forces category.

b. Strategic Forces

Strategic forces military end-strength will rise by approximately 700 manpower spaces because of the continuing growth of the operational and combat support personnel dedicated to the TRIDENT submarine program. Civilian increases totalling approximately 350 positions are related to the establishment of the TRIDENT Support Site, Bangor, Washington, under the Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command. Other TRIDENT support increases are addressed in the Central Support - Logistics section.

c. General Purpose Forces

Tactical Air Forces will decline by approximately 1,600 manpower spaces. This reduction is a result of the completion of USS CRISKANAY's deactivation and phasing out of various aviation squadrons.

A substantial increase of approximately 9,500 manpower spaces will occur in Naval Forces. This increase is attributable to the introduction of new classes of ships into the fleet in that year; to include hydrofoil missile ships, guided missile frigates, and the Spruance class destroyer.

A civilian increase of 137 in the Mobility Forces sub-category is for increased Civil Service manning of Military Sealift Command ships in FY 77.

d. Auxiliary Forces

Centrally Managed Communications will decline by approximately 2,000 manpower spaces. This decline is attributable to the restructuring of the Naval Communications system caused by the introduction of satellite communications in FY 77. This reduction in manpower, however, is contingent upon this satellite system being operational as scheduled. No significant civilian changes are currently planned.

e. Mission Support Forces

Military and civilian staff does not change from FY 77 to FY 77.

f. Central Support Forces

Military manpower spaces will decline by approximately 800 spaces. This reduction stems from further management efficiencies and economies being instituted in the Individual Training and Command sub-categories.

Civilian staff in Base Operating Support increases by approximately 400 positions. This represents a continuation of effort begun in FY 76 to reduce workload backlog at Public Works Centers. An increase of approximately 200 positions in Command consists primarily of a centrally controlled group of manpower spaces for the Financial Management Improvement Program. These spaces are distributed among various categories for FY 74-77, but are centrally controlled in the FY 77 column.

Civilian increases of 4,500 are reflected in the Logistics sub-category, primarily for three programs. Naval Air Rework Facilities increase by 225 positions, based on program dollar increases of \$25 million and projected workload carryover from FY 77, and preliminary overtime and contractor effort estimates. An increase of 151 for ordnance activities is for removal of stored ammunition at the Bangor, Washington Annex and related site preparation for the TRIDENT base. The Strategic Weapons Facility, Pacific, also at Bangor, shows a similar TRIDENT-related increase of 240 positions. Finally, an increase of 3,800 positions for Naval Shipyards represents a continuing effort for the period FY 76-80 to significantly reduce the current backlog of ship overhaul deferrals. An intensive review of shipyard capacity, funding requirements, and optimum naval shipyard - private shipyard mix is being undertaken to develop a comprehensive long-range shipyard workload and employment plan.

g. Individuals

In the non-structure Individuals category, the Transients account will be reduced by 1,700 manpower spaces. Transients fluctuate considerably based upon inventory and accession considerations. The trainee, students and midshipmen account will rise by 6,800 because accessions increase to replace personnel losses.

CHAPTER XII

MARINE CORPS MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

A. Introduction

The Marine Corps is unique among the four services in that the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, provides that the Marine Corps will consist of "...not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein...organized, trained, and equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms...for service with the fleet...".

The Marine Corps is also charged by law to provide security for naval installations and to furnish guards for US embassies abroad. In addition the Marine Corps has been assigned contingency missions by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in support of the national strategy and objectives.

While the structure of the Marine Corps is specified in law the manpower requirement is not. The manpower required to fully man the Marine Corps to perform its assigned missions at what is considered an appropriate peacetime level totals 212,000 military and 20,500 direct and indirect hire civilians. The manpower levels being requested for fiscal years 1976, 1977, and 1978 have been fiscally constrained to a lower requirement as shown in the following table.

Marine Corps Manpower Requirement (End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Active Military Personnel</u>	<u>196,303</u>	<u>196,498</u>	<u>197,646</u>
<u>Civilian Personnel</u>			
Direct Hire, Military Functions	17,635	18,111	18,111
Indirect Hire Foreign Nationals	<u>2,282</u>	<u>2,282</u>	<u>2,282</u>
Total Civilians	<u>19,917</u>	<u>20,393</u>	<u>20,393</u>

In the process of constraining the force to the requested level selected units are manned at less than 100% of structure space requirements and low priority units are cadred, that is, reduced to zero manning. Cadred units are not eliminated from the total structure requirement because in time of emergency when force levels are increased these units would be activated and manned. In adjusting requirements

to fiscal constraints, security forces, embassy guard manpower and manpower assigned to certain other activities are kept manned at the required level.

B. Significant Manpower Trends

1. Enlisted Manning Levels

In FY 1974, the Marine Corps experienced a 4% shortfall in its authorized end strength, primarily because of an enlisted recruiting shortfall. This shortfall is attributed in large part to the impact of Section 718 of the FY 1974 DoD Appropriations Act which required no less than 55% high school graduates among all recruits. The requirement was imposed halfway through the fiscal year and after the prime summer recruiting period had passed for obtaining additional high school graduates. Although the requirement to recruit 55% high school graduates was eventually rescinded, it occurred too late in the year to permit recovery. The recruit requirement for FY 1975 has been increased proportionately to recoup the end FY 1974 strength shortfall. Expansion of recruiting resources, including a temporary increase in recruiting personnel, increases the likelihood that the recruit quota will be achieved. The programmed FY 1976 recruit input is well below the FY 1975 level and contributes to significant decreases in training overhead and training load; and a commensurate increase in combat forces.

Marine Corps Enlisted Recruiting Quota

<u>FY 1974</u>	<u>FY 1975</u>	<u>FY 1976</u>	<u>FY 1977</u>
47,856	58,410 <u>1/</u>	50,320	13,560

1/ Initial quota of 49,000 increased to offset the FY 1974 shortfall.

Because accession requirements are determined by losses, the actions currently being taken to increase the average time served on an enlistment and to improve retention will eventually result in a lower annual accession requirement. The FY 1976 plan projects an average length of initial enlistment of 3.5 years reflecting a gradual increase from an average of 3.0 years in FY 1972. While nearly one-half of all enlistments in FY 1972 were for a term of only two years, over 80% of all enlistments for FY 1976 are planned to be for three years or more.

Attainment of the requested authorization strengths is dependent, in part, on a continued active and effective retention program. Total

reenlistments in FY 1974 exceeded the total for any of the past 15 years and the results for the first half of FY 1975 are slightly above those for the same periods of FY 1974. The impact of the Bonus Revision Act on retention is not yet measurable due to the brief period of time since implementation and due to the saved pay provisions of the Act.

2. Recruit Quality

The Congress expressed concern during consideration of the FY 1975 authorization request that the Marine Corps would be forced to sacrifice quality in order to achieve a planned increase in Land Forces manpower. The quality necessary to maintain the readiness of the Marine Corps has not been sacrificed, as evidenced by actual recruiting results, shown below, using two indicators of quality.

Marine Corps Recruit Quality

Percent of Non-Prior Service Recruits

	<u>FY 74</u> <u>Total</u>	<u>First 6 Months</u>	
		<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
High School Graduates	54%	51%	54%
Mental Group I - III	93%	93%	95%

The Marine Corps expects to continue to maintain its recruiting quality standards and the manpower program allocates the necessary resources to accomplish this objective.

3. Officer Procurement and Retention

a. Officer Procurement. The officer procurement objectives for FY 1975 and for the budget years are shown in the table below.

Marine Corps Officer Procurement Objective

<u>FY 1975</u>	<u>FY 1976</u>	<u>FY 1977</u>
2,330	2,138	499

Because the Marine Corps has no academy or Reserve Officer Training Corps program of its own, only a small proportion of its annual procurement requirements are met from these two sources. Instead, as shown below, the Marine Corps relies primarily on the Officer Candidate Course and the Platoon Leaders Class, which are relatively low cost procurement

programs. Because they are low in cost, the Marine Corps plans to continue to obtain the majority of its officer procurements through these sources. Attainment of procurement objectives is possible only if incentives are not deleted from these programs which would detract from their attractiveness to the prospective officer.

Marine Corps Officer Accessions

<u>Source</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>
Naval Academy	4%
Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps	12%
Platoon Leaders Course	35%
Officer Candidate Course	34%
Other Sources <u>1/</u>	15%

1/ Includes Marine Enlisted Scientific Education Program, Judge Advocate Program, and other sources.

b. Officer Retention. Recent officer retention experience has been adequate to support the peacetime level officer force while permitting retention of only the most promising officers. Because the necessary action (reversion of temporary officers and involuntary separation of selected Reserve officers) to reduce officer strengths to peacetime level was taken early in the Vietnam phasedown, it has not since been necessary to deny retention to deserving officers or to seriously disrupt the normal promotion flow. The total officer requirements included in the authorization requests reflect a modest but planned reduction for which no special legislation is required.

4. Grade Distribution

Reductions have been made in the senior officer and enlisted grades concurrent with the reductions in total strength since 1969. However, the Marine Corps has not returned to the precise grade structure which prevailed prior to Vietnam. Requirements have changed in both organizational structure and weaponry since that time. The Marine Corps also found during the Vietnam buildup that a greater number of career officers and career enlisted Marines are required to support rapid expansion in time of emergency. Nevertheless, the program for the budget periods indicates that 73% of all officers will be captains or below and 71% of all enlisted will be in the four lowest grades. The average officer grade is 2.7, the average enlisted grade is less than 3.5, and the average civilian grade is 6.2. These

relatively low averages reflect the Marine Corps' awareness of the cost of manpower and are the result of a conscious effort to minimize the costs without degrading the effectiveness of the organization or destroying an important incentive for maximum effort and productivity.

5. Military-Civilian Mix

It is Marine Corps policy that civilians be used to meet the manpower requirements of supporting activities to the maximum extent practicable consistent with Marine Corps requirements for the use of military personnel by reason of law, security, discipline, rotation, operational readiness, and cost. Additionally, the Marine Corps adheres to the policy of relying on the civilian, non-Department of Defense, sector of the economy for the products and services needed in preference to in-house alternatives to the maximum extent consistent with effective and efficient mission accomplishment. When functions need not be performed by military personnel and the use of civilian manpower is less expensive, then civilian manpower is programmed for that function. If the function need not be performed in-house, the Marine Corps conducts an analysis to determine the most effective and economical means of providing the service or product; i.e., in-house or contract. The Marine Corps has established stringent requirements on the type and scope of in-house operations, preferring the contractual route whenever economically justifiable.

C. Requirements Determination Process

The Land Forces manpower requested is based upon a systematic determination of the size of the Marine infantry battalion, the smallest ground element which can be deployed independently for sustained combat operations. A variety of methodologies are used in this determination however, the common goal of each is the development and testing of various organizations and manning levels for the infantry battalion. Using a building block approach, alternative organizations are developed and tested, beginning with a rifle battalion of approximately 1,200 Marines. Controlled scenario troop tests, from the squad to battalion level, are conducted to investigate and validate computer model simulations. The process for determining ground force manpower requirements includes: research, field tests, equipment experiments and war games using manual and computer simulation.

The other portion of the ground elements, the Force Troops of the Fleet Marine Forces, constitutes a pool of essential specialized units which may be used to augment a combat force as required for a particular mission. The manpower needed for these units is directly based on the level of support needed for the combat units to accomplish assigned missions.

Manpower requirements for aviation units are derived by a two-fold approach, considering primarily the necessity to provide adequate support for the ground forces and, secondarily, the span of control and administrative structure of the squadron. As an example, in the case of an AH-1 attack helicopter squadron, computer simulated war games and past historical data provide an estimate of the daily sorties required for the support of each infantry battalion. This requirement, combined with the sortie capability for that particular aircraft, generates data on the required number of attack helicopters. The crew ratio of 1.2 pilots per aircraft in wartime (1.1 in peacetime) and the direct maintenance and ordnance support factors of 11.67 enlisted Marines for each aircraft yield one part of the total manpower required to fly and maintain the helicopters. Decisions on the desirable span of control and the necessity to provide forces in different geographic areas result in a determination of the number of aircraft to be assigned to each squadron. In turn, this number provides the basis for the manpower that is required per squadron.

The determination of the manpower required for supporting activities is more complex than the process described above for the combat forces. This is due to the great variety of activities performed and the many one-of-a-kind situations that exist. Because of this diversity, the determination process for the support forces will be described in the appropriate DPPC category in Section D of this chapter.

D. Marine Corps Manpower Requirements by Defense Planning and Programming Category

The following tables display by DPPC Marine Corps manpower requirements for the period FY 74 to FY 77. This section describes the significant features of the FY 75-FY 77 program. Section E will describe the FY 77 program.

Marine Corps Military Manpower Requirements
(Active Duty End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 75</u> <u>(FY 1976 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	-	-	-	-	-
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	103.2	111.3	113.0	110.5	111.7
Land Forces	74.9	82.5	84.2	81.8	83.0
Tactical Air Forces	27.6	28.2	28.2	28.2	28.2
Naval Forces	.7	.6	.6	.5	.5
Mobility Forces	-	-	-	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.7
Intelligence & Security	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.0
Centrally Managed					
Communication	*	*	*	*	*
Research & Development	.7	.7	.7	.7	.7
Support to Other Nations	.1	.1	*	*	*
Geophysical Activities	*	*	*	*	*
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	24.0	22.3	22.3	22.2	22.2
Reserve Components Support	.4	.5	.5	.5	.5
Base Operating Support	18.7	17.6	17.6	17.6	17.6
Force Support Training	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8
Command	2.0	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	24.3	22.5	22.4	22.4	22.4
Base Operating Support	5.6	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.6
Personnel Support	3.1	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.7
Individual Training	8.8	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.2
Command	4.8	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5
Logistics	.9	.9	.8	.8	.8
Federal Agency Support	1.1	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6
<u>Individuals</u>	35.4	38.4	36.9	39.7	39.7
Transients	11.8	11.8	11.7	11.8	11.8
Patients & Prisoners	1.6	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3
Trainees & Students	22.0	25.3	23.9	26.6	26.6
<u>Total Marine Corps</u>	<u>188.8</u>	<u>196.4</u>	<u>196.3</u>	<u>196.5</u>	<u>197.6</u>

*Less than 50 spaces.

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

Marine Corps Civilian Manpower Requirements
(Direct & Indirect Hire and Strengths in Thousands)

	FY 74 Actual	FY 75	FY 76 (FY 1976 Budget)	FY 77	FY 77 Auth.
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	10.6 (2.3)	10.8 (2.3)	10.8 (2.3)	11.2 (2.3)	11.2 (2.3)
Reserve Components Support	.1 (-)	.1 (-)	.1 (-)	.1 (-)	.1 (-)
Base Operating Support	10.5 (2.3)	10.7 (2.3)	10.7 (2.3)	11.1 (2.3)	11.1 (2.3)
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	9.2 (-)	9.6 (-)	9.2 (-)	9.2 (-)	9.3 (-)
Base Operating Support	1.9 (-)	1.6 (-)	1.7 (-)	1.7 (-)	1.7 (-)
Personnel Support	.1 (-)	.1 (-)	.1 (-)	.1 (-)	.1 (-)
Individual Training	2.4 (-)	2.5 (-)	2.4 (-)	2.5 (-)	2.5 (-)
Command	1.8 (-)	2.0 (-)	2.0 (-)	2.0 (-)	2.0 (-)
Logistics	3.0 (-)	3.1 (-)	3.0 (-)	3.0 (-)	3.0 (-)
<u>Total</u>	19.8 (2.3)	20.4 (2.3)	20.0 (2.3)	20.4 (2.3)	20.4 (2.3)
<u>Direct Hire Only</u>	17.5	18.1	17.6	18.1	18.1


() Indirect hire included.

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

1. General Purpose Forces

The Marine Corps contribution to General Purpose Forces consists of Land Forces, Tactical Air Forces, and Naval Forces. Over 113,000 Marines (57% of the Corps) will be in General Purpose Forces in FY 1976. Civilian manpower is not programmed for this category because of the need to keep these forces in a totally deployable, self-contained status. The following diagram displays the organization of Marine General Purpose Forces.


Marine Corps General Purpose Forces



The Marines in the Fleet Marine Forces provide the ground and aviation elements of three combined arms units called Marine Amphibious Forces, each of which consists of a Marine Division, a Marine Aircraft Wing, and selected tactical supporting units. The manpower requested will provide the Marine Corps sufficient trained personnel to commit two Marine Amphibious Forces immediately to combat operations, such as amphibious assaults or forcible entry against well-defended positions. Elements of the third amphibious force could be used as reinforcement, to provide assistance to allies, or in a sub-theater level operation.

There are two Fleet Marine Force commands, one in the Atlantic, and the other in the Pacific. The organization of these two is depicted below:

The Fleet Marine Forces



1/ Composed of units from 3rd Marine Division, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and Force Troops Pacific.

The Fleet Marine Forces are highly specialized, completely deployable, amphibious assault forces. Their Land Forces and Tactical Air Forces are combined into integrated weapon systems, called the Marine Amphibious Forces. While the Fleet Marine Force units are designed primarily for amphibious operations and the projection of naval power ashore, they have the additional capability of participating in sustained land-based combat operations.

a. Land Forces

As described above, Land Forces include the three Marine divisions, their support Force Troops, and support helicopter and air defense units from the Marine Aircraft Wings. The following table displays Land Forces for FY 74-FY 7T.

Marine Corps Land Forces Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
<u>Military</u>	<u>74.9</u>	<u>82.5</u>	<u>84.2</u>	<u>81.8</u>

The increase in the manpower programmed for the Land Forces in FY 1975 over those actually on hand at end FY 1974 is directly attributable to the correction of the end strength shortfall which occurred in FY 1974. Sound management practice dictated that the shortfall be absorbed in the areas requiring the least training lead time which, generally, are in the Land Forces. This action temporarily degraded the immediate capability of the Marine Corps but preserved the training and support establishment to allow rapid recovery. The increase of 1,700 Marines in Land Forces between FY 1975 and FY 1976 is a result of smaller training requirements resulting from decreased accessions. These Marines will be used to increase the manning level of the Marine Divisions and complete the recovery from the FY 1974 contraction.

Barring any other actions, the programmed end strength in Land Forces would stabilize at the FY 1976 level. However, the change in the end date of the fiscal year, from end June to end September, highlights the dynamic and cyclic nature of the manpower program. In FY 77 a heavy input of recruits during July, August, and September causes 2,700 more Marines programmed to be undergoing training at end September than at end June. With an essentially level total end strength this seasonal variation of necessity results in an undermanning of the trained strength and, consequently, a smaller number of Marines expected to be in Land Forces on that particular day. The fact is that the Marine Corps is not changing the structure of the Land Force nor decreasing the average manning which is programmed. The apparent reduction is the result of a realistic assessment of where each Marine will be accounted for on the last day of the new fiscal year.

The Land Forces manpower program will man the infantry, aviation, and other combat units at approximately 90% of the structure. Specifically, the 1st Marine Division, based in California, will be manned at 80% of structure; the 2nd Marine Division, located in North Carolina but with elements deployed afloat, will be manned at 96% of structure; the 3rd Marine Division, forward deployed in the Far East, will be at 88% of structure. The Force Troops will be manned at 81% while most aviation units will be at 90% of structure.

b. Tactical Air Forces

The Marine Corps Tactical Air Forces manpower request is to support the fixed wing tactical aircraft squadrons of the Marine Aircraft Wings. The request for Tactical Air Forces manpower is derived from an estimate of the number of aircraft that are required to support Marine ground elements committed to combat operations against a specified threat. The analysis deals with the type of weapons, the sorties required, aircraft and crew capabilities, and the necessity to control the airspace over the operating area. The number of squadrons, on the other hand, is a function of the span of control, maintenance capability, and the basing and deployment requirements. The establishment of a tactical squadron melds these two, resulting in the determination

of the manpower for each unit. The tactical aviation manpower request is as follows:

Marine Corps Tactical Air Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	<u>27.6</u>	<u>28.2</u>	<u>28.2</u>	<u>28.2</u>

The above manpower request will support a programmed level of 30 tactical squadrons in FY 1976 and FY 1977. During that period the Marine Corps will activate a new F-14 squadron with a concurrent reduction of an F-4 squadron. The above manpower request will also allow adequate manning of the air control units necessary to exercise control of the airspace over an amphibious operating area, the intermediate level aircraft maintenance activities, and expeditionary base operating support. There will continue to be a Marine Aircraft Wing deployed on each coast of the United States and one in the Far East. Selected fixed wing squadrons will also be embarked on Navy carriers. The manning level of the deployed 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, based on the east coast, is currently programmed at 90% of structure. The 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing will be manned at 80% of structure.

c. Naval Forces

The Marines request for Naval Forces include ships detachments (except those on aircraft carriers) and security detachments aboard submarine tenders. To assure consistency between the Navy and the Marine Corps accounting systems, detachments aboard aircraft carriers are accounted for under Tactical Air Forces. The Marine Corps furnishes these Naval Forces in accordance with a traditional mission, confirmed by law, to provide security in major Navy vessels, both at sea and in port. The following table shows a generally constant level of effort through the period.

Marine Corps Naval Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.5</u>

2. Auxiliary Forces

The Marine Corps request for active duty military manpower in the Auxiliary Forces category is small, totalling approximately 1,900 military personnel, most of whom are in one of two areas: Intelligence and Security or Research and Development. The Marine Corps has no civilian manpower in the Auxiliary Forces category.

a. Intelligence and Security

The manpower requested under Intelligence and Security will assist the Navy in manning and providing security for cryptographic centers. The manpower request also provides for a small number of personnel (less than 50) who serve at various Naval intelligence centers. The following table displays Marine Intelligence and Security manpower.

Marine Corps Intelligence and Security Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
<u>Military</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.0</u>

The Marine Corps contribution to the Intelligence and Security function represents an effort to use personnel in peacetime in a manner which will allow them to receive valuable training and experience through work in their occupational specialty. Under wartime conditions most of these Marines would be returned to duty with the Fleet Marine Forces, remaining in the same type of billet, but contributing directly to the support of a deployed Marine Amphibious Force.

b. Research and Development

As the following table shows Marine Corps participation in Research and Development activities is small and remains constant throughout the period.

Marine Corps Research and Development Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
<u>Military</u>	<u>.7</u>	<u>.7</u>	<u>.7</u>	<u>.7</u>

The Marines assigned to this function include representatives at the Naval Air Test Center as well as other development activities but are primarily those at the Marine Corps Development Center at Quantico, Virginia. Marine Corps developmental efforts encompass the

procurement and subsequent test, evaluation, and modification of equipment prior to introduction into the Fleet Marine Forces. These Marines plan and conduct military potential, engineering service, and troop tests. They also review and update Marine Corps training manuals. The manpower requirement is based on workload and the number requested reflects the Marine Corps' best estimate of the continuing requirements for organizational and equipment related tests and analyses.

2. Other Auxiliary Forces

In FY 76 less than 50 Marines are in each of the remaining Auxiliary Forces categories. The Marines in the Centrally Managed Communications category are supporting the Military Affiliate Radio System and the Defense Communication Agency. Those in the Support to Other Nations category are in Military Assistance and Advisory Groups. The Marines in the Geophysical Activities category are assigned to the Defense Mapping Agency as instructors in schools attended by Marines.

3. Mission Support Forces

a. Reserve Components Support

The following table displays the military manpower needed for the six district headquarters that manage the Marine Corps Reserve. Marines directly supporting a specific unit are reflected in the DPFC of the supported unit.

Marine Corps Reserve Component Support Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	<u>.4</u>	<u>.5</u>	<u>.5</u>	<u>.5</u>
<u>Civilians (Direct Hire)</u>	<u>.1</u>	<u>.1</u>	<u>.1</u>	<u>.1</u>

b. Base Operating Support (Mission Support)

The following table displays the manpower requirement for the period FY 74-FY 77.

Marine Corps Base Operating Support Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	<u>18.7</u>	<u>17.6</u>	<u>17.6</u>	<u>17.6</u>
<u>Civilians (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	<u>10.5</u>	<u>10.7</u>	<u>10.7</u>	<u>11.1</u>

The Marine Corps sizes its requirement for base operating support manpower at its 15 installations using a fixed/variable support concept. The fixed portion, which is all that is requested here, consists of the functions and services which are required due to the existence of the base but without regard to the Fleet Marine Force units that are based there. Examples of these functions are road maintenance and repair, utilities operations, and sewerage disposal. The variable portion of the manpower is required solely due to the presence of the tenant units. It is provided by the tenant units on a temporary basis under agreements worked out by the local commanders and monitored and approved by Headquarters Marine Corps. This manpower augmentation remains assigned to the parent unit; and trains and deploys with the unit as an organized and effective combat force. As a result, this manpower is counted in General Purpose Forces. This method of operation allows the Marines assigned to augmentation duties to maintain skills required upon deployment when the parent unit must provide a substantial portion of its own support.

The Marine Corps reviews the base operating support manpower for each installation continually, including on site inspections conducted at least once every three years. The base organizations are analyzed, as well as the functions performed and services rendered, to assure that the total manpower programmed is required and that the grades and skill levels are correct.

The aggregate of the Base Operating Support manpower comes from a building block approach. The first task is to decide upon the functions to be performed, then upon the work unit required so that a measurement system may be devised. Staffing then becomes a matter of deciding the level of support or service that will be furnished.

The Base Operating Support category also includes a request for 8,400 Marines assigned to security duties in barracks at 51 major Navy bases throughout the world. Personnel are provided for security guard and correctional center posts based on the number of hours that each post is required to be manned per week. Supervisory supply, mess and administrative personnel are provided based on the number of guards in that unit and/or to meet other functional responsibilities assigned.

c. Force Support Training

The following table summarizes manpower required for the Force Support Training mission.

Marine Corps Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>2.8</u>

Force Support Training units train recently designated aviators and flight officers in combat aircraft prior to their assignment to an operational squadron and provide standardized training to other aviation personnel. In addition, designated units within the Marine Air Training Groups are tasked with providing interceptor support for the Continental Air Defense Command. The manpower request is based upon the projected student load and the necessity to provide instructors, maintain aircraft, and perform the air defense mission.

d. Command (Mission Support Forces)

The following table displays Marine manpower in the Mission Support Forces Command category.

Marine Corps Command (Mission Support Forces) Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>1.3</u>

The Marines in this category fill positions at various international, combined, and unified command headquarters as well as the headquarters of the two Fleet Marine Forces. Marine staff members at other service commands perform two important functions. First, they provide expertise to the commander on matters concerning amphibious warfare. Secondly, they provide a two-way conduit through which the

Marine Corps is apprised of contingency planning and through which the staffs are aware of the capabilities and limitations of the Fleet Marine Forces. The manpower requested for the Fleet Marine Forces headquarters elements represents the necessary overhead structure required to administer and provide operational control over the Marine Corps General Purpose Forces. The manpower requested for these headquarters has been reduced by 254 spaces in consonance with Congressional direction. The reduction will be effected by the end of FY 1975.

4. Central Support Forces

a. Base Operating Support

Marine Base Operating Support Manpower (End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	<u>3.6</u>	<u>4.6</u>	<u>4.6</u>	<u>4.6</u>
<u>Civilians (Direct Hire)</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>1.7</u>

The manpower requested is used to support the logistic and training installations of the Marine Corps. The Logistic installations base operations request in FY 76 is for 900 military and 1,700 civilians. The installations supported are the Marine Corps supply activities at Barstow, California; Albany, Georgia; and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The Philadelphia facility will close in FY 1976 and the functions being performed will be transferred to Albany. The relocation will eliminate 50 military and 184 civilian billets.

The Marine Corps training installations that are supported are the two recruit depots at Parris Island and San Diego and the training base at Quantico, Virginia. The military manpower requested in FY 76 totals 3,700 Marines. The civilian manpower needed is carried under the Individual Training category and amounts to 2,400 end strength.

b. Personnel Support

The Personnel Support manpower request shown below is almost exclusively for the recruiting service. Recruiting is a particularly critical service function in the Marine Corps because of the conditions created by the cessation of the draft and the marketing conditions prevailing under the all volunteer force concept.

Marine Personnel Support Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
<u>Military</u>	<u>3.1</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>2.9</u>
<u>Civilian (Direct Hire)</u>	<u>.1</u>	<u>.1</u>	<u>.1</u>	<u>.1</u>

As previously mentioned, the Marine Corps fell approximately 7,000 below its FY 1974 target end strength and the recruiting quota has been increased in FY 75 to make up this shortage. To help the programmed recruiting force meet these higher goals the force was temporarily over-staffed with 112 billets at end FY 74. Additionally, the procurement process was made more effective through improved recruiter training, supervision, and the support of paid advertising. The results to date have been satisfactory. Through the first five months of FY 1975 the Marine Corps has obtained 99.9% of its recruiting goals. Indications are that the FY 1975 goal will be met while maintaining an acceptable quality standard.

c. Individual Training

The Individual Training manpower shown in the following table conduct and support the formal training and education of officers and enlisted men within the Marine Corps schools and in the schools of the other services, most notably the Navy.

Marine Individual Training Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 7T</u>
<u>Military</u>	<u>8.8</u>	<u>8.0</u>	<u>8.0</u>	<u>8.0</u>
<u>Civilian (Direct Hire)</u>	<u>2.4</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>2.4</u>	<u>2.5</u>

The training functions performed are designed to provide the Marine Corps with the right numbers of Marines with the proper skills. Complete justification of the Marine Corps training load request is provided in the Military Manpower Training Report for FY 1976. The men being trained are included in the Trainee/Student account of the Individuals category.

d. Command (Central Support Forces)

Command manpower is displayed in the following table.

Marine Command (Central Support Forces) Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	<u>4.8</u>	<u>4.5</u>	<u>4.5</u>	<u>4.5</u>
<u>Civilian (Direct Hire)</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>2.0</u>

The manpower requested under Command (Central Support Forces) is for Marine Corps headquarters, Navy headquarters support, and support of certain administrative and field activities of the Marine Corps, Navy, and other agencies. The Marine Corps does not project any significant changes in this category.

e. Logistics

The Logistics manpower displayed below is required for the conduct of centrally managed supply, maintenance, and support activities. These activities procure material, maintain a centralized inventory control, perform depot level maintenance, and provide other support services. A generally constant level of effort is programmed for the period FY 75-FY 77.

Marine Logistics Manpower

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	<u>.9</u>	<u>.9</u>	<u>.8</u>	<u>.8</u>
<u>Civilian (Direct Hire)</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>3.1</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>3.0</u>

f. Federal Agency Support

The following table displays Marine Corps manpower committed to Federal Agency support.

Marine Federal Agency Support Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.6</u>

The Federal Agency Support manpower requested by the Marine Corps consists almost exclusively of the 1,600 man Marine Corps Security Guard Battalion which furnishes embassy guards for the Department of State around the world. The increase from the FY 1974 level of 1,100 Marines is in response to the need to provide additional security as a result of the increased threat posed by terrorist organizations.

5. Individuals

The Individuals accounts contain the Marine Corps estimates of the manpower required for transients, patients, prisoners, and students/trainees. The following table displays the manpower needed for these accounts.

Marine Corps Individuals Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Transients	11.8	11.8	11.7	11.8
Patients/Prisoners	1.6	1.3	1.3	1.3
Trainees/Students	22.0	25.3	23.9	26.6
Total	<u>35.4</u>	<u>38.4</u>	<u>36.9</u>	<u>39.7</u>

The Individuals accounts will always be estimates of the requirement. These estimates are based partly on historical data and partly on current and projected manpower plans and policies. It is important to emphasize that the Individuals accounts are as necessary as the force structure spaces, and that shortages in these accounts can only be made up by taking reductions with the combat or support forces.

The FY 1975 Trainee/Student end strength of 25,300 is larger than either the FY 1974 and FY 1976 totals due to the increased accessions necessary to make up the FY 1974 recruiting shortfall. As discussed previously under the Land Forces category, the change in the end date of the fiscal year from end June to end September highlights the cyclic nature of programmed accession pattern. The larger than average number of accessions programmed during the July through September period will result in a higher end strength in training at the end of September than at the end of June.

E. FY 1977 Marine Corps Manpower Requirements

The FY 1977 manpower levels requested by the Marine Corps, compared to FY 1971, is shown on the following page.

Marine Corps Manpower Requirements

	<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilian</u> <u>(Direct and Indirect)</u>	
	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	-	-	-	-
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>110.5</u>	<u>111.7</u>	-	-
Land Forces	81.8	83.0	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	28.2	28.2	-	-
Naval Forces	.5	.5	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>1.7</u>	-	-
Intelligence & Security	1.0	1.0	-	-
Centrally Managed				
Communication	*	*	-	-
Research & Development	.7	.7	-	-
Other Nation Support	*	*	-	-
Geophysical Activities	*	*	-	-
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>22.2</u>	<u>22.2</u>	<u>11.2 (2.3)</u>	<u>11.2 (2.3)</u>
Reserve Component				
Support	.5	.5	.1	.1
Base Operating Support	17.6	17.6	11.1 (2.3)	11.1 (2.3)
Force Support Training	2.8	2.8	-	-
Command	1.3	1.3	-	-
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>22.4</u>	<u>22.4</u>	<u>9.3</u>	<u>9.3</u>
Base Operating Support	4.6	4.6	1.7	1.7
Personnel Support	2.9	2.7	.1	.1
Individual Training				
Overhead	8.0	8.2	2.5	2.5
Command	4.5	4.5	2.0	2.0
Logistics	.8	.8	3.0	3.0
Federal Agency Support	1.6	1.6	-	-
<u>Individual</u>	<u>39.7</u>	<u>39.7</u>	-	-
Transients	11.8	11.8	-	-
Patients & Prisoners	1.3	1.3	-	-
Trainees & Students	26.6	26.6	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>196.5</u>	<u>197.6</u>	<u>20.4 (2.3)</u>	<u>20.4 (2.3)</u>
<u>Direct Hire Only</u>			<u>18.1</u>	<u>18.1</u>

() Indirect hire included.

The only substantive change in the Marine Corps manpower program involves the modest increase in military end strength programmed into the General Purpose Forces to increase the manning of the Marine Divisions.

The manpower program for FY 1977 is based upon the current projected threat and national military strategy. Changes in either may lead to revisions in the program.

CHAPTER XIII

AIR FORCE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

A. Introduction

1. Summary and Highlights. Within limited resources available for National defense, decisions have been made as to force levels, deployments and activity which will permit the Air Force to accomplish its assigned missions with a prudent level of risk. These decisions are reflected in the allocation of total available funds to forces, facilities, weapons system procurement, research and development and manpower. This chapter provides the justification for Air Force manpower levels requested for Fiscal Years 1976, 1977, and 1978 as summarized in the following table.

Air Force Manpower Requirements
(End Strengths)

	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
<u>Active Military Personnel</u>	<u>590,000</u>	<u>590,000</u>	<u>590,000</u>
<u>Civilian Personnel</u>			
Direct Hire, Military Functions	255,904	257,825	255,699
Indirect Hire Foreign Nationals	15,364	15,362	15,318
Total	<u>271,268</u>	<u>273,187</u>	<u>271,017</u>

The Air Force has been challenged to achieve needed improvements within existing budgetary constraints. In meeting this challenge, the Air Force has taken initiatives to reduce support costs and reinvest them in force modernization or in retained capability that would otherwise have been eliminated. The most notable Air Force support reduction initiatives in the President's FY 1976 Budget are an overall reduction in headquarters (including the elimination of two major command headquarters), consolidation of activities in research and development, elimination of over 400 support aircraft, the closure of one major and one minor Air Force installation and support reductions in Europe and the Pacific.

These major actions, combined with numerous additional management innovations and organizational restructuring have freed over 30,000 Air Force military and civilian personnel for use in increasing combat effectiveness. In FY 76, they have made possible the initial increment needed to improve the combat capability of our tactical air forces. Specifically, tactical fighter crew ratios are restored to 1.25 per aircraft from the 1.1 level to which they were reduced in FY 71. This increase in trained aircrews provides a significant improvement in capability for rapid deployment and greater staying power once in the combat area. These resources have also

made possible activation of three F-5E tactical training (aggressor) squadrons to provide more realistic combat training for our aircrews. Additionally, we have increased flying hours to allow our wartime supplement aircrews to maintain proficiency in their aircraft of wartime assignment. We have also developed a program of complementary initiatives to increase strategic airlift capability which include increases to active force aircrew personnel.

These combat enhancing initiatives will be accommodated while the overall Air Force active duty military manpower is reduced from 611,534 projected for end FY 75 to 590,000 at end FY 76. These improvements in combat capability will not, however, fully correct tactical fighter force deficiencies.

Current plans call for a second incremental improvement in tactical air capability by end FY 77. Under this plan, and within the requested 590,000 active duty military strength level, crew ratios will be further increased and maintenance personnel added to both tactical fighter and tactical reconnaissance forces such that wartime operating capability will be increased from 50 to 60 fighter and 45 to 52 reconnaissance flying hours per month per aircraft. This also will represent the restoration of capability lost in FY 1971 due to resource limitations. Beyond this increment, as new weapon systems are introduced, the Air Force plans to add about three additional tactical wings within overall strength levels.

2. Air Force Force Structure. The force structure of the Air Force is the primary determinant of manpower requirements. Therefore, before discussing Air Force manpower requirements, it is necessary to understand the force structure which generates these requirements.

An overview of the FY 76 force structure and comparison between FY 76 and FY 68 (Southeast Asia peak) levels provides insight into the changing complexion of the force in terms of absolute numbers; improved capabilities and performance; increased modernization of and reliance on Reserve Forces; and, the requirement to maintain options for a "high-low mix" force of both sophisticated and highly capable but more austere tactical fighters.

As shown in the following table, the active force aircraft inventory has decreased by over 34% since FY 68. In terms of capability, however, this reduction has to some extent been offset. Performance and

capabilities of fighter aircraft have been improved. The bomber force has been given enhanced penetration capabilities. There has been a conversion to an all-jet strategic airlift force. Aircraft with high cost of maintenance and limited capability have been dropped from the inventory.

Total Active Force Aircraft

	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 76</u>
Bombers	779	500
Tankers	667	628
Fighter/Attack/Interceptor	3,985	2,479
Recon	1,009	492
Cargo/Transport	2,358	902
Trainers	2,584	1,880
Other	1,224	371
Total	12,606	7,252

The balance between the Air Force active and Reserve components is based upon the needs and missions which these complementary forces are most suited to accommodate. Active forces are primarily required to support non-mobilization contingencies, the initial, pre-mobilization defense of NATO and to provide deterrence, forward deployments, and the rotation base to support these deployments. Reserve forces serve as effective complements to the active forces as follow-on augmentations for selective contingencies when mobilization is appropriate, and for general war conditions. The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve have been fully integrated into the total Air Force over the past eight years. This integration has meant equipping the Reserve components with first-line aircraft, F-106s, A-7s, RF-4s, C-130s, and beginning in FY 76, with KC-135s. We are planning to concurrently equip the active and Reserve forces with production line A-10s after the aircraft reaches initial operational capability (IOC). In addition to aircraft modernization, the Reserve force structure has been expanded through the addition of the new roles of medical evacuation and weather reconnaissance.

a. Strategic Offensive. Since FY 68, the size of the Air Force strategic missile force has remained unchanged at over 1,000 ICBN's. In the bomber force there have been changes in both the size and mix. In terms of size, the number of bombers in the force has been reduced by over 190 UE to a level of approximately 400 UE. In terms of mix, the B-58 was phased out of the inventory in FY 69, and the FB-111 entered the inventory in FY 71. The bomber force is continued at the current level; however, the capabilities of selected Air Force B-52s are planned for expansion. Those aircraft currently configured for mine laying will also be configured to launch the Navy Harpoon missile.

The FY 76 active tanker force is gradually reduced from its present level of over 600 aircraft as the Reserve forces assume an

eventual total of 128 KC-135 aircraft. As the Reserve component units become mission ready, they will perform day-to-day alert and will augment Strategic Air Command forces under generated alert conditions.

b. Strategic Defensive. Air Force air defense forces have undergone a significant change since FY 68. The number of active interceptors has been reduced by 75% as the emphasis on defense against a strategic bomber attack was reduced and effort was directed to the missions of providing bomber attack warning and peacetime air-space surveillance and control. In FY 76, the active interceptor force remains at six squadrons while the Air National Guard force is reduced to 10 squadrons. Tactical F-4s augment this force to maintain minimum essential day-to-day U.S. coverage with contingency planning for additional tactical fighter augmentation during crises.

c. Tactical Air. The overall size of the active force tactical fighter force has been reduced by approximately 500 aircraft since FY 68. Similarly, the active force tactical reconnaissance force has been reduced by approximately 150 aircraft; the F-100 and RF-101 have been dropped from the active inventory, and the A-7 and F-111 have been introduced. Although we are deploying highly capable aircraft, present crew resource limitations prevent us from achieving full system efficiency in terms of a capability to meet the high sustained sortie rates we would encounter in combat. Support manpower reductions will enable us in FY 76 to make marginal increases in tactical crew ratios to maximize the capabilities of our deployed systems, with further improvement projected for FY 77.

In FY 76 the active tactical fighter force will be retained at 22 wings. Significant to this force capability, however, is the addition of the first two squadrons of F-15s in FY 76. The President's FY 76 Budget contains funds to initiate full engineering development on a smaller, less-costly aircraft - the Air Combat Fighter. By moving toward a force structure composed of sophisticated fighters and highly capable but more austere aircraft, the Air Force will in the future be able to maintain a larger combat capability and further reduce force deficiencies for equivalent budget expenditures and manpower levels.

The FY 76 program continues the modernization of the Reserve components through the transfer of four RF-4 tactical reconnaissance squadrons from the active force, bringing the number of RF-4 squadrons in the Reserve components to seven.

The requirement for an effective command control system is satisfied, in part, by the various elements of the Tactical Air Control System. The present airborne element of this system is the C-130E Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center. These aircraft, as

well as the EC-135 Tactical Deployment Control Aircraft, will be replaced by the E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). The FY 76 program continues the AWACS development.

d. Airlift. In terms of changes in capabilities, the most dramatic have occurred in the Air Force airlift force. For example, a major portion of the strategic airlift capability in FY 68 was represented by the propeller-driven C-124. This force also contained C-123s and C-130s. Since that time, this capability has been quantitatively and qualitatively increased through the conversion to the all-jet C-5 and C-141 force. The active tactical airlift force has changed from a mixed C-7, C-123, C-130 force to an entirely C-130 force. The Reserve forces now solely provide the necessary STOL capability for our tactical airlift forces.

The President's FY 76 Budget continues the FY 75 force levels for strategic airlift. The FY 76 active strategic airlift force consists of four squadrons of C-5s and 13 squadrons of C-141s. This active strategic airlift force is augmented by four C-5 and 13 C-141 Air Force Reserve Associate units. The crews of the Associate units fly active force C-5s and C-141s to provide necessary augmentation of the active force to sustain increased aircraft utilization rates upon mobilization. In addition to these resources, the mobility forces include approximately 250 long range commercial aircraft in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). The President's FY 76 Budget also contains several programs to increase strategic airlift aircraft without purchasing additional aircraft.

It is especially critical, during a period when maximum effort is expended on reducing manpower levels to the absolute minimum required, that there be an objective and regularized process that can translate workloads generated by this force structure into manpower requirements. The following section briefly describes this process.

3. Manpower Requirements Determination Process

Since 1961, the Air Force has operated the Manager's Engineering Program as the principal means for determining manpower requirements. Experience and a conscientious effort to improve the program over the years have produced a dependable, objective and accurate base for documenting Air Force manpower requirements.

As of 30 September 1974, more than 65% of total Air Force manpower requirements were based on standards. A description of this most important part of the requirements determination process, the development of standards, is presented below. The steps described are typical of those used to develop standards for functions peculiar to a major command or for common functions performed throughout the Air Force.

a. Three Phases of Standards Development

Because there are three distinct phases in a standards study, the steps that occur in a typical study are described separately for each phase. The three phases are: Preliminary, Measurement, and Computation.

(1) Preliminary Phase. An initial review is made of the function to document the kinds of work and tasks performed. Research includes directives, policies, organization, work processes, workload data, and other items affecting the scope of work involved. From this, the function is divided into homogeneous work groupings or work centers -- such as the in and out processing activity in the military personnel function or the requisitioning activity in the supply function -- and a detailed "work center description" is developed for each work center. This detailed description includes a listing of all tasks which are then grouped into homogeneous categories of work.

A Preliminary Report is prepared and reviewed by the staffs of the Manpower and Organization function and the function being studied to insure that the description reflects essential and required work. The Preliminary Report also includes potential workload factors or units of measure that will be expressive of the production outputs or work performed in each work center, e.g., number of personnel serviced, number of supply requisitions filled. Additionally, the report contains a measurement plan and identifies the measurement techniques to be employed during the next phase.

(2) Measurement Phase. Many work measurement techniques are available and all are used to some extent. The two most commonly used in the Air Force are work sampling and operational audit.

Work sampling is employed by taking a large number of instantaneous samples of work being performed, according to the categories of work identified in the work center description. These observations are made at random, preselected times. By the mathematical law of large numbers, the percentages of time observed in each category of work approach the percentages of time actually spent by the workers. This method is very accurate and is economical for measuring large cost, relatively stable functions with standard operations. Sufficient observations are taken during the study of a work center to insure a statistical confidence of 95% with plus or minus 3% accuracy. Stated in other terms, if sampling were continued indefinitely, the results that would be obtained 95% of the time would be within plus or minus 3% of the results already obtained through the study.

Operational audit integrates four techniques into a systematic method for measuring work activity. Directed requirement recognizes that many activities and some positions are required by statute or Air Force directive. The directed requirement may apply to a whole-man position, or to such things as directed frequencies for inspections and even directed time values for an activity, such as the periodic run-up of a standby electrical generator. Good operator technique is based on the selection of a qualified individual and observing the amount of time taken by that person to perform a given activity. Historical experience draws on a documented past experience as a source for frequency and time required to accomplish certain jobs. Best judgment employs the combined experience with judgment of the management engineering technician, the worker, and the work center supervisor to derive time and frequency estimates. This technique is used only in those cases where the required information is not attainable by any other means.

(3) Computation Phase. All data are analyzed and several tests are performed with different workload factors and statistical models to develop a standard which represents the most valid man-hour to workload relationship.

The measured man-hours required and workload volume as reported are plotted, after which correlation and regression analysis will produce the best correlation between manpower and workload. As a result, a regression line, in graphic form, is developed to show the manpower required to perform at varying volumes of workload.

The standard is also published in the form of a manning table which shows the manpower (by totals and skills/grades) for the varying workload levels.

A final report with work center descriptions, work measurement data, and all other supporting materials is prepared, reviewed by the major command, and forwarded to Headquarters USAF for review and final approval.

The final study report usually includes standards for all work centers within the specific function. By using the results of all these standards, program estimating equation is developed which relates the aggregate command requirements to a programmable factor, such as base population, flying hours, etc. As changes in programs are forecasted, the standards allow corollary management actions to adjust manpower authorizations.

b. Manpower Guides

As previously stated, 65% of total Air Force manpower requirements are determined by manpower standards, developed according to the process just described. The remaining Air Force requirements are based on what we term manpower guides, which employ various techniques including staff estimates, manpower surveys, desk audits, and contractor estimates. We expect that manpower guides will continue to be vital to determination of approximately 30-40% of Air Force manpower requirements. Guides are preferred when inexperience with new systems make standards development infeasible, when functions or systems have a known short-term life before phase-out, and when it would not be cost effective to develop costly standards for small, one-of-a-kind, specialized activities.

The application of both manpower standards and guides to forecasted workloads requirements provides the accurate, objective and consistent basis for resource managers at all levels of the Air Force to predict future manpower requirements. This process provides the Air Force the capability to insure that like activities throughout the Air Force receive required levels of manpower consistent with workload requirements. Further, when workload changes because of mission or force adjustments, accurate numbers of related manpower can be programmed with the changed mission or force level.

B. Significant Trends

1. Total Program. Manpower reductions in the following table, which compares FY 1968 with FY 1976, reflect the elimination of over 5,000 aircraft, reduced utilization of remaining aircraft, a 25% reduction of major installations and significant reductions in sustaining activities.

The resultant manpower program driven by these force changes reflects deliberate management initiatives required to minimize the effects on combat capability of decreasing buying power, increasing manpower costs and limited resources available for National defense.

Air Force Manpower Reductions FY 68-FY 76 (Active Duty End Strengths in OCOs)

	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>Numbers</u>	<u>Change</u>	
				<u>Per Cent</u>	
<u>Active Duty Military</u>	904.8	590.0	-314.8	-34.8	
<u>Civilian Personnel (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	<u>357.9</u>	<u>271.3</u>	- 86.6	-24.2	
Total	1,262.6	861.3	-401.3	-31.8	

2. Headquarters. One of the most dramatic changes since FY 68 has been the reduction of personnel in Air Force management headquarters. Whereas total Air Force strengths have been reduced 31.8%, actions planned for FY 76 will bring reductions of personnel in Air Force management headquarters to over 50%. This reduction includes the elimination of two major command headquarters (Pacific Air Forces and Air Force Communications Service) in FY 76; the elimination of six numbered air force headquarters; and, the reduction of three numbered air force headquarters to skeletal staffs retained for wartime expansion. In addition to the management headquarters reductions/eliminations, thirty-one air divisions have been eliminated.

3. Overseas Deployments. Not only has the total Air Force declined during this period, but also the numbers of Air Force Military personnel deployed overseas has been decreased. When compared to FY 68, the Air Force overseas posture in FY 76 reflects an overall reduction of 169,549 personnel, 2,213 aircraft, 29 bases. Personnel reductions include significant reductions in Southeast Asia, a 55% reduction in the Western Pacific and a 13% reduction in Europe and related areas.

These substantial overseas reductions have placed more emphasis on retaining strong peacetime management capabilities in major commands located in the continental United States (CONUS) and insuring the capability for rapid deployment of required forces and personnel to overseas locations during wartime and contingency situations.

C. Manpower Requirements by Defense Planning and Programming Category

The following tables display by DPPC Air Force manpower requirements for the period FY 74 to FY 77. This section describes the significant features of the FY 75-FY 77 program. Section D will describe the FY 1977 program.

Air Force Military Manpower Requirements
(Active Duty End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 75</u> <u>(FY 1976 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>99.8</u>	<u>90.0</u>	<u>81.9</u>	<u>81.7</u>	<u>81.6</u>
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>113.7</u>	<u>111.5</u>	<u>112.4</u>	<u>112.8</u>	<u>116.6</u>
Land Forces	-	-	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	73.9	72.9	74.6	75.0	79.0
Naval Forces	-	-	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	39.8	38.7	37.8	37.8	37.6
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>79.8</u>	<u>71.8</u>	<u>67.7</u>	<u>67.6</u>	<u>67.5</u>
<u>Intelligence & Security</u>	<u>25.2</u>	<u>23.4</u>	<u>21.6</u>	<u>21.6</u>	<u>21.3</u>
Centrally Managed					
Communication	24.3	19.7	18.8	18.8	18.9
Research & Development	17.4	17.5	17.0	17.0	17.1
Support to Other Nations	2.0	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4
Geophysical Activities	10.9	9.8	8.9	8.9	8.8
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>172.0</u>	<u>164.1</u>	<u>157.1</u>	<u>157.1</u>	<u>155.4</u>
Reserve Components Support	1.0	1.0	.6	.6	.6
Base Operating Support	130.4	125.3	119.8	119.8	117.6
Force Support Training	16.1	16.0	15.9	16.0	16.5
Command	24.5	21.8	20.8	20.7	20.6
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>109.1</u>	<u>105.5</u>	<u>103.1</u>	<u>102.9</u>	<u>102.7</u>
Base Operating Support	21.7	20.7	20.4	20.4	20.5
Medical Support	31.2	30.6	29.8	29.8	29.5
Personnel Support	7.0	7.0	6.8	6.7	6.7
Individual Training	28.7	27.7	27.1	27.1	27.1
Command	14.8	14.2	14.0	13.9	13.9
Logistics	5.2	4.8	4.6	4.6	4.6
Federal Agency Support	.4	.5	.4	.4	.4
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>69.3</u>	<u>68.7</u>	<u>67.7</u>	<u>67.9</u>	<u>66.0</u>
<u>Transients</u>	<u>25.2</u>	<u>25.0</u>	<u>24.2</u>	<u>23.9</u>	<u>21.8</u>
Patients	.8	.8	.8	.8	.8
Trainees & Students	38.9	38.5	38.3	39.0	39.2
Cadets	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.2	4.2
<u>Total Air Force</u>	<u>643.8</u>	<u>611.5</u>	<u>590.0</u>	<u>590.0</u>	<u>590.0</u>

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

**Air Force Civilian Manpower Requirements
(Direct & Indirect Hire End Strengths in Thousands)**

	<u>FY 74 Actual</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76 (FY 1976 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77 Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces - Total</u>	<u>8.4 (.)</u>	<u>7.6 (.)</u>	<u>7.1 (.)</u>	<u>7.0 (.)</u>	<u>6.8 (.)</u>
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>26.9 (.9)</u>	<u>28.5 (1.0)</u>	<u>29.3 (1.0)</u>	<u>29.4 (1.0)</u>	<u>29.6 (1.0)</u>
Land Forces	-	-	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	13.2 (.2)	14.3 (.2)	14.8 (.2)	14.9 (.2)	15.0 (.2)
Naval Forces	-	-	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	13.7 (.7)	14.2 (.7)	14.5 (.7)	14.5 (.7)	14.6 (.7)
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>33.1 (1.1)</u>	<u>32.5 (.9)</u>	<u>31.0 (.8)</u>	<u>31.0 (.8)</u>	<u>31.0 (.8)</u>
<u>Intelligence & Security</u>	<u>3.0 (.4)</u>	<u>3.0 (.5)</u>	<u>2.8 (.4)</u>	<u>2.8 (.4)</u>	<u>2.7 (.4)</u>
Centrally Managed					
Communication	6.5 (.6)	5.6 (.3)	5.3 (.3)	5.3 (.3)	5.3 (.3)
Research & Development	22.7 (-)	22.8 (-)	21.5 (-)	21.5 (-)	21.5 (-)
Support to Other Nations	.1 (.)	.1 (.)	.2 (.)	.2 (.)	.2 (.)
Geophysical	.9 (.1)	1.0 (.1)	1.2 (.1)	1.2 (.1)	1.2 (.1)
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>79.1 (12.8)</u>	<u>77.0 (12.5)</u>	<u>74.6 (12.4)</u>	<u>74.8 (12.4)</u>	<u>73.2 (12.4)</u>
<u>Reserve Components Support</u>	<u>6.6 (-)</u>	<u>6.6 (-)</u>	<u>6.0 (-)</u>	<u>6.0 (-)</u>	<u>6.0 (-)</u>
Base Operating Support	66.5 (12.4)	64.7 (12.3)	63.2 (12.2)	63.3 (12.2)	61.8 (12.2)
Force Support Training	1.2 (.)	1.4 (.)	1.4 (.)	1.4 (.)	1.4 (.)
Command	4.8 (.4)	4.3 (.1)	4.1 (.2)	4.1 (.2)	4.1 (.1)
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>141.8 (1.1)</u>	<u>135.5 (1.3)</u>	<u>129.2 (1.1)</u>	<u>131.0 (1.1)</u>	<u>130.4 (1.1)</u>
<u>Base Operating Support</u>	<u>33.2 (.2)</u>	<u>31.0 (.2)</u>	<u>30.1 (.2)</u>	<u>30.2 (.2)</u>	<u>30.3 (.2)</u>
Medical Support	6.9 (.5)	7.8 (.7)	7.4 (.6)	7.4 (.6)	7.3 (.6)
Personnel Support	2.0 (.2)	2.2 (.3)	2.1 (.2)	4.0 (.2)	4.0 (.2)
Individual Training	7.4 (.)	7.7 (.)	7.4 (.)	7.4 (.)	7.4 (.)
Command	12.3 (.1)	12.1 (.2)	11.6 (.2)	11.6 (.2)	11.6 (.2)
Logistics	80.1 (.)	74.7 (.)	70.5 (.)	70.4 (.)	69.7 (.)
<u>Total</u>	<u>289.4 (15.8)</u>	<u>281.2 (15.6)</u>	<u>271.3 (15.4)</u>	<u>273.2 (15.4)</u>	<u>271.0 (15.3)</u>
<u>Direct Hire Only</u>	<u>273.6</u>	<u>265.6</u>	<u>255.9</u>	<u>257.8</u>	<u>255.7</u>

* Less than 50.

() Indirect hire included.

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

1. Strategic Forces. Air Force strategic forces are subdivided into offensive, defense and control and surveillance forces.

a. Strategic Offensive Forces. The following tables show Air Force Strategic Offensive Force requirements.

Air Force Strategic Offensive Forces

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Active Forces:</u>				
<u>Bombers</u>				
B-52 (UE)	372	330	330	330
FB-111 (UE)	66	66	66	66
<u>Tankers</u>				
KC-135 (UE)	615	615	583	575
<u>Missiles</u>				
Titan II	54	54	54	54
Minuteman	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
<u>Reserve Forces:</u>				
<u>Tankers</u>				
ANG KC-135 (UE)	0	0	32	40

Air Force Strategic Offensive Forces Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	72.0	65.2	58.3	58.1
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	.6	.7	1.5	1.7

Strategic offensive forces consist of combat aircraft and intercontinental ballistic missiles under the control of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). SAC's primary mission is to prevent nuclear war through its ability to deliver this nuclear firepower to any part of the world, even if subjected to surprise attack. SAC is also capable of delivering conventional (non-nuclear) weapons with its bomber aircraft. To perform these missions in FY 76, there are 22 B-52 squadrons, 4 FB-111 squadrons, 35 KC-135 tanker squadrons, 6 Titan missile squadrons and 20 Minuteman squadrons with the unit equipment (UE) 1/ shown in the table below.

1/ Unit Equipment (UE) is the basis for manning aircraft equipped units. This is less than the Total Active Inventory (TAI), which remains level except for aircraft attrition.

The strategic offensive manpower reductions shown in the above table are attributable to the following actions. In FY 75, the B-52 force was reduced by one squadron because of aircraft aging and budgeting constraints. In FY 76, two major changes are planned in the operation of the bomber force. The first is a reduction in the proportion of the force to be maintained on ground alert from 40% to 30%. The second major change involves the transfer of 128 UE KC-135 tankers from the active force to the Air Reserve components over the next several years. Civilian manpower increases in the active force reflect additional Reserve forces technician requirements for this increased mission. Additionally, a B-52 wing will be inactivated and its resources consolidated with other active units.

The above FY 76 bomber and tanker actions result in a reduced requirement for 12 satellite activities. With the decrease in active force tankers, it has been possible to consolidate some alert aircraft at selected satellite bases and main operating bases without decreasing operational capability.

b. Strategic Defensive Forces. The following tables show Air Force Strategic Defensive Force requirements.

Air Force Strategic Defensive Forces

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Interceptor Squadrons:</u>				
Active Air Force	7	6	6	6
Air National Guard	19	14	11	10

Air Force Strategic Defensive Forces Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	16.2	14.1	13.0	12.9
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	6.9	6.0	4.7	4.4

Air Force strategic defensive forces include the aircraft and radars of the Aerospace Defense Command, Air National Guard and Alaskan Air Command. These forces are required for surveillance and control of air space. To perform this mission in FY 76, we will employ a force of six active Air Force and six Air National Guard F-106

squadrons, one ANG F-4 squadron and three ANG F-101 squadrons through FY 71. The ground environment systems include 8 Region Control Centers, 5 manual NORAD control centers, and 91 Surveillance radar sites of which the Air Force mans all but 25 located in Canada. There are also 8 FAA/USAF joint use radar sites and 3 ANG radar sites used for strategic defense. Thirty-one Distant Early Warning (DEW) stations are manned primarily by contractor personnel.

The reduction from FY 74 to FY 75 reflects the transfer of one F-106 squadron from the active force as part of the Air Reserve Forces Modernization Program, and the phase out of 6 EC-121 aircraft. In addition to those actions that were contained in the FY 1975 President's Budget, further reductions have been made in FY 1975 due to the phase out of 8 surveillance radar sites. From FY 1975 to FY 1976, the reduction in end strength is primarily attributable to the phase out of the remaining EC-121 squadron (6 aircraft) from the active force, and a reduction in ANG munitions storage personnel.

c. Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces. Manpower requirements for this category are:

Air Force Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	11.5	10.7	10.7	10.7
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	.9	.9	.9	.9

Control and surveillance (C&S) forces consist of the following aircraft: 1 squadron of SR-71s for reconnaissance; 28 Fast Attack Command and Control System (FACCS) aircraft which are used by the Strategic Air Command for airborne command posts, communication relay, and launch control centers, and 3 E-4A aircraft which are the National Emergency Airborne Command post aircraft located at Andrews AFB, MD. The ground environment activities include the NORAD Combat Operations Center in Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs which is the nerve center for aerospace defense of the North American Continent; 3 Ballistic Missile Early Warning sites; 6 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile Detection and Warning sites; 7 SPACE RACK sites consisting of radars and Baker-Nunn cameras, including the FPS-85 phased array radar at Eglin AFB, FL; the ground data system for the satellite early warning program and portions of the national military command and control system. Finally, C&S forces include communications and command and control support equipment associated with the strategic forces.

Manpower reductions shown in the above table are attributable to the phase out of two submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) radar sites in FY 75.

2. General Purpose Forces. Air Force general purpose forces are subdivided into tactical air forces and mobility forces.

a. Tactical Air Forces. Tactical air forces primary mission manpower includes the crews, organizational and field maintenance, weapons systems security and munitions maintenance personnel required to operate and maintain tactical air weapons systems. Also included are the personnel required to man associated command functions. This category also includes manpower for tactical air control systems to operate and maintain assigned equipment as well as to provide the Forward Air Control and Air Liaison Officers necessary to support Army and allied ground forces.

Civilian resources are programmed in the Tactical Forces to perform those jobs that do not require military personnel. The majority support War Readiness Materiel storage and maintenance requirements or serve as Reserve Forces technicians.

The following example, using the A-7 aircraft, is illustrative of the manner in which tactical air manpower requirements are derived:

Crews: The crew composition of the A-7 is one pilot. The required crew ratio based on combat readiness requirements is 1.25 per aircraft. The 1.25 crew ratio means that for a squadron composed of 24 aircraft, 30 pilots would be required in primary crew positions.

Maintenance: Presently, maintenance manpower requirements for tactical air forces are based on a statistical manpower standard which relates required manpower to flying hour generation.

A maintenance manhour per flying hour factor is developed by examining maintenance manhour data that are collected daily from each maintenance activity in the Air Force. The maintenance manhour per flying hour factor for the A-7 is 25 hours; i.e., it takes 25 productive direct manhours of maintenance to produce one flying hour. The maintenance manhour factor times the number of flying hours each aircraft must generate per month equals the total productive direct maintenance manhours that must be made available for each A-7 each month. To this must be added manhours for maintenance of the aerospace ground equipment (e.g., starters, generators) associated with the weapon system. On the average this requires an additional 15% of the maintenance manhours. The manhour requirement developed thus far pertains only to the worker or "wrench turner". It is also necessary to add a factor for maintenance

supervision. This factor varies by weapon system and by deployment configuration, but Air Force-wide the factor amounts to 10% of the manhours required to maintain the weapon system and the aerospace ground equipment.

The manhour requirements for maintenance, computed in the above manner, are converted to authorizations by dividing by the number of hours an individual is available for direct productive work in an average month. Air Force studies have established that an individual who is on wartime sustained schedule of a 10 hour shift, six days a week, is available for work 242 hours per month. 1/ This number excludes the time lost for sickness, leave, training, and similar activities. Further, surveys have determined that he is directly productive, doing actual "wrench turning", 60% of this time, with the remaining time devoted to indirect requirements such as standby and cleanup.

To summarize the requirements computation for an A-7 squadron:

25	Productive Direct Maintenance Manhours/Flying Hour
x56 2/	Wartime Flying Hours per month per Aircraft
<u>1,400</u>	Maintenance Manhours/Aircraft
x24	Number of Aircraft/Squadron
<u>33,600</u>	Maintenance Manhours/Squadron
x1.15	Ground Support Equipment Maintenance
<u>38,640</u>	Manhours for Maintenance of Aircraft and GSE
x1.10	Maintenance Supervision (Planning, Scheduling, Quality Control) Manhours/Month
<u>42,504</u>	Total Manhours Required/Month
242	Hours Available for Work/Month
x.60	Productive Direct Manhour Factor
<u>145.2</u>	Direct Productive Manhours/Month
42,504	Productive Direct Manhours Required
<u>145.2</u>	Productive Direct Manhours Available
	Per Man

= 293 Spaces Required for Squadron Maintenance

293 ÷ 24 = 12.2 Maintenance Spaces Per Aircraft

1/ Maintenance manning for tactical air forces is calculated on a 60 hour wartime work week using wartime flying hours.

2/ The example reflects additive maintenance personnel associated with the restoration of the tactical fighter force crew ratios to 1.25.

Munitions. These requirements are based on management engineering statistical standards. Included in this area is the manpower required for: loading, unloading, arming and de-arming of committed munitions; inspection, testing and maintenance of all aircraft weapons release systems; maintenance, ammunition loadings, activation and deactivation of aircraft gun systems; and a 30 day capability for munitions maintenance, storage and handling. The factor for the A-7 is 5.45 manpower authorizations per aircraft.

Supervision and Wing Staff. These requirements are based on management engineering standards and manning guides. Included are the men required for squadron supervision and the squadron contribution to wing staff. These personnel perform such jobs as command, operations, planning and scheduling, flying safety, quality control of aircrew training and proficiency, etc. Each A-7 squadron requires 16 officers and 30 airmen.

Weapons System Security. These requirements are based on manpower standards. Security personnel are required for entry control close and distant boundary support, security alert teams, etc. The requirement for an A-7 squadron has been determined to be 37 airmen.

Application of Factors

(24 aircraft, each flying 16 hours per month, with personnel working 10 hours a day and 6 days a week.)

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Airmen</u>	<u>Total</u>
Crew: 24 x 1 x 1.25	30	0	30
Maintenance: 24 x 12.2	6	287	293
Munitions: 24 x 5.45	3	128	131
Wing/Squadron Staff	16	30	46
Weapons Security	0	37	37
Primary Mission Manpower Required for Typical A-7 Squadron	55	482	537

Manpower requirements for other types of tactical air forces squadrons are calculated in a similar manner.

Air Force Tactical Air Forces

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Active Force:</u>				
Air Force Tactical Wings (TFW)	22	22	22	22
Air Force Reconnaissance Squadrons	13	13	9	9
Air Force Tactical Fighter Training (Aggressor) Sqds	-	-	3	3
<u>Reserve Forces:</u>				
Air National Guard Fighter/Attack Sq 1/	29	31	30	30
ANG Reconnaissance Sq	7	7	9	9
Air Force Reserve Fighter/Attack Sq	7	7	7	7

Air Force Tactical Air Force Manpower (End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	73.9	72.9	74.6	75.0
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	13.2	14.3	14.8	14.9

In FY 76, four squadrons of RF-4Cs are transferred from the active force as part of the Air Reserve Forces Modernization Program. As discussed earlier in this chapter, this decrease is offset by increasing tactical force crew ratios to 1.25 per aircraft (from the 1.1 to which they were reduced in FY 1971 because of resource limitations). Consistent with the Air Reserve Forces crew ratios, this increase in trained aircrews and associated maintenance personnel represents a significant increase in capability for rapid deployment and greater staying power once in the combat area. Air Force support reduction initiatives have also released sufficient resources to activate three 18 UE tactical fighter training (aggressor) squadrons which will provide more realistic aircrew combat training than has been possible outside the actual combat environment.

In FY 76, the active tactical fighter force is retained at 22 wings. The capability represented by this force is significantly

1/ Includes two training squadrons.

improved by the activation of the first two squadrons of F-15s, whose agility and armament were designed specifically for air-to-air combat.

Additional tactical air forces capability increases are planned for FY 77 and later years to correct present and emerging deficiencies and to move towards a force structure of 26 active wings.

b. Mobility Forces. Mobility forces manpower includes the crew, aircraft maintenance and weapons system security personnel as well as personnel to perform essential training flying safety and command and control duties. The determination of these requirements is accomplished in a manner similar to procedures described in the section on tactical air forces, although maintenance requirements for the C-141 are based on an engineered standard rather than a statistical (manhour per flying) hour factor/standard. Civilian resources in the Mobility forces are programmed to fill those requirements that do not require military personnel. In addition to maintenance specialists, the aerial port and terminal operations necessary to support the strategic airlift force also require large numbers of civilians. Reserve forces technicians employed in associate airlift units are also included in civilian totals.

Air Force Mobility Forces

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Active Force:</u>				
Tactical Airlift Sq	17	17	15	15
Strategic Airlift Sq	17	17	17	17
Aeromed Airlift Sq	3	3	3	3
Special Mission Airlift Sq	2	2	2	2
Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Sq	12	9	7	7
<u>Reserve Force:</u>				
Tactical Airlift Sq	34	37	37	37
Strategic Airlift Sq	3	0	0	0
Strategic Airlift Sq (Assoc) 1/	17	17	17	17
Aeromed Airlift Sq (Assoc) 1/	1	1	1	1
Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Sq	4	6	6	6

1/ Associate squadrons provide aircrews and maintenance personnel for utilization with active USAF squadrons.

Air Force Mobility Forces Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	39.8	38.7	37.8	37.8
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	13.7	14.2	14.5	14.5

Consistent with Congressional direction, required increases in strategic airlift capability will be achieved to the maximum extent possible by employing components of the Selected Reserve. Recruiting experience indicates that the Air Force, therefore, to achieve required strategic airlift mobilized crew ratios of 4.0 per aircraft and a capability for sustaining a 10 hour utilization rate, active force capabilities will be increased in FY 76 by two means. Wartime surge and sustained requirements will be met, in part by employing active force "auxiliary" aircrews and maintenance personnel from non-wartime essential positions. This will be done with no increase in total strength requirements. In addition, to make up the remaining capability shortfall, the C-5 active crew ratio will be increased from 2.0 to 2.25.

This modest increase is offset by transfer of two C-130 tactical airlift squadrons from the active force as part of the Air Reserve Forces Modernization Program. Additionally, two Air National Guard air rescue and recovery squadrons will be formed from HH-3 and HC-130 aircraft transferred from the active force.

3. Auxiliary Forces. Auxiliary forces are subdivided into intelligence and security, centrally managed communications, research and development, support to other nations and geophysical activities.

a. Intelligence and Security. Air Force manpower requirements for this category are:

Air Force Intelligence & Security Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	25.2	23.4	21.6	21.6
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	3.0	3.0	2.8	2.8

Intelligence manpower reductions reflect the continued emphasis by the Air Force to reduce intelligence resources. They represent such things as unit inactivations and the phasedown of reconnaissance and signal intelligence based on the realignment of priorities, management efficiencies and the application of technological advances.

The resources to support intelligence training which were formerly reported in this category are transferred to the central support forces Individual Training category in FY 76 (700 military and 100 civilians).

b. Centrally Managed Communications. Air Force manpower requirements for this category are:

Air Force Centrally Managed Communications
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	24.3	19.7	18.8	18.8
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	6.5	5.6	5.3	5.3

The decreases between FY 74 and 75 are attributable to base closures, Southeast Asia support reductions and a transfer of base communications resources from centrally managed communications to the base operating support categories to properly identify this resource with the force activities supported. Reductions between FY 75 and FY 76 result from support reduction initiatives including: consolidation of activities in the Kanto Plain, Japan; realignment of Air Force activities in the Pacific, including the disestablishment of Headquarters Pacific Air Forces; consolidation of Air Force Communications Service (AFCS) activities under the Military Airlift Command, permitting elimination of Headquarters AFCS as a major command; and reductions at bases throughout the Air Force where activities under the Military Airlift Command are collocated and can be consolidated or eliminated.

c. Research and Development. Air Force manpower requirements for this category are:

Air Force Research and Development Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	17.4	17.5	17.0	17.0
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	22.7	22.8	21.5	21.5

The decline in research and development manpower is largely attributable to Air Force support reduction initiatives. The Air Force has consolidated laboratories to focus research and development activities into three functional areas: space and missile systems; aeronautical systems; and electronics, communications, command and control. Not only does this laboratory realignment save manpower but it also permits more direct support to the three Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) product divisions. Further savings result from consolidation of AFSC test aircraft from six to three locations, thus improving utilization of aircraft and modification facilities and reducing management overhead.

d. Support to Other Nations. Air Force manpower requirements for this category are:

Air Force Support to Other Nations Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	2.0	1.4	1.4	1.4
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	.1	.1	.2	.2

Military decreases result from reductions in military assistance activities. The small civilian change is an increase in reimbursable personnel for support of Foreign Military Sales cases.

e. Geophysical Activities: Air Force manpower requirements for this category are:

Air Force Geophysical Activities Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	10.9	9.8	8.9	8.9
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	.9	1.0	1.2	1.2

Reductions reflect drawdown in base weather operations consistent with drawdown in forces and base structure. In addition, 5 WC-130s are phased out of the active force. The Air Reserve Forces now share the weather reconnaissance mission with the active force. Increases in civilians are attributable to requirements for Air Reserve Forces technicians to support this increased mission.

4. Mission Support Forces. Mission Support Forces are subdivided into Reserve Components Support, Base Operating Support, Force Support Training, and Command.

a. Reserve Component Support. Air Force manpower requirements for this category are:

Air Force Reserve Components Support Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	1.0	1.0	.6	.6
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	6.6	6.6	6.0	6.0

Air Force Reserve Components Support manpower in the following table is employed in activities with area responsibilities such as Air Force Reserve regions and National Guard state headquarters; general administrative activities such as the Air Reserve Personnel Center; personnel associated with the operations and maintenance of Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve air bases and combat aircrew training; manpower associated with the Office of the Chief of Air Force Reserve and Headquarters Air Force Reserve; and the Air Force support portion of the National Guard Bureau.

Reserve Components Support reductions in the preceding table reflect the net effect of several actions, primarily closing of Ellington and Hamilton Air Force Bases in FY 76.

b. Base Operating Support. Air Force manpower requirements for this category are:

Air Force Base Operating Support (Mission Support Forces) Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	130.4	125.3	119.8	119.8
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	66.5	64.7	63.2	63.3

These personnel are an integral part of the combat wing and perform such functions as aircraft refueling, control tower operations, aircraft dispatch, airfield and facilities maintenance, fire protection and crash rescue, base security, supply and supply services and essential administrative management functions.

Reductions in this category result from force reductions discussed in the preceding section, base closures, and from management initiatives to reduce support costs. As examples of the latter, ceremonial guards are being reduced, the Matagorda Island Bombing Range is to be closed, and propeller driven support aircraft are being withdrawn from the active force inventory with attendant annual savings in funds, manpower and fuel.

c. Force Support Training. Manpower requirements for this category are:

Air Force Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	16.1	16.0	15.9	16.0
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	1.2	1.4	1.4	1.4

Requirements in this category are relatively stable. Training increases for F-15 and CV-10A aircraft crews are offset by decreased crew training for other aircraft.

d. Command. Air Force manpower requirements for Command are:

Air Force Command (Mission Support Forces) Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	24.5	21.8	20.8	20.7
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	4.8	4.3	4.1	4.1

The reductions shown in the above table are in part attributable to DoD Management Headquarters reduction program described in Appendix B. Other management headquarters reductions are reflected in the Auxiliary Forces and Central Support Forces categories.

The following table provides a detailed display of the various command activities.

Air Force Command (Mission Support Forces) Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Active Military Personnel</u>				
<u>Non-Air Force Organizations</u>				
<u>International Hqs</u>	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7
<u>Unified Command Hqs</u>	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.2
<u>International/Unified Hqs Spt</u>	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
<u>Air Force Management Hqs</u>	12.6	10.8	10.7	10.7
<u>Air Force Operating Commands</u>	.8	.6	.6	.6
<u>Administrative Activities</u>	.3	.3	.3	.3

Air Force Command (Mission Support Forces) Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Special Activities</u>				
<u>Command Developments</u>				
Activities	.4	.4	.4	.4
Ceremonial Activities	.7	.5	.5	.5
Mission Evaluation				
Activities	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Mission Operations/				
Control Activities	.7	.6	.5	.5
Logistical Support				
Activities	<u>3.7</u>	<u>3.4</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>2.7</u>
Total Military	24.5	21.8	20.8	20.7
<u>Civilian Personnel (Direct</u> <u>and Indirect Hire)</u>				
<u>Non-Air Force Organizations</u>				
International Hqs	*	*	*	*
Unified Command Hqs	.4	.4	.4	.4
International/Unified				
Hqs Spt	.1	.1	.1	.1
Air Force Management Hqs	3.5	3.3	3.1	3.1
Air Force Operating				
Commands	.1	.1	.1	.1
<u>Administrative Activities</u>				
<u>Special Activities</u>				
<u>Combat Development</u>				
Activities	.1	.1	.1	.1
Mission Evaluation				
Activities	.1	*	*	*
Mission Operations/				
Control Activities	.1	.1	.1	.1
Logistical Support				
Activities	<u>.4</u>	<u>.2</u>	<u>.2</u>	<u>.2</u>
Total Civilian	4.8	4.3	4.1	4.1

*Fewer than 50.

5. Central Support Forces. Central Support Forces comprise Base Operating Support, Medical Support, Personnel Support and Individual Training, Command, Logistics and Federal Agency Support.

a. Base Operating Support. Manpower requirements for this category are:

Air Force Base Operating Support (Central Support Forces) Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	21.7	20.7	20.4	20.4
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	33.2	31.0	30.1	30.2

This manpower has been reduced consistent with reductions in logistics, flight training and specialized military training. Management initiatives, such as support aircraft reductions previously described, have also reduced the requirement for Base Operating Support manpower.

b. Medical Support. Manpower requirements for this category are:

Air Force Medical Support Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	31.2	30.6	29.8	29.8
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	6.9	7.8	7.4	7.4

Medical support manpower reductions in the preceding table reflect the general reduction in medical support requirements associated with changes in Air Force basing structure and overall strength.

c. Personnel Support. Manpower requirements in this category are:

Air Force Personnel Support Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	7.0	7.0	6.8	6.7
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	2.0	2.2	2.1	4.0

The Air Force operates about 1,000 of the total 4,800 DoD recruiting offices under the management of the USAF Recruiting Service. It also contributes 140 personnel to the 74 Armed Forces Entrance and Examination Stations (AFEES). The Air Force has recently developed a manpower standard for this function that incorporates results of a reorganization and reorientation of Air Force recruiting resources. Manpower savings resulting from development of this management engineered standard will pay for a new Procurement Management Information System (PROMIS) that enables recruiters to communicate directly with Air Force Personnel Data System to determine personnel vacancies and to be able to promise a potential recruit a job which will meet both his and Air Force needs. Air Force manpower requirements in support of investigative activities and the Overseas Dependent Education Program are also included in this category.

Personnel Support manpower changes reflect the net effect of the following actions. Reductions in military are attributable to reduced support to the Defense Intelligence Agency, and small reductions in investigative activities and the Overseas Dependent Education Program. The civilian increase in FY 77 is due to the change in fiscal year end from 30 June, when school teachers are not on the rolls, to 30 September, when they are.

d. Individual Training. Manpower requirements in this category are:

Air Force Individual Training Active Manpower 1/
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	28.7	27.7	27.1	27.1
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	7.4	7.7	7.4	7.4

1/ Does not include active trainees, students or cadets; Reserve Component trainees or students; or ROTC cadets in training in civilian status.

Individual Training manpower reductions are the net result of several actions. Undergraduate pilot training (UPT) and undergraduate navigator training (UNT) production have been reduced in FY 76 and thereafter consistent with aircrew personnel inventories and projected requirements. The Air Force has also consolidated training overhead functions.

Detailed justification of training requirements is in the FY 76 Military Manpower Training Report.

e. Command. The following table displays the military and civilian manpower associated with this function.

Air Force Command (Central Support Forces) Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	14.8	14.2	14.0	13.9
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	12.3	12.1	11.6	11.6

The decreasing trend shown in the above table is the result of actions taken as part of the overall DoD management headquarters reduction program. The DoD program is described in detail in Appendix B. There have also been reductions in ceremonial activities and in participation in the Civil Air Patrol program.

The following table provides a detailed display of the various command activities.

Air Force Command (Central Support Forces) Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Active Military Personnel</u>				
<u>OSD and JCS</u>	.7	.6	.6	.6
<u>Air Force Management Hqs</u>	4.5	4.2	4.0	3.9
<u>Administrative Activities</u>	5.8	5.8	5.8	5.8
<u>Special Activities</u>				
Ceremonial Activities	.9	.7	.7	.7
Civil Air Patrol	.3	.2	.2	.2
Criminal Investigation Activities	-	-	-	-
Postal/Courier Activities	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.5
Intelligence Support Activities	.1	.1	.1	.1
Logistical Support Activities	.9	1.0	1.0	1.0
Total Military	14.8	14.2	14.0	13.9

Air Force Command (Central Support Forces) Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Civilian Personnel (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>				
<u>Air Force Management Hqs</u>	6.6	6.4	6.0	6.0
<u>Administrative Activities</u>	5.0	5.0	4.9	4.9
<u>Special Activities</u>				
<u>Civil Air Patrol</u>	.1	.1	.1	.1
Postal/Courier Activities	.3	.3	.3	.3
Intelligence Support Activities	.1	.1	.1	.1
Logistical Support Activities	.2	.2	.2	.2
Total Civilian	12.3	12.1	11.6	11.6

f. Logistics. Manpower requirements for logistics are:

Air Force Logistics Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	5.2	4.8	4.6	4.6
<u>Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)</u>	80.1	74.7	70.5	70.4

Air Force manpower needs for Central Supply and Maintenance activities depend on the size and activity level of the mission forces, the amount of logistics support provided at unit and installation level, depot maintenance repair rates, and the "cost effectiveness" trade off between performing maintenance in service operated facilities, including Army, Navy and Air Force or by private industry (contract). These manpower requirements are based on aircraft and missile inventories and flying hours.

Logistics manpower reductions result from many actions. Military manpower in support of the Defense Supply Agency (DSA) has been reduced. Manpower has also been reduced in supply, procurement, inventory control and depot maintenance as the result of reduced flying hours and reductions in aircraft inventory resulting from force and support aircraft reductions. Savings also result from logistics productivity improvements.

g. Federal Agency Support. Manpower requirements in this category are:

Air Force Federal Agency Support Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Military</u>	.4	.5	.4	.4

Federal Agency Support includes military manpower assigned to other Federal Departments and agencies.

6. Individuals. The following table summarizes manpower requirements for Individuals (transients, patients, trainees, students and Air Force Academy cadets).

Air Force Individuals Manpower
(Military End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Transients	25.2	25.0	24.2	23.9
Patients	.8	.8	.8	.8
Trainees/Students	38.9	38.5	38.3	39.0
Cadets	<u>4.4</u>	<u>4.4</u>	<u>4.4</u>	<u>4.2</u>
Total Military	69.3	68.7	67.7	67.9

The reduction in transients in the preceding table is consistent with the overall active duty military population reduction. The variation in cadet requirements in FY 77 reflects a projected on-board strength as of 30 September 1976.

D. FY 1977 Air Force Manpower Request.

1. Authorization Request. In FY 1977 the Air Force requests 590,000 military and 255,669 direct hire civilians subject to ceiling. Within this relatively stable program, the Air Force is continuing to seek out areas where resources can be reduced without impairing combat capability and applying those resources to complete the combat

initiatives begun in FY 1976. Under this plan, crew ratios will be further increased and maintenance personnel added to both tactical fighter and tactical reconnaissance forces such that wartime operating capability will be increased to 60 flying hours in fighters and 52 flying hours in reconnaissance aircraft. This represents restoration of capability lost in FY 1971 due to resource limitations. Beyond this increment, as new weapon systems are introduced the Air Force expects to be able to add about three additional tactical wings without an increase above the 590,000 active duty military personnel strength level. The following provides end strength changes by Defense Planning and Programming categories necessary to support this planned initiative.

Air Force Manpower Requirements
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilian</u>	
	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>81.7</u>	<u>81.6</u>	<u>7.0 (*)</u>	<u>6.8 (*)</u>
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>	<u>112.8</u>	<u>116.6</u>	<u>29.4 (1.0)</u>	<u>29.6 (1.0)</u>
<u>Tactical Forces</u>	<u>75.0</u>	<u>79.0</u>	<u>14.9 (.2)</u>	<u>15.0</u>
Mobility Forces	37.8	37.6	14.5 (.7)	14.6
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>67.6</u>	<u>67.5</u>	<u>31.0 (.8)</u>	<u>31.0 (.8)</u>
Intelligence & Security	21.6	21.3	2.8 (.4)	2.7
Centrally Managed Comm	18.8	18.9	5.3 (.3)	5.3
Research & Development	17.0	17.1	21.5 (-)	21.5
Support to Other Nations	1.4	1.4	.2 (*)	.2 (*)
Geophysical Activities	8.9	8.8	1.2 (.1)	1.2 (.1)
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>	<u>157.1</u>	<u>155.4</u>	<u>74.8 (12.4)</u>	<u>73.2 (12.4)</u>
<u>Reserve Component</u>				
Support	.6	.6	6.0 (-)	6.0 (-)
Base Operating Support	119.8	117.6	63.3 (12.2)	61.8 (12.2)
Force Support Training	16.0	16.5	1.4 (*)	1.4 (*)
Command	20.7	20.6	4.1 (.2)	4.1 (.1)
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>102.9</u>	<u>102.7</u>	<u>131.0 (1.1)</u>	<u>130.4 (1.1)</u>
Base Operating Support	20.4	20.5	30.2 (.2)	30.3 (.2)
Medical Support	29.8	29.5	7.4 (.6)	7.3 (.6)
Personnel Support	6.7	6.7	4.0 (.2)	4.0 (.2)
Individual Training	27.1	27.1	7.4 (*)	7.4 (*)
Command	13.9	13.9	11.6 (.2)	11.6 (.2)
Logistics	4.6	4.6	70.4 (*)	69.7 (*)
Federal Agency Support	.4	.4	-	-
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>67.9</u>	<u>66.0</u>		
<u>Transients</u>	<u>23.9</u>	<u>21.8</u>	-	-
Patients	.8	.8	-	-
Trainees/Students	39.0	39.2	-	-
Cadets	4.2	4.2		
<u>Total</u>	<u>590.0</u>	<u>590.0</u>	<u>273.2 (15.4)</u>	<u>271.0 (15.3)</u>
<u>Direct Hire Only</u>			<u>257.8</u>	<u>255.7</u>

* Less than 50.

() Indirect hire included.

2. Changes from the FY 77 Request

a. Overall: The overall program for military is stable at 590,000 and the civilian program is reduced in FY 77. Within this relatively stable program a second incremental improvement in General Purpose Forces combat capability has been accommodated.

b. Strategic Forces: Remain essentially level.

c. General Purpose Forces: The primary reason for the increase in General Purpose Forces is the increased combat capability programmed in the tactical forces: crew ratio increases for fighters (1.25 to 1.35) and reconnaissance (1.1 to 1.25) aircraft, also, the increase in maintenance personnel to support a higher wartime flying hour rate of 60 hours for fighters and 52 hours for reconnaissance. Increase in military and civilians also accommodates the transfer of A-7, F-105, and F-4 aircraft to the Reserves and the phase in of additional F-15, A-10 and AWACS aircraft into the active force. Mobility forces remain relatively stable except for the programmed reduction in C-141 navigators based on increased reliability of the Inertial Navigation System (INS).

d. Auxiliary Forces: Auxiliary Forces remain relatively stable from FY 77 to FY 77. Intelligence and Security reflect a slight decrease in resources. Centrally managed communications increases in the area of satellite communications are partially offset by reductions in engineering and installation functions.

e. Mission Support Forces: Reductions in base operating support reflect anticipated downward adjustments in overseas basing structure. Increases in force support training are predicated on changes in the mix and number of tactical force training aircraft.

f. Central Support Forces: Both the military and civilian programs for central support forces are relatively stable. The primary reasons for the civilian decreases are reductions in logistics associated with flying hour and inventory adjustments and the continuation of the Depot Plant Modernization Program and Technology Repair Center efficiencies.

g. Individuals: Reductions are primarily driven by the reduced PCS move program in FY 77. Fluctuations in transient authorizations will be made to accommodate changes in the PCS move program during development of the FY 1977 budget. Cadets and patients are projected to be relatively stable. The increase in students is based on training requirements; details on training requirements are included in the FY 76 Military Manpower Training Report.

CHAPTER XIV

DEFENSE AGENCY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

A. Introduction

This chapter addresses the manpower requirements of the:

- Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
 - Staff
 - Activities*
- Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS)
- Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
- Defense Communications Agency (DCA)
- Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)
- Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA)
- Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
- Defense Investigative Service (DIS)
- Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)
- Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)
- Defense Supply Agency (DSA)
- Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS)

These organizations, collectively called the Defense Agencies, perform specialized functions supporting the entire Department of Defense. The National Security Agency is excluded from the above listing and the following discussion for security reasons.

The manpower requirements of these Agencies are shown in the following table.

Defense Agency Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1974 (Actual)	FY 1975	FY 1976	FY 1977
		<u>PRESIDENT'S FY '76 BUDGET</u>		
Military	10.1	9.3	9.0	9.0
Civilian, Direct Hire	74.7	73.8	72.9	72.9
Civilian, Indirect Hire	.6	.7	.8	.8
Total	<u>85.4</u>	<u>83.8</u>	<u>82.6</u>	<u>82.7</u>

* Includes personnel assigned to the Office of Information for the Armed Forces, the Office of Overseas Dependents Education, the US Court of Military Appeals, the Defense Security Assistance Agency, and the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services.

B. Significant Manpower Changes

The total military and civilian manpower requested for the Defense Agencies for FY 1976 is 2,800 (3%) less than the actual strength at the end of FY 1974. These reductions are the result of a careful review of the manpower needs of each agency. This review is still in process and may result in further manpower economies. The table below lists the major manpower changes by agency during this period. It should be noted that the net reduction of 2,800 includes manpower increases of new missions.

Major Manpower Changes, FY 1974 Actual
Compared to FY 1976 Programmed,
Total Military and Civilian
(In Thousands)

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Change</u>
1. Defense Supply Agency	-2.1
2. Defense Mapping Agency	- .4
3. Defense Investigative Service	- .4
4. Defense Contract Audit Agency	- .2
5. All other reductions	- .1
6. Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS)*	+ .2
7. Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS)*	+ .2
Total	<u>-2.8</u>

* New missions not assigned to Defense Agencies in FY 1974.

The above reductions do not include some 1,600 made prior to the end of the FY 1974 nor a nearly 2,000 decrease in the National Security Agency.

C. New Missions for Defense Agencies

1. USUHS

The Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences was created by Public Law 92-426 to train doctors and other health professionals for the military services. This mission, which was not performed in FY 1974 has a planned strength of 230 in FY 1976 and will continue to expand to 464 (including 161 students) in FY 1977.

2. CHAMPUS

The Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services provides payment for medical care in non-military facilities for retired members and their dependents and for survivors of active or retired members. In order to improve the administration of CHAMPUS claims, the Office of the Secretary of Defense assumed control of all CHAMPUS funds and the office in Denver, responsible for payments, was made a field activity of the Office of the Secretary of Defense in FY 1975. The manpower requirement for CHAMPUS is increased to 215 in FY 1976 to hire auditors and investigators, set up a claims appeals system, and staff overseas offices.

D. Military Strength Reductions and Civilianization

The military strength of Defense Agencies is reduced 1,100 or 11% from FY 1974 to FY 1976 as a result of the Department's staffing review and the conversion of military to civilian positions. During this period 663 military positions in Defense Agencies were converted to civilian status.

The military strength reduction includes the specific 250 man FY 1975 reduction directed by the House Appropriations Committee during its consideration of the FY 1975 budget.

E. Defense Agency Manpower Requirements for FY 1977

The following table compares military and civilian requirements for end FY 1977 with those for FY 1977.

Defense Agency Manpower Requirements
(In Thousands)

	<u>FY 1977</u>	<u>FY 1977</u>
Military	9.0	9.1
Civilian Direct Hire	72.9	73.0
Civilian Indirect Hire	.8	.8
Total	<u>82.7</u>	<u>82.9</u>

The manpower increase for FY 1977 provides additional staff, faculty and students for the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences.

F. Defense Agency Requirements by DPPC

The following tables show Defense Agency military and civilian manpower requirements by DPPC.

Defense Agency Military Manpower Requirements 1/
(In thousands)

	<u>FY 74</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u> <u>(FY 1976 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u> <u>Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	6.2	5.7	5.2	5.3	5.3
Intelligence & Security	3.6	3.3	2.9	3.0	3.0
Centrally Mgd Comm.	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3
Research & Development	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3
Geophysical Activities	.9	.8	.8	.7	.7
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	3.5	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.5
Base Operating Support	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1
Medical Support	-	-	.1	.1	.3
Personnel Support	.1	.1	.1	.2	.1
Command	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7
Logistics	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3
<u>Defense Agency Total</u>	<u>10.1</u>	<u>9.3</u>	<u>9.0</u>	<u>9.0</u>	<u>9.1</u>

1/ Military manpower is included in Service totals in preceding chapters.

**Defense Agencies Civilian Manpower Requirements
(Direct & Indirect Hire End Strengths in Thousands)**

	<u>FY 74 Actual</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76 (FY 1976 Budget)</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77 Auth.</u>
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	<u>1.1 (-)</u>	<u>1.1 (-)</u>	<u>1.1 (-)</u>	<u>1.1 (-)</u>	<u>1.1 (-)</u>
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>	<u>12.2 (*)</u>	<u>11.8 (*)</u>	<u>11.9 (*)</u>	<u>11.9 (*)</u>	<u>11.9 (*)</u>
Intelligence & Security	2.7 (-)	2.6 (-)	2.7 (-)	2.7 (-)	2.7 (-)
Centrally Managed Comm.	1.3 (*)	1.3 (*)	1.2 (*)	1.2 (*)	1.2 (*)
Research & Development	.3 (-)	.3 (-)	.3 (-)	.3 (-)	.3 (-)
Geophysical Activities	7.8 (*)	7.6 (*)	7.6 (*)	7.6 (*)	7.6 (*)
<u>Central Support Forces</u>	<u>62.0 (.6)</u>	<u>61.6 (.7)</u>	<u>60.7 (.8)</u>	<u>60.7 (.8)</u>	<u>60.8 (.8)</u>
Base Operating Support	6.8 (-)	6.8 (-)	6.5 (-)	6.5 (-)	6.5 (-)
Medical Support	- (-)	- (-)	.4 (*)	.4 (*)	.4 (*)
Personnel Support	1.4 (-)	1.5 (-)	1.7 (-)	1.7 (-)	1.7 (-)
Command	6.1 (*)	6.1 (*)	6.1 (*)	6.1 (*)	6.1 (*)
Logistics	47.8 (.6)	47.2 (.7)	46.0 (.7)	46.1 (.7)	46.1 (.7)
<u>Total</u>	<u>75.3 (.6)</u>	<u>74.5 (.7)</u>	<u>73.7 (.8)</u>	<u>73.7 (.8)</u>	<u>73.8 (.8)</u>
<u>Direct Hire Only</u>	<u>74.7</u>	<u>73.8</u>	<u>72.9</u>	<u>72.9</u>	<u>73.0</u>

() Indirect hire included.

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

APPENDIX A
THE COST OF MANPOWER

A. Introduction

Previous sections of this report explained how military functions and missions shape the design of the manpower program and provide the underlying rationale for the number and mix of personnel required by Department of Defense. This chapter is an explanation of the costs in manpower needed to satisfy manpower requirements. Costs do not dictate requirements, they are a derivative of them. This is not to say that costs do not play an important role in formulating a manpower program, for budgetary constraints and cost controls are essential to achieving efficient utilization of scarce resources.

Two key variables affect the size of manpower costs; the number of Defense employees and the level of pay and support services they receive. The first variable, the level of manpower, has been the subject of the previous sections, while the second variable, the level of pay and support services will be the subject analyzed here.

B. Trends in Defense Manpower Costs

The cost of Defense manpower has increased over the past few years. Increasing manpower costs are the result of conscious public policy decisions (such as pay comparability legislation), predictable phenomena (such as retirements), and general economic trends (such as inflation).

Total outlays for manpower by Department of Defense are budgeted at \$49.2 billion for FY 1976. These manpower costs have five major components which are displayed in Table One, together with their historical cost trends.

Table One

Department of Defense Total Outlays for Manpower
(\$ Billions)

	<u>FY64</u>	<u>FY68</u>	<u>FY73</u>	<u>FY74</u>	<u>FY75</u>	<u>FY76</u>
Total DoD Budget (Outlays)	<u>50.8</u>	<u>78.0</u>	<u>73.8</u>	<u>78.4</u>	<u>84.8</u>	<u>92.8</u>
Manpower Outlays:						
Military Basic Pay <u>1/</u>	8.5	12.8	17.6	18.1	18.9	19.4
Other Military Personnel Expenses	4.5	7.1	5.6	5.6	6.2	6.5
Civil Service Payroll	7.3	10.3	13.0	13.4	14.6	15.4
Family Housing	0.5	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.9	1.1
Military Retirement	<u>1.2</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>4.4</u>	<u>5.1</u>	<u>6.3</u>	<u>6.9</u>
Total Manpower Outlays	<u>22.0</u>	<u>32.6</u>	<u>41.2</u>	<u>43.0</u>	<u>46.8</u>	<u>49.2</u> <u>2/</u>
Percent of DoD Outlays	43.3%	41.8%	55.8%	54.8%	55.2%	53.0%

1/ Includes cost items whose level is determined by basic pay such as FICA and reenlistment bonuses.

2/ Includes \$1.2 billion contingency for 5% pay increase.

Table One reveals that over the thirteen year period, FY 1964-1976, outlays for Defense manpower have grown at a compound rate of 8% annually. Year-to-year rates of growth in manpower costs have at times exceeded the pace of the overall DoD budget, but the growth in manpower costs for FY 1976 over the current year is expected to be less than the growth in total DoD outlays so that manpower will consume 53% of total DoD outlays in FY 1976 compared to 55% in FY 1975. An examination of the trends indicates that the share of the Defense Budget allocated to manpower stabilized beginning in FY 1973 at 53-56%. To be able to place some qualitative judgment on the size of the total manpower outlays, the underlying causes of the growth in manpower costs should be examined before any conclusions can be drawn.

C. Analysis of the Components of Defense Manpower Costs

1. Military Basic Pay

This component of Defense manpower costs is the sum of basic pay for all military personnel, both active and reserve and those items whose level is determined by basic pay such as FICA, reenlistment bonuses and separation pay.

In spite of the fact that there are 15% fewer military personnel (active and reserve) on duty today than in FY 1964, outlays for basic pay have more than doubled since that time. Regular Military Compensation (RMC) is suitable as a surrogate for military pay. It consists of four items: basic pay, quarters allowance, subsistence allowance and tax advantages. An examination of the increases in Regular Military Compensation since FY 1964 has revealed that four factors have been responsible for the size of today's level of compensation. Table Two distributes the approximate net increase in RMC of \$8.9 billion since FY 1964 among the four factors. The total RMC cost in FY 1974, \$20.7 billion, does not match, for three reasons, the total cost of military basic pay and other military personnel expenses, \$23.7 billion, in Table One. First, RMC in Table Two excludes pay costs for Reserve Forces (\$1.6 billion). Second, RMC in Table Two excludes some items which are included in other military personnel expenses such as permanent change of station allowances. Third, the Federal income tax advantage value on the two tax-free allowances is not reflected in the budget.

Table Two
Summary of Changes in Total Active Duty Military
Compensation (RMC), FY 1964-74
(\$ Billions)

Total RMC in FY 1964	\$11.8
Increases to Match Private Sector Wage Increase	7.6
Increases to Establish Pay Comparability	5.1
Changes in Grade Structure	0.6
Force Reductions	<u>-4.4</u>
Total RMC in FY 1974	\$20.7

Table Two reveals that the Department of Defense has not spent unreasonable sums on the pay of its personnel, rather the growth in pay can be traced to the desire by the Executive and Congressional branches of government to correct the long history of inequity in pay that was endured by military personnel and their families.

2. Other Military Personnel Expenses

This component of manpower cost includes a wide variety of special pays, allowances and subsidies that have been instituted over the years. Table Three summarizes the elements of this component of manpower costs:

Table Three

Other Military Personnel Expenses (\$ Billions)

	<u>FY64</u>	<u>FY68</u>	<u>FY73</u>	<u>FY74</u>	<u>FY75</u>	<u>FY76</u>
Special Pay and Bonuses <u>1/</u>	.6	1.3	.7	.6	.6	.6
Subsistence, Quarters and Other Allowances	3.1	4.3	3.7	3.7	4.2	4.3
Permanent Change of Station Allowances	<u>.8</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>1.6</u>
Total	4.5	7.1	5.6	5.6	6.2	6.5

1/ Excludes reenlistment bonuses.

The trend in the costs of other military personnel expenses has not followed the same pattern of increases as basic pay. The decline in outlays since FY 68 can be attributed to the phase out of hostile fire pay and reduced outlays for subsistence and clothing allowances.

Historical cost trends in elements of this manpower cost component are the result of four factors. First, the withdrawal of combat forces from the Vietnam war; second, the reduction in military strengths; third, revisions or elimination of certain types of benefits no longer deemed suitable in an all-volunteer environment; and fourth, inflation both here and abroad.

3. Civil Service Payroll

These costs include the basic pay of civil servants employed by Department of Defense and the employing agency's contribution for retirement, health insurance and other benefits, primarily educational and training. Year-to-year changes in the civilian work force for Department of Defense have not been as dramatic as that for military personnel. Table Four provides a display of the trends in Department of Defense Direct Hire Civilians and Active Duty Military Personnel.

Table Four

Total Department of Defense Direct Hire Civilian Personnel
And Active Duty Military Personnel, FY 1964-76
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY64</u>	<u>FY68</u>	<u>FY74</u>	<u>FY75</u>	<u>FY76</u>
Active Duty Military	2,687.4	3,547.9	2,161.2	2,129.0	2,100.0
Direct Hire Civilians	<u>1,035.0</u>	<u>1,287.0</u>	<u>1,014.0</u>	<u>994.4</u>	<u>985.0</u>
Total Manpower	3,722.4	4,834.9	3,175.2	3,123.4	3,085.0

Since FY 1968, a year of peak activity in Vietnam, active duty military strengths have declined by approximately 41%. Direct hire civilian employment reached a Vietnam peak of 1,287,000 in FY 1968. Since then civilian employment has steadily decreased to the currently budgeted end strength in FY 1976 of 985,000 - a decrease of over 300,000 employees. This steady decrease is even more significant considering that more than 120,000 military positions have been converted to civilian positions during this period.

Since FY 1973, outlays for civil service employment by Department of Defense have increased by 18%. This is a more rapid cost increase than that for military personnel, since declining military strengths appreciably slowed the rate of growth in total military personnel outlays.

It is worth noting that the civil service payroll listed in Table One includes contributions by employer and employee to the civil service retirement fund, while military retirement outlays are shown separately. It is important to recognize that what is contributed in a given year is not necessarily equal to what is paid out for retirement. Since the end of WW II, the growth in the pool of civil service annuity recipients has grown at a compound rate of 10% annually.

4. Family Housing

This component of manpower costs represents the cost of leasing, constructing, and maintaining family housing for military personnel. Outlays for these programs are included here because they are a cost directly supporting military personnel.

5. Military Retired Pay

Of the five components shown in Table One, outlays for military retirement benefits have risen the most rapidly. However, total manpower costs which can be attributed to the present size military force are somewhat overstated by the fact that military retirement outlays in FY 1976 (and earlier years shown in Table One) actually represent the retirement costs of the larger prior year's military forces. That is, the present retirement pool and funds required to support them are primarily the result of the size of our military forces over the previous three decades.

The discounted future retirement cost for services performed by the present size military forces is estimated at \$4.0 billion. This is \$2.9 billion less than the \$6.9 billion which will actually be paid to retirees in FY 1976. If this approach to retired costs is used, total manpower costs in FY 1976 attributed to the present size force are \$46.3 billion rather than the \$49.2 billion shown in Table One.

There are essentially three reasons for the growth in the military retirement outlays. The first is the number of net additions to the annuitant pool in a given year; second is the salary of the annuitant at the time of retirement (or disability); and third is the rate of increase in consumer prices which, by law, increase the annuitant's annual benefits to protect his level of real income against the adverse effects of inflation.

a. Number of Net Additions to the Annuitant Pool

The rate of growth in the retired pool has begun to decline; for the period FY 1972 to FY 1976, the average annual rate of increase is 6%. For the next four years, FY 1976-80, the rate of increase is projected to be approximately 3½%. Outlays for retirement are expected to reach \$8.1 billion by 1980, excluding any increase in benefits linked to the CPI. By the year 2020, the retired pool will reach a "steady-state" level of approximately 1.8 million annuitants compared to 1.1 million in FY 1976.

b. The Salary of Annuitant at the Time of Retirement (or Disability)

Because of the method employed in calculating an annuitant's retirement benefits, the growth in active duty salaries will have an impact on total outlays for retirement in the future. Relative to total retirement outlays, however, this factor will not have a significant effect since turnover in the retired pool is less than 6% annually at present and is projected to decline to 3½% by the steady-state period around year 2020. Thus, the short-run and intermediate term (one to five years) effect of pay raises for the active force will have only a negligible impact on total retirement outlays. However, the impact of pay raises (on retirement outlays) over the long-run can be significant.

c. The Rate of Increase in Consumer Prices

This factor has the largest and most immediate effect on retirement outlays, primarily because the total pool of annuitants is entitled to an increase. Cost of living increases provided are roughly equivalent to the percentage increase in the consumer price index (CPI).

APPENDIX B
HEADQUARTERS REDUCTIONS

A. Introduction

The Department of Defense headquarters review is an effort to improve management effectiveness and make more efficient use of resources by reducing the number, size, layering and duplication of headquarters and by updating and streamlining command relationships. Headquarters in four major areas are under review:

1. The Military Departments - Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force.
2. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
3. Unified, specified, and international commands.
4. The defense agencies.

Most of the manpower savings resulting from reductions to headquarters in these activities are being used to improve the strength and readiness of combat forces. Thus, the two major benefits of the headquarters review are improvement in the combat to support ratio and improvement in defense management.

B. Milestones in the Headquarters Review

The Department of Defense has made a strong effort to reduce its headquarters over the past few years. For example, in 1973 the Chief of Naval Operations ordered a 25% cut in most Navy headquarters. During the same time period the Air Force completed an aggressive program to restructure and streamline their headquarters. Similar efforts have been underway for some time in the Army. However, it was not until October 1973 that the headquarters review became a DoD wide program. At that time the Secretary of Defense requested the Secretaries of the Military Departments; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Assistant Secretaries of Defense; and the Directors of Defense Agencies to conduct reviews of their management headquarters. Across-the-board percentage reductions of headquarters activities were not encouraged; rather, elements within headquarters contributing only marginally to the mission were to be sought out and either eliminated or substantially reduced.

Headquarters to be examined during this review were defined in a new DoD directive which was published at about the same time. Generally speaking, the directive defines as management headquarters those headquarters in the Army which are above the corps level, in the Navy which are above the flotilla/task force level, and in the Air Force which are above the air division level. Thus headquarters such as the Army General Staff, the Navy Atlantic fleet, the Air Force Secretariat, and the US European Command are management headquarters. All management headquarters contained in the directive together with their manning are listed in the Budget backup books submitted each year to the Congress in connection with the President's Budget.

The headquarters review initiated by the Secretary of Defense together with efforts of the Services yielded early returns. In March 1974 the Army announced substantial reductions in its headquarters including the elimination of seven major headquarters and the reorganization and consolidation of other headquarters. This resulted in an average reduction of more than 20% in headquarters personnel. The Navy agreed to reduce its headquarters strengths by another 7% in addition to the reductions in 1973 and also consolidated eight major headquarters. The Air Force further reduced its headquarters by about 15% and included these reductions in the FY75 President's Budget. More recently the Air Force decided to disestablish the headquarters for Pacific Air Forces and the Air Force Communications Service.

In March 1974 the Joint Chiefs of Staff made recommendations for changing the Unified Command Plan (UCP). The UCP defines the responsibilities of the seven unified and one specified command. These recommendations, which are currently under review, could result in significant changes to the unified commands throughout the world.

C. Achievements to Date

Total savings identified as a result of this effort are about 25,600. Of this total, about 19,200 people are headquarters personnel and the remainder are in defense agency field activities. Defense agencies in total (including their field activities) were considered as a part of the headquarters reduction effort as opposed to just the defense agency headquarters. Overall reductions in headquarters average throughout the Department of Defense about 16%. The base line against which these reductions are measured is the FY74 President's Budget for it was during the review of this budget that Congress most strongly criticized the size of Department of Defense Headquarters. A breakdown by major activity is contained in Table 1. In addition to the many headquarters that have been reduced, nineteen separate headquarters have been either eliminated or consolidated. This list of consolidations and eliminations is contained in Table 2.

D. Future Plans

The Department of Defense headquarters review is a continuing effort. Of particular interest at this time is the review of the unified command structure. Changes to the Unified Command Plan are under consideration which could eliminate more headquarters. At the same time the Services are continuing to examine their headquarters, and further reductions in headquarters manpower are likely. Finally, the directive which defines management headquarters is also being rewritten to better define the manpower not only in headquarters but also in activities which support headquarters.

Table 1

Progress in Headquarters Reductions

Approximate military and civilian reductions identified to date from the FY 1974 President's Budget Submission Base.

	Military and Civilian Reductions Through FY 1976
Army	7,100
Navy	1,600
Marine Corps	500
Air Force	8,300
OSD/OJCS/Unified Commands	1,400
Defense Agency Headquarters	300
Def. Agency Field Activities	6,400
	<u>25,600</u>

These figures reflect additional reductions identified since the Defense Posture Statement was submitted.

Table 2

Headquarters Closures and Consolidations

<u>Headquarters</u>	<u>Date to Be Closed or Consolidated</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>Army</u>		
US Army Theater Support Cmd, Europe	Closed	Germany
US Army Engineer Cmd, Europe	"	Germany
Army Air Defense Command	"	Colorado
US Army, Alaska	"	Alaska
US Army Force Southern Cmd	"	Canal Zone
US Army, Pacific	"	Hawaii
US Army Intelligence Cmd	"	Maryland
<u>Navy a/</u>		
Naval Ship Systems Command	Consolidated	Virginia
Naval Ordnance Systems Cmd.	1 July 1974	Virginia
Service Force, Atlantic	Consolidated	Virginia
Amphibious Force, Atlantic	"	Virginia
Cruiser-Destroyer Force, Atlantic	"	Virginia
Service Force, Pacific	1 July 1975	Hawaii
Amphibious Force, Pacific	"	California
Cruiser-Destroyer Force, Pacific	"	California
<u>Air Force</u>		
US Air Force, Pacific b/	30 Jun 76	Hawaii
AF Communications Service b/	30 Jun 76	Missouri
8th Air Force c/	Closed	Guam
19th Air Force	Closed	N. Carolina

a/ These eight headquarters are being consolidated into three new headquarters.

b/ Will be initiated after headquarters plan is submitted to Congress in March 1975.

c/ 8th Air Force in Guam has been inactivated; 2nd Air Force in Louisiana has been redesignated as 8th Air Force.

APPENDIX C

WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

The Department of Defense has made great strides in increasing the number of women in uniform; increasing the number of career fields open to women; expanding the number of locations to which women may be assigned; and revising personnel policies and procedures to insure that women are provided the same opportunity as men within existing law.

A. Greater Numbers of Women

The number of women serving in the military has increased from 55,400 in FY 1973 to 97,000 in FY 1975 and is planned to rise to over 120,000 in FY 1977. The proportion of women in the total active military force will increase from 2.5% in FY 1973 to 5.6% in FY 1977 as shown in the following table.

	<u>Women in the Military</u> (End Strength in Thousands)					
	<u>FY73</u>	<u>FY74</u>	<u>FY75</u>	<u>FY76</u>	<u>FY77</u>	<u>FY77</u>
Number of Women	55.4	74.7	97.0	109.0	112.7	119.9
Percent of Active Force	2.5%	3.5%	4.6%	5.2%	5.3%	5.6%

Individual Service plans to increase the number of women in the active force are shown in the following table.

Women in the Military
(Active Duty End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 73</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 74</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 75</u> <u>Planned</u>	<u>FY 76</u> <u>Planned</u>	<u>FY 77</u> <u>Planned</u>	<u>FY 77</u> <u>Planned</u>
<u>Army</u>						
Officers	1.1	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.7	2.0
Off (Healing Arts)	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.0	3.0	3.0
Enlisted	16.5	26.3	37.1	42.5	44.6	47.3
Total	<u>20.8</u>	<u>30.7</u>	<u>41.6</u>	<u>47.1</u>	<u>49.3</u>	<u>52.3</u>
<u>Navy</u>						
Officers	.9	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.5
Off (Healing Arts)	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.6
Enlisted	9.1	13.4	18.6	20.9	20.9	20.9
Total	<u>12.5</u>	<u>17.1</u>	<u>22.4</u>	<u>24.8</u>	<u>24.8</u>	<u>25.0</u>
<u>Marine Corps</u>						
Officers	.3	.3	.3	.4	.4	.4
Off (Healing Arts)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Enlisted	2.0	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4
Total	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>2.8</u>
<u>Air Force</u>						
Officers	1.2	1.4	1.8	2.0	2.0	2.3
Off (Healing Arts)	3.5	3.3	3.3	3.6	3.6	3.6
Enlisted	15.0	19.5	25.2	28.7	30.2	33.9
Total	<u>19.7</u>	<u>24.2</u>	<u>30.3</u>	<u>34.3</u>	<u>35.8</u>	<u>39.8</u>
<u>DoD</u>						
Officers	3.6	4.1	4.6	5.3	5.4	6.2
Off (Healing Arts)	9.2	9.0	9.1	9.2	9.2	9.2
Enlisted	42.6	61.6	83.3	94.5	98.1	104.5
Total	<u>55.4</u>	<u>74.7</u>	<u>97.0</u>	<u>109.0</u>	<u>112.7</u>	<u>119.9</u>

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

B. Greater Career Opportunities for Women

The Department has undertaken a concerted effort to bring more women into the Services both in enlisted and officer roles. Our goal is to obtain the best qualified women and utilize them in an increasingly wide range of occupations. Increasing the number of career fields open to women assists in achieving our national security objectives in an all-volunteer environment and supports the national policy of providing equal opportunity to women.

Specific actions taken to enhance opportunities for women in the Services are discussed below.

1. Army. Women are now eligible to enter training and perform specifically identified jobs in 93% of the Army's enlisted Military Occupational Specialities (MOSs). The only skills excluded are those associated with combat or close combat support. Women have been principally utilized in medical, dental, administrative, communications, and clerical positions. However, there has been some recent success in attracting women to other than the "traditional" career fields and the Army anticipates that in the future greater numbers of women will seek to enlist in other fields.

Army has taken the following actions to enhance military service attractiveness for women in the Army and provide additional opportunities for qualified WAC applicants:

- a. Standardized enlistment options for men and women where practicable.
- b. Expanded the career fields open to women to include such skills as military police, helicopter pilot, parachute rigger, and Veterinary Specialist.
- c. Eliminated the restriction on command by female officers to female units; women now may command any unit except combat or tactical combat support types.
- d. Integrated all training for women with similar training for men, except enlisted basic training, but including officer basic and advanced branch courses.
- e. Identified positions that can be filled by women. In the past 30 months, positions that can be filled by women have increased from 19,000 to over 215,000.

f. Opened ROTC to women. During the school year 74-75, 6,354 women have enrolled in Senior ROTC, and 33,500 have enrolled in Junior ROTC.

g. Opened the National Guard to women. Nearly 200 officers and 2,400 enlisted women are now assigned to the National Guard.

h. Expanded the role of women in the Army Reserve. There are over 1,430 women officers and 8,900 enlisted women in the Army Reserve.

i. Equalized the housing and dependency policies pertaining to men and women.

2. Navy. The Navy has created and implemented practices and procedures to provide maximum opportunity for women to contribute their talents to the accomplishment of its missions.

a. Specific actions taken by the Navy are as follows:

(1) Opened all enlisted occupational specialty areas to women.

(2) Significantly expanded overseas assignment opportunities for women as a result of a world-wide survey and evaluation of suitable billets.

(3) Made assignments without regard to sex within limits prescribed by law (Section 6015, Title 10, U.S. Code) which currently precludes sending women to sea on combatant ships.

(4) Consolidated men and women's recruit training, and consolidated male and female officer candidate school.

(5) Added NROTC as a women officer source to complement Officer Candidate School. Currently there are approximately 260 women students in the NROTC.

b. Women line officers compete on an equal basis with their male contemporaries for assignments not requiring Warfare expertise. Some of the more challenging assignments currently held by women line officers include:

- Naval War College student
- Commanding Officers of shore activities
- Instructors at NROTC units, USNA and Officer Candidate School.

(1) Naval Aviation was opened to Women officers in the past two years. Presently there are six women designated as Naval Aviators with an additional eight women in various stages of flight training.

3. Marine Corps. The continued stress on combat forces, combined with the relative smallness and remotely deployed units of the Marine Corps, has tended to limit the number of women that can be effectively utilized. Normally women Marines are assigned to commands at which a women Marine administrative unit is located and suitable on-base housing is available. However, the assignment of women, on an individual basis, to other commands where suitable off-station housing can be obtained is not precluded.

The Marine Corps has recently taken the following actions:

a. Revised all Marine Corps regulations and policies which are not constrained by law to eliminate any possibility of discrimination on the basis of sex.

b. Undertaken a study to see which additional occupational fields can be opened to women.

c. Changed the Marine Corps Manual to allow women to command other than women Marine units.

d. Routinely considers women Marines for selection to attend career schools.

e. Women Marine officers are considered for promotion by the same board that considers their male counterparts.

4. Air Force. The Air Force has reviewed all policies that differentiate between men and women and has changed those which were without legal or rational basis. Such changes have made the Air Force more attractive to women. This is borne out by the fact that the percentage of reenlistments among women eligible for first term reenlistment rose from 35.7% in FY 1971 to 56.5% in FY 1974. Air Force now allows full female participation in AFJROTC. The AFROTC program for college women was begun in 1969; current FY 75 enrollment is 2,246.

All officer and enlisted career specialties have been opened with the exception of those directly related to combat. Only three of the 48 officer utilization fields are currently closed to women: pilot, navigator-observer, and missile operations. Similarly, those areas closed to enlisted women are: combat control team operations, defense fire control systems operations, in-flight refueling, flight engineer, aircraft loadmaster, pararescue recovery and security. The majority of women has historically been assigned to non-technical areas, e.g., administration, personnel, supply. Special emphasis is now being placed on recruiting women for such career fields as engineering, electronics, scientific, maintenance, and computer technology, where the number of women assigned has been below the number desired. To insure the flow of qualified women, and to facilitate an even distribution into a wider spectrum of job specialties, particularly in the technical areas, procurement goals by specialty have been established. The FY 75 procurement goal is to train 50% of the enlisted women entering the Air Force for jobs within the electronics and mechanical specialties.

Assignment locations have been expanded overseas and in the CONUS. Officers, enlisted women in grades E-4 and above, and married military women may be assigned anywhere there is available and adequate on or off base housing. Locations for single E-3s and below were increased to 194 in 1974 (a 322% increase since 1968) and are projected to go to 238 by December 1975. Approximately 67% of these installations are in the CONUS. Additional installations will continue to be evaluated and opened.

APPENDIX D

FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS

A. Rationale for Forward Deployments

We maintain forward deployments of our forces in order to:

- Help deter aggression by demonstrating to potential enemies and to our allies the U.S. resolve to honor its commitments;

- Enable the United States to assist our allies in collective defense in the event they are attacked; and

- Provide the President with the flexibility necessary in responding promptly to contingencies.

In determining whether forces are to be deployed overseas or retained in the United States, a number of factors must be considered. There are clear advantages and disadvantages of overseas deployments, so a balance must be struck for each area which depends on the threat, the military requirements peculiar to the area, costs, and political considerations.

The advantages of forward deployments include:

- Immediate availability in the event of a crisis;

- Greater assurance to our allies of the firmness of our commitments;

- Greater deterrent to a potential enemy; and

- Reduced requirement for mobility forces.

The disadvantages include:

- Additional costs related to personnel moves;

- Balance of payments costs;

- Potential political problems caused by the presence of large numbers of American personnel in a foreign country; and

- Adverse impact on morale of military personnel when separated from families.

The advantages of forward deployment are greatest for our land forces because of their dependence on heavy, bulky weapons and support equipment.

Moving large land forces rapidly from the United States to a conflict area requires large, costly airlift forces, or a mix of forward positioning of major equipment items and airlift for the remaining equipment and troops.

Tactical air forces are less dependent on forward deployments for rapid employment during a crisis because additional planes can be quickly flown into existing forward airfields. For this reason, the percentage of our tactical air forces deployed is smaller than the percentage of our ground forces deployed.

Navy and Marine Corps forces are deployed primarily to the Mediterranean and Western Pacific areas. Most Navy land-based patrol air units and afloat units rotate through these areas from their homeports in the United States. A number of ships are, however, permanently stationed overseas along with major staffs and shorebased support activities.

B. Summary of Manpower By Geographic Location

The following tables summarize our present and planned deployments.

Authorized End Fiscal Year Military Manpower
By Geographic Location (000's)

	<u>FY 1974</u>	<u>FY 1975</u>	<u>FY 1976</u>	<u>FY 1977</u>
Total Military Manpower	2,174.1	2,129.0	2,100.1	2,115.4
US Territories and Possessions and Southeast Asia	1,694.1	1,665.6	1,635.5	1,650.9
(Afloat)	(143.7)	(143.7)	(141.5)	(141.6)
Total Foreign Countries less Southeast Asia	480.1	463.5	464.5	464.4
(Afloat)	(64.2)	(64.9)	(65.2)	(65.2)
Europe & Related Areas	317.2	313.3	315.3	315.3
Western Pacific	154.0	140.9	140.1	140.0
Other Countries and Areas	8.9	9.3	9.1	9.1

As of June 30, 1974, our actual total military strength was .5 percent under the authorized strength and our actual strength in foreign countries was 95 percent of that authorized. Actual strengths in foreign locations usually vary from authorized strengths by 5 percent or less, and usually

fall below authorized strengths during June because of the high turn-over rate during that month.

Public Law 93-437 limits forces stationed ashore outside the 50 United States to 452,500 after May 31, 1975. The following table shows the trend in force levels ashore outside the United States.

Military Manpower Stationed Ashore
Outside of the United States (000's)

	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Actual</u>
June 30, 1974	478.7	465.1
June 30, 1975	446.0	NA
June 30, 1976	435.8	NA
September 30, 1976	435.8	NA

C. European Deployments

Forces in Europe and related areas represent our largest overseas deployment. These forces are part of our contribution to NATO. The US fleet in the Mediterranean, unencumbered by political boundaries, is available for use in crisis situations outside the NATO area where US interests may diverge from the national interests of other NATO nations.

Total manpower programmed for Europe decreases from FY 1974 to FY 1976, but improved utilization of this manpower will provide NATO with increased conventional combat capability. The restructuring of US forces to improve combat capability is consistent with the provisions of the Nunn amendment to the FY 1975 Military Procurement Authorization Act which requires the non-combat component of the US military strength in Europe be reduced by 18,000 by end FY 1976. Most of the non-combat force reductions are being taken from headquarters and miscellaneous supporting units. Strength in Europe at end FY 1975 is lower than that projected for end FY 1976 because many of the support reductions are being taken in FY 1975, while the compensating combat increases will not be made until early FY 1976. FY 1975 Army combat increases will include the introduction of an additional brigade in Germany and increased manning and equipment for existing combat units. The Air Force is providing more tactical airlift and increasing manning in combat units in early FY 1976.

Army combat increases planned for FY 1976 include the introduction of another brigade into Germany. During FY 1975 and FY 1976, without any increase in overall Army manpower in Europe, Army combat power in Europe is programmed to increase from 4-1/3 to 5 divisions. In addition the

capabilities of many existing Army and Air Force combat units in Europe will be increased. Final decisions on Air Force FY 1976 combat increases to offset support reductions have not yet been made.

Apart from this unilateral effort to improve our forces, the NATO Executive Working Group has begun studies to determine if more efficient use of resources, including manpower, can be achieved through consolidation of training, consolidation of communications, and host nation support for wartime lines of communications.

Keeping Western Europe free from Soviet domination is vital to the security of the United States. It is unrealistic to expect that Western Europe could defend itself against Soviet/Pact forces without help from the United States. The firmness of the US commitment is important for political as well as military stability. While our long term objective is to turn a larger share of the responsibility for the defense of Europe over to our allies, in the near term we will continue to provide approximately 10 percent of the ground forces, 20 percent of the ships and 25 percent of the aircraft in the European NATO area.

D. Western Pacific and Southeast Asia Deployments

While our forces in Asia generally perform the same types of military and political missions as those in Europe, there are some important differences in emphasis. There is less emphasis on combat forces for immediate defense and more on maintaining the infrastructure necessary for the reintroduction and support of US forces, and on support of allies throughout the region. Combat forces serve principally as a deterrent by indicating our intention and willingness to remain involved in Asian affairs. In addition, combat forces -- with the exception of those in South Korea -- are deployed less for the defense of their peacetime locations than to speed their deployment to wherever in the region they might be required. Forces in South Korea are also capable of deploying to other locations in theater. Partly because of this and partly because our Asian allies depend on us for much of their logistic support, we find fewer opportunities in Asia for the sorts of mutually supporting activities we are developing with our European allies.

Since the height of our involvement in Vietnam in 1968-69, US troops in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia have been reduced by over 80% (end FY 68 to end FY 75). Of course, much of this reduction was in South Vietnam and Thailand where troop levels have fallen 96%, but elsewhere our forces have still been reduced by about 50% (about 137,000 people). This latter figure includes the Army division withdrawn from Korea in FY 1971, a significant reduction in tactical airlift and strategic bomber forces which had supported operations in Southeast Asia, and a two-thirds reduction in forces afloat.

By the end of FY 76, our combat forces in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia will include an Army division in Korea, elements of a Marine division and wing in Japan, nine tactical fighter squadrons -- deployed in Korea, Okinawa, the Philippines, and Thailand -- and carrier and amphibious forces afloat.

E. Other Deployments

About 9,000 spaces are programmed in FY 76 for 73 foreign locations, both ashore and afloat, outside Europe and Related Areas, the Western Pacific Area and Southeast Asia. Included in this number are about 1,200 Navy spaces in Bermuda for operation and support of patrol aircraft covering the central Atlantic area, and about 1,000 Navy afloat spaces for Indian Ocean deployments. Most of the remaining spaces are allocated to small Military Assistance Groups and diplomatic missions throughout the other countries.

F. Present and Planned Deployments

The following tables summarize present and planned deployments of major U.S. force units.

UNIT	LOCATION	MISSION	PRIMARY APPLICABLE THEORY	STRATEGY SUPPORTED	GENERAL POTENTIAL REFERENCE
<u>AIR FORCE</u>					
10th AF	COMUS	Inter attack on the U.S. and its allies.	Interim Offensive Force Agreement	Maintain an adequate second-strike capability to deter an all-out surprise attack on our strategic forces. Provide no incentive for the Soviet Union to strike the United States first in a crisis. Prevent the Soviet Union from gaining the ability to cause considerably greater urban/industrial destruction than the United States could inflict on the Soviets in a nuclear war.	None
20 Bomber Squadrons (B-52/79-111)	1 Guam 23 COMUS	Inter attack on the U.S. and its allies.			Potential for worldwide contingency deployments
35 Tenth Squadron	1 Okinawa, 24 34 - COMUS				Potential for worldwide contingency deployments
<u>NAVY</u>					
41 SSBNs	Guantanamo, S. C. Rota, Spain Holy Loch, Scotland Guam	Inter attack on the U.S. and its allies.	Interim Offensive Force Agreement		None
<u>AIR FORCE</u>					
6 Interceptor Squadrons	COMUS	Restrict unauthorized overflight of U.S. and defend against small bomber attacks.	SMB Agreement	Perceive air space surveillance and control	Worldwide

END FY 76 STRATEGIC FORCES

PRIMARY
APPLICABLE
TREATY

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	
<u>OFFENSIVE</u>			
<u>AIR FORCE</u>			
1054 ICBN	CONUS	Deter attack on the U.S. and its allies.	Interim Offensive Forces Agreement
26 Bomber Squadrons (B-52/FB-111)	1 Guam 25 CONUS	Deter attacks on the U.S. and its allies.	
35 Tanker Squadrons	1 Okinawa, JA 34 - CONUS		
<u>NAVY</u>			
41 SSBNs	Charleston, S. C. Rota, Spain Holy Loch, Scotland Guam	Deter attack on the U.S. and its allies.	Interim Offensive Forces Agreement
<u>DEFENSIVE</u>			
<u>AIR FORCE</u>			
6 Interceptor Squadrons	CONUS	Restrict unauthorized overflight of U.S. and defend against small bomber attacks.	NORAD Agreement

PRIMARY APPLICABLE <u>TREATY</u>	STRATEGY <u>SUPPORTED</u>	OTHER POTENTIAL <u>DEPLOYMENTS</u>
Interim Offensive Forces Agreement	Maintain an adequate second- strike capability to deter an all-out surprise attack on our strategic forces. Provide no incentive for the Soviet Union to strike the United States first in a crisis. Prevent the Soviet Union from gaining the ability to cause considerably greater urban/industrial destruction than the United States could inflict on the Soviets in a nuclear war.	None Potential for worldwide contingency deployments Potential for worldwide contingency deployments
Interim Offensive Forces Agreement		None
NORAD Agreement	Peacetime air space surveillance and control	Worldwide

Black

1st Armored Division
3d Armored Division
3d Infantry Division (M)
10th Infantry Division (M)
3d, 1st Infantry Division (M)
3d, 2d Armored Division
3d, 4th Infantry Division (M)

Answer Key

10/15/20

force pressure. In contrast with
allied and other U.S. forces,
other Warsaw Pact aggression.
Following that, stop any Warsaw
Pact ground attack on stabilise
the military situation without
major loss of NATO territory.

PIZZA HUT: CAKE TALK

A treaty, signed April 4, 1906, by which the partners agree that no armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and . . . measures with constitutional powers . . . authorized by taking forthwith individually and in concert with the other partners such action as it deems necessary including the use of armed force.

North Atlantic Treaty
4 April 1949.

Don't crowd out relief-
ers for 1979 freeze.

11

These forces are entitled to receive
the requirements for meeting
their contingencies and
providing for a strategic
reserve and assistance to
allies.

Wsp: 10

Forward deployed U.S. forces are an integral link in the spectrum of deterrence and demonstrate to enemies and allies the U.S. resolve to honor commitments. Should an attack occur, these forces allow the U.S. to assist allies in timely defense.

Abstract

**Provides force for Pacific
and Contingents.. Provides
force personnel.**

national defense treaty. A bilateral agreement, signed October 1, 1953, whereby each party "recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the parties . . . or either of the parties . . . could be dangerous to its own peace and safety" and that each party "wishes not to meet the grave danger in circumstances with its own constitutional processes."

1

these programs. Besides
ground combat and security
training for South Korea.

Pacific Command Ground Combat Reserve, also strategic reserves and ground forces for world wide deployment.

1

(Society of Friends)
1700 N. 1st St., N.W.

FY 76 GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

ARMY DIVISIONS

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>PRINCIPAL</u>
1st Armored Division 3d Armored Division 3d Infantry Division (M) 8th Infantry Division (M) Bde, 1st Infantry Division (M) Bde, 2d Armored Division Bde, 4th Infantry Division (M)	West Germany	Force presence. In concert with allied and other U.S. forces, deter Warsaw Pact aggression. Failing that, stop any Warsaw Pact ground attack and stabilize the military situation without major loss of NATO Territory.	NORTH A A treat 1949, b agree t against in Euro shall b against each of accord process taking and in partner deems n use of
1st Infantry Division (M) (Minus 1 Brigade) 2d Armored Division 4th Infantry Division (M)	Ft. Riley, Kansas Ft. Hood, Texas Ft. Carson, Colorado	Early ground combat reinforcement for NATO forces.	North A 4 April
1st Cav Division 9th Infantry Division 101st Airmobile Division (ABN) 82d Airborne Division 7th Infantry Division (Minus 1 Brigade) 24th Infantry Division (Minus 1 Brigade) 5th Infantry Division (M) (Minus 1 Brigade)	Ft. Hood, Texas Ft. Lewis, Washington Ft. Campbell, Kentucky Ft. Bragg, N.C. Ft. Ord, California Hunter/Stewart, Georgia Ft. Polk, Louisiana	To provide Strategic Reserve and ground forces for world-wide deployment.	
2d Infantry Division	South Korea	Force presence. Provides ground combat and security forces for South Korea.	Mutual a bilat October party attack either would b peace a each Pa the com ance vi process
25th Infantry Division (Minus 1 Brigade)	Hawaii	Pacific Command Ground Combat Reserve, also strategic reserve and ground forces for world wide deployment.	SEATO

<u>MISSION</u>	<u>PRIMARY APPLICABLE TREATY</u>	<u>STRATEGY SUPPORTED</u>	<u>OTHER POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENTS</u>
<p>sence. In concert with other U.S. forces, saw Pact aggression. hat, stop any Warsaw nd attack and stabilize any situation without s of NATO Territory.</p> <p>and combat reinforce- NATO forces.</p> <p>Strategic Reserve l forces for world- yment.</p>	<p>NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY</p> <p>A treaty, signed April 4, 1949, by which the partners agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and . . . each of them acting in accordance with constitutional processes . . . attacked by taking forthwith individually and in concert with the other partners such action as it deems necessary including the use of armed forces.</p> <p>North Atlantic Treaty 4 April 1949.</p>	<p>Our NATO strategy seeks to deter all forms of aggression against NATO through the maintenance of a full spectrum of nuclear and non-nuclear military capabilities and application of a forward defense concept.</p> <p>Same as above.</p> <p>These forces are applied to the requirements for meeting minor contingencies and providing for a strategic reserve and assistance to allies.</p>	<p>Worldwide</p>
<p>sence. Provides mbat and security r South Korea.</p>	<p>Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral agreement, signed October 1, 1953, whereby each party "recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties . . . would be dangerous to its own peace and safety" and that each Party "would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its own constitutional processes."</p>	<p>Forward deployed U.S. forces are an integral link in the spectrum of deterrence and demonstrate to enemies and allies the U.S. resolve to honor commitments. Should an attack occur, these forces allow the U.S. to assist allies in timely defense.</p>	<p>Worldwide</p>
<p>Command Ground serve, also strategic nd ground forces for le deployment.</p>	<p>SEATO</p>	<p>Provides force for Pacific Area Contingencie.. Provides force presence.</p>	<p>Worldwide</p>

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END BY 76 CENTRAL FURNACE FORCES FURNACE FURNACE FURNACE (CAF)

UNIT	LOCATION	MISSION	PRIMARY APPLICABLE TREATY	STAFF BY
1st Air Force (1st AF) 1st Air Force (1st AF) 1st Air Force (1st AF) 1st Air Force (1st AF) 1st Air Force (1st AF)	Camp Pendleton, Calif./WPA, El Toro, Calif. and WPA, 29 Palms, Calif.	Pacific Command Reserve Together with 3rd Air Force, provide ground/air combat forces to project and power centers.	SEATO Bilateral Mutual Defense Treaties	Provide forces primarily for Pacific area contingencies. These forces can be applied to the requirements for meeting major or minor contingencies worldwide and providing assistance to Allies.
2nd Air Force (2nd AF) 2nd Air Force (2nd AF) 2nd Air Force (2nd AF) 2nd Air Force (2nd AF) 2nd Air Force (2nd AF)	Camp Lejeune, N. C./WPA, Cherry Point, N. C. and WPA, Quantico, Va. Post deployed units; Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Mediterranean, Caribbean	Atlantic Command Reserve Provide to CINCPAC's ground/air combat forces with an amphibious flexible entry capability.	NSAF	Provide forces primarily for Atlantic and European (NSAF) Area contingencies. Provides forward effort in Eastern Atlantic Mediterranean areas and the Caribbean area. These forces can be applied to the requirements for meeting major or minor contingencies worldwide and providing assistance to Allies.
3rd Air Force (3rd AF) 3rd Air Force (3rd AF) 3rd Air Force (3rd AF) 3rd Air Force (3rd AF) 3rd Air Force (3rd AF)	Camp Butler, Okla./WPA, Inman, Okla. and WPA, Putnam, Okla. 5th China See	Pacific Command Reserve Provides forward deployed combat force in the Western Pacific Provide to CINCPAC's ground/air combat forces with amphibious flexible entry capability.	SEATO Bilateral Mutual Defense Treaties	Provide forces for Pacific Area contingencies. Provides forward effort in Western Pacific. These forces can be applied to the requirements for meeting major or minor contingencies worldwide and providing assistance to Allies.
4th Air Force (4th AF) 4th Air Force (4th AF) 4th Air Force (4th AF) 4th Air Force (4th AF) 4th Air Force (4th AF)	Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii	Pacific Command Reserve Early reinforcement of forward deployed forces in the Western Pacific Provide to CINCPAC's ground/air combat forces with an amphibious flexible entry capability.	SEATO Bilateral Mutual Defense Treaties	These forces could be applied to meeting minor contingency requirements.

**END FY 76 GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE (MAF)**

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	
<u>I MAF</u> (1st Marine Division/3d Marine Aircraft Wing Team, plus supporting force troops elements.)	Camp Pendleton, Calif/MCAS, El Toro, Calif. and MCB, 29 Palms, Calif.	Pacific Command Reserve Together with Navy Components of the amphibious team provide ground/air combat forces to project sea power ashore.	SEATO Defense
<u>II MAF</u> (2d Marine Division/2d Marine Aircraft Wing Team, plus supporting force troops elements.)	Camp Lejeune, N. C./MCAS, Cherry Point N. C. and MCAS, Quantico, Va. Fwd deployed units; Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Mediterranean, Caribbean	Atlantic Command Reserve Provide to CINC's ground/air combat forces with an amphibious forcible entry capability.	NATO
<u>III MAF</u> (3d Marine Division(-)/1st Marine Aircraft Wing Team, plus supporting force troops elements.)	Camp Butler, Okinawa/MCAS, Iwakuni, Japan and MCAS, Futenma, Okinawa South China Sea	Pacific Command Reserve Provides forward deployed combat force in the Western Pacific Provide to CINC's ground/air combat forces with amphibious forcible entry capability.	SEATO Defense
<u>1st MARINE BRIGADE</u> (Regimental Landing Team 3/Marine Aircraft Group 22, plus supporting force troops elements.)	Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii	Pacific Command Reserve Early reinforcement of forward deployed forces in the Western Pacific Provide to CINC ground/air combat forces with an amphibious forcible entry capability.	SEATO Defense

<u>MISSION</u>	<u>PRIMARY APPLICABLE TREATY</u>	<u>STRATEGY SUPPORTED</u>	<u>OTHER POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENTS</u>
<p>Pacific Command Reserve</p> <p>Together with Navy Components of the amphibious command provide ground/air combat forces to project power ashore.</p>	SEATO Bilateral Mutual Defense Treaties	<p>Provides forces primarily for Pacific area contingencies.</p> <p>These forces can be applied to the requirements for meeting major or minor contingencies worldwide and providing assistance to allies.</p>	To NATO/Worldwide
<p>Atlantic Command Reserve</p> <p>Provide to CINCPAC's ground/air combat forces with an amphibious forcible entry capability.</p>	NATO	<p>Provides forces primarily for Atlantic and European (NATO) Area contingencies.</p> <p>Provides forward afloat deployed force presence in the Eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean areas and the Caribbean area.</p> <p>These forces can be applied to the requirements for meeting major or minor contingencies worldwide and providing assistance to Allies.</p>	To Pacific Command/Worldwide
<p>Pacific Command Reserve</p> <p>Provides forward deployed combat force in the Western Pacific</p> <p>Provide to CINCPAC's ground/air combat forces with amphibious forcible entry capability.</p>	SEATO Bilateral Mutual Defense Treaties	<p>Provides forces for Pacific area contingencies.</p> <p>Provides forward afloat deployed presence in the Western Pacific.</p> <p>These forces can be applied to the requirements for meeting major or minor contingencies worldwide, and providing assistance to Allies.</p>	To NATO/Worldwide
<p>Pacific Command Reserve</p> <p>Primary reinforcement of forward deployed forces in the Western Pacific</p> <p>Provide to CINCPAC ground/air combat forces with an amphibious forcible entry capability.</p>	SEATO Bilateral Mutual Defense Treaties	<p>These forces could be applied to meeting minor contingency requirements.</p>	To NATO/Worldwide

END PT 7: GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
ACTIVE AIR FORCE TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

UNIT	LOCATION	MISSION	PRIMARY APPLICABLE THREAT	STRATEGIC SUPPORT	REMARKS
-21 Squadron	U.S. West Germany, Belgium, Italy, Turkey, and Spain	Provide close air support, gain air superiority, and provide interdiction for a NATO conflict.	NATO	To deter aggression in Europe. To insure that we have the capability to conduct an initial con- ventional defense of NATO.	None planned.
6 Squadron	Southeast Asia, Philippines, Malaya, and Republic of Korea	Provide close air support, gain air superiority, and provide interdiction for an Asian conflict.	SOGATO bilateral Mutual Defense Treaties	To deter aggression in Asia. To insure that we have the capability, in concert with allies, to conduct a con- ventional defense of Asia against a threat including the PRC.	Can be redeployed worldwide.
3d Squadron	CENTO, Alaska and Ireland	Provide reinforcement of tactical air capability in Europe and Asia.		Europe and Asia Strategies Major Contingencies.	Can reinforce NATO in Asia. Can also be used for other contingencies.

END FY 76 GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
ACTIVE AIR FORCE TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

<u>UNIT</u> <u>(Fighter/Attack Squadron)</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>PRINCIPAL</u> <u>APPLICATION</u> <u>TREATY</u>
21 Squadrons	U.K., West Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Turkey, and Spain	Provide close air support, gain air superiority, and provide interdiction for a NATO conflict.	NATO
9 Squadrons	Southeast Asia, Philippines, Okinawa, and Republic of Korea	Provide close air support, gain air superiority, and provide interdiction for an Asian conflict.	SEATO Bilateral Mutual Defense Treaties
38 Squadrons	CONUS, Alaska and Iceland	Provide reinforcement of tactical air capability in Europe and Asia.	-

<u>ION</u>	<u>PRIMARY APPLICABLE TREATY</u>	<u>STRATEGY SUPPORTED</u>	<u>OTHER POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENTS</u>
air support, priority, and direction for act.	NATO	To deter aggression in Europe. To insure that we have the capability to conduct an initial con- ventional defense of NATO.	None planned.
air support, priority, and direction for 'lict.	SEATO Bilateral Mutual Defense Treaties	To deter aggression in Asia. To insure that we have the capability, in concert with allies, to conduct a con- ventional defense of Asia against a threat including the PRC.	Can be redeployed worldwide.
orceement of capability in ia.	-	Europe and Asia Strategies Minor Contingencies.	Can reinforce NATO or Asian allies. Can also be used for minor contingencies.

END FY 76 GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

NAVY SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT

<u>UNIT</u> ^{a/}	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>PRIMARY APPLICABLE TREATY</u>
Second Fleet & Western Atlantic 5 Attack/Multi-Purpose Carriers 91 Surface Combatants ^{b/} 1 Amphibious Ready Group 10.5 ASW Patrol Squadrons 76 Associated Support Ships & Attack Submarines	U.S. East Coast & Western Atlantic	Maintain Atlantic sea lanes in NATO conflict. Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces in support of NATO land war. Provide crisis management or contingency force in Atlantic. Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Atlantic.	NATO
Sixth Fleet 2 Attack/Multi-Purpose Carriers 16 Surface Combatants ^{b/} 1 Amphibious Ready Group 1.5 ASW Patrol Squadrons 15 Associated Support Ships & Attack Submarines	Mediterranean	Maintain Mediterranean sea lanes in NATO conflict. Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces in support of NATO land war, particularly any Warsaw Pact initiatives against the NATO southern flank. Provide crisis management or contingency force in Mediterranean. Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Mediterranean.	NATO
Middle East Force 1 Flagship 2 Surface Combatants	Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean	Provide peacetime naval presence in Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. Provide limited contingency force in the area.	
Third Fleet and Eastern Pacific 4 Attack/Multi-Purpose Carriers 68 Surface Combatants ^{b/} 0 Amphibious Ready Groups 8 ASW Patrol Squadrons 67 Associated Support Ships & Attack Submarines	U.S. West Coast & Eastern Pacific	Maintain Pacific sea lanes in NATO or Asian conflict. Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces to reinforce Western Pacific forces and in support of Asian conflict. Provide crisis management or contingency force in Eastern Pacific and to reinforce Western Pacific forces. Provide peacetime naval presence in Eastern Pacific.	NATO Various Pacific Mutual Defense & Aid Treaties.
Seventh Fleet & Western Pacific 2 Attack/Multi-Purpose Carriers 21 Surface Combatants ^{b/} 2 Amphibious Ready Groups 4 ASW Patrol Squadrons 24 Associated Support Ships & Attack Submarines	Western Pacific	Maintain Western Pacific sea lanes in NATO or Asian conflict. Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces in support of Asian conflict. Provide crisis management or contingency force in Western Pacific. Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Western Pacific.	NATO Various Pacific Mutual Defense & Aid Treaties.

- ^{a/} Figures shown are approximate averages. Most ships are rotated to distant assignments from U.S. homeports. contain a few units selectively homeported overseas, including one CV homeported in Japan.
- ^{b/} An amphibious ready group (ARG) is one-ninth of a Marine amphibious force (MAF). It consists of 3 to 5 and Only the ARGs forward deployed (in the Mediterranean, the Western Pacific and periodically in the Caribbean operated as a squadron with Marine units embarked).

Y 76 GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

NAVY SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT

	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>PRIMARY APPLICABLE TREATY</u>	<u>STRATEGY SUPPORTED</u>	<u>OTHER POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENTS</u>
East & Atlantic	Maintain Atlantic sea lanes in NATO conflict. Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces in support of NATO land war. Provide crisis management or contingency force in Atlantic. Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Atlantic.	NATO	Provide for initial defense of NATO Europe. Provide for the protection of naval forces and shipping. Provide a strategic reserve.	Redeployment worldwide possible. Provides capability for rapid reinforcement of NATO in Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.
Mediterranean	Maintain Mediterranean sea lanes in NATO conflict. Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces in support of NATO land war, particularly any Warsaw Pact initiatives against the NATO southern flank. Provide crisis management or contingency force in Mediterranean. Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Mediterranean.	NATO	Provide for initial defense of NATO Europe. Provide for the protection of naval forces and shipping. Provide appropriate forward deployment of U.S. forces.	None planned.
Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea	Provide peacetime naval presence in Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. Provide limited contingency force in the area.		Provide appropriate forward deployment of US forces.	Redeployment worldwide possible. Force provides limited military capability.
East Pacific	Maintain Pacific sea lanes in NATO or Asian conflict. Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces to reinforce Western Pacific forces and in support of Asian conflict. Provide crisis management or contingency force in Eastern Pacific and to reinforce Western Pacific forces. Provide peacetime naval presence in Eastern Pacific.	NATO Various Pacific Mutual Defense & Aid Treaties.	Provide for joint defense of Asia (Korea or Southeast Asia). Provide for protection of naval forces and shipping. Provide a strategic reserve.	Redeployment worldwide possible. Provides capability for reinforcement of either NATO or Western Pacific forces.
West Pacific	Maintain Western Pacific sea lanes in NATO or Asian conflict. Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces in support of Asian conflict. Provide crisis management or contingency force in Western Pacific. Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Western Pacific.	NATO Various Pacific Mutual Defense & Aid Treaties.	Provide for joint defense of Asia (Korea or Southeast Asia). Provide for protection of naval forces and shipping. Provide appropriate forward deployment of U.S. forces.	Redeployment worldwide possible. Deployment of entire force elsewhere unlikely due to need of US naval presence in the Western Pacific.

ships are rotated to distant assignments from U.S. homeports. Mediterranean and Western Pacific forces, however, process, including one CV homeported in Japan.
of a Marine amphibious force (MAF). It consists of 3 to 5 amphibious ships with a Marine battalion landing team embarked.
Mediterranean, the Western Pacific and periodically in the Caribbean) are actually constituted, (the amphibious shipping
based).

APPENDIX E

MANPOWER DATA STRUCTURE

A. Changes to the Defense Planning and Programming Categories

The categorization of manpower used in this report is the same as that contained in the FY 75 report. However, the Defense data structure, of necessity, has undergone evolutionary change resulting from continuous efforts to improve Defense planning and management. A brief discussion of the rationale for these management planning emphasis transfers is presented below. Following this discussion is a table displaying the audit trail to current manpower category of each activity transferred, and the manpower involved.

Aerial Demonstration Team - The Air Force "Thunderbirds" are a ceremonial activity and therefore are more appropriately placed in Personnel Support than Tactical Air Forces.

Intelligence/Cryptologic Training - Concurrent with the on-going reorganization, redefinition, and consolidation of intelligence and security activities, the Defense data base was restructured to permit separate identification of intelligence, cryptologic, and SIGINT-related training resources. Consequently, these resources were transferred from Intelligence and Security to Individual Training.

* Tactical Signal Intelligence - Units performing these functions will be in direct support of combat units and are more accurately reflected in Land Forces than in Intelligence and Security.

* Base Communications - With the creation of the U.S. Army Communications Command (USACC), the responsibility for base communications was consolidated from the theater commanders and the former U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command (STRATCOM). The base communications resources of the Air Force, which are the responsibility of the Air Force Communications Service (AFCS), have been identified totally to the major commands which they support. These actions resulted in a transfer of resources from Centrally Managed Communications to Base Operating Support.

Medical Research - Greater emphasis has been placed on the planning of research and development financial resources in the context of the output of the research. This results in the manpower associated with the Air Force aeromedical research activities at Brooks AFB, Texas; Holloman AFB, New Mexico; Lackland AFB, Texas; and Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, being transferred from the Research and Development category to Medical Support.

*These transfers were covered in the FY 75 Report. They are included in this report in order to discuss the differences between the FY 74 Actual data and the current FY 75 Plan data.

Personnel Research - Greater emphasis has been placed on the planning of research and development financial resources in the context of the output of the research. This results in the manpower associated with the Air Force Human Resources Laboratory at Brooks AFB, Texas, being transferred from the Research and Development category to Personnel Support.

Fleet Logistical Support - Greater emphasis has been placed on the integrated planning of workload and financial resource requirements to improve fleet readiness. This results in Ship Repair Facilities, Supply Depots, Ordnance Facilities, etc., operated by Commander, Service Forces-Pacific Fleet, in Japan, Guam, and the Philippines, being treated as fixed-site, broad spectrum capability logistics activities. Thus these resources were transferred from Base Operating Support to Logistics.

Dependent Support - The Navy Family Allowance Activity-Cleveland is responsible for processing dependent entitlement claims. As such it is more appropriately categorized in Personnel Support than Base Operating Support.

Training Administration - The Administrative Commands for MTC Great Lakes, Illinois, and MTC San Diego, California provide common administrative and technical services to the Recruit Training Command and Service Schools Command at each location. Thus they are more appropriately categorized in Individual Training than Base Operating Support.

Installation Operations - An attempt has been made to be responsive to the Senate Armed Services Committee's suggestion that the support category contents be more clearly defined. Thus, the resources devoted to the operation of U.S. Army Health Services Command installations (Walter Reed Army Medical Center, D.C.; Fitzsimons Army Hospital, Colorado; and Ft. Detrick, Maryland) have been transferred from Medical Support to Base Operating Support. Similarly, the installation operation resources at the United States Military Academy, New York; MCRD Parris Island, South Carolina; MCRD San Diego, California; and MCB Quantico, Virginia, have been transferred from Individual Training to Base Operating Support.

Adult Trail of Activities Transferred Between Categories^{a/}
(End Strengths in Thousands)

From	To	Activity	Service	Military			Civilian		
				FY74	FY75	FY76	FY74	FY75	FY76
Tactical Air Forces	Personnel Support	Aerial Demonstration Team	Air Force	.1	.1	.1	-	-	-
Intelligence/Security	Individual Training	Intelligence/Cryptologic Training	Army	-	-	1.2	-	-	.5
"	"	"	Navy	-	-	.7	-	-	.1
"	"	"	Marine Corps	-	-	.8	-	-	.1
"	Trainees/Student	"	Air Force	-	-	.5	-	-	.1
"	"	"	Army	-	-	1.5	-	-	-
"	"	"	Navy	-	-	.6	-	-	-
"	"	"	Marine Corps	-	.2	.2	-	-	-
"	"	"	Air Force	-	-	.7	-	-	-
Centrally Managed Communications	Land Forces	Tactical Army Signal Intelligence	Army	-	-	4.2	-	-	-
"	Base Operating Support (OSP)	Base Communications	Army	-	2.0	2.0	-	1.6	1.6
"	Base Operating Support (OSP)	"	Air Force	-	1.8	1.8	-	1.2	1.2
"	"	"	Army	-	.8	.8	-	.9	.9
Research/Development	Medical Support	Medical Research	Air Force	-	.8	.8	-	.8	.8
"	Personnel Support	Personnel Research	Air Force	.7	.6	.6	.6	.5	.5
Base Operating Support (OSP)	Logistics	Fleet Logistical Support	Air Force	.1	.1	.1	.2	.2	.2
Base Operating Support (OSP)	Personnel Support	Dependent Support	Navy	1.5	1.8	1.9	1.9	10.8	10.0
"	Individual Training	Training Administration	Navy	-	-	-	.1	.1	.1
Medical Support	Base Operating Support (OSP)	Installation Operations	Navy	1.6	1.5	1.5	-	-	-
Individual Training	"	"	Army	.3	.4	.4	1.3	1.4	1.5
"	"	"	Army	.5	.5	.5	1.5	1.5	1.5
"	"	"	Marine Corps	-	-	3.6	-	-	-

^{a/}Less than 50 spaces.

^{b/} For rationale see preceding pages.

B. Major Defense Programs and Defense Planning & Programming Categories

As stated in Chapter I, there are two ways to view manpower. The manpower requirements shown in each section of this report explain "how" manpower will be used (e.g., some manpower operates aircraft, some operates installations, some plans for and manages resources, etc.). Thus, in this report manpower requirements are displayed from the "input" point of view. However, manpower can also be displayed by the total devoted to the various missions of DoD. This is an "output" point of view. The "outputs" of the Defense financial system are called Major Defense Programs and have been provided to the Congress as part of the Military Personnel and Operations and Maintenance appropriations justification for several years.

Major Defense Programs contain many resources of different types that directly relate to the performance of a Defense mission (or program). These resources include both units which execute the mission (e.g., SAC aircraft) and units which sustain mission capability (e.g., SAC base personnel). DPP Categories, on the other hand, include units performing similar activities (e.g., installation operations) associated with the performance of several missions (e.g., strategic offensive, tactical air, and mobility).

The following summary matrices are provided to illustrate the allocation of FY 76 manpower "inputs" in each DPPC to the various "outputs" represented by Major Defense Programs. Adding down a column gives the total manpower devoted to one of the ten Major Defense Programs. Adding across a row gives the total manpower performing a type of activity (i.e., a manpower category) for all Major Defense Programs.

Army Response to: (Interim)
(1) - The Army's (2) - The Army's (3) - The Army's

Major Categories	Major Response to: (Interim)									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strategic Forces	Strategic Forces	General Purpose Forces	Intelligence and Communications	Ally and Support Forces	Guard and Reserve Forces	Research and Development	Control Supply and Maintenance	Training, Medical and Other General Activities	Joint and Component Activities	Other
	6.0	13.2	3.0	3.7	20.0	7.6	21.4	22.0	22.0	22.0
General Purpose Forces	General Purpose Forces	General Purpose Forces	General Purpose Forces	General Purpose Forces	General Purpose Forces	General Purpose Forces	General Purpose Forces	General Purpose Forces	General Purpose Forces	General Purpose Forces
	6.0	13.2	3.0	3.7	20.0	7.6	21.4	22.0	22.0	22.0
Auxiliary Forces	Auxiliary Forces	Auxiliary Forces	Auxiliary Forces	Auxiliary Forces	Auxiliary Forces	Auxiliary Forces	Auxiliary Forces	Auxiliary Forces	Auxiliary Forces	Auxiliary Forces
	6.0	13.2	3.0	3.7	20.0	7.6	21.4	22.0	22.0	22.0
Mission Support Forces	Mission Support Forces	Mission Support Forces	Mission Support Forces	Mission Support Forces	Mission Support Forces	Mission Support Forces	Mission Support Forces	Mission Support Forces	Mission Support Forces	Mission Support Forces
	6.0	13.2	3.0	3.7	20.0	7.6	21.4	22.0	22.0	22.0
Control Support Forces	Control Support Forces	Control Support Forces	Control Support Forces	Control Support Forces	Control Support Forces	Control Support Forces	Control Support Forces	Control Support Forces	Control Support Forces	Control Support Forces
	6.0	13.2	3.0	3.7	20.0	7.6	21.4	22.0	22.0	22.0
Individuals	Individuals	Individuals	Individuals	Individuals	Individuals	Individuals	Individuals	Individuals	Individuals	Individuals
	6.0	13.2	3.0	3.7	20.0	7.6	21.4	22.0	22.0	22.0
TOTAL	6.0	13.2	3.0	3.7	20.0	7.6	21.4	22.0	22.0	22.0

Less than 50 years
Should not add to totals due to rounding.

Army Manpower Requirements
(FY 76 End Strengths in thousands)

MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAM

Manpower Categories	I		II		III		IV		V		VI		St Ma
	Strategic Forces		General Purpose Forces		Intelligence and Communications		Airlift and Sealift		Guard and Reserve Forces		Research and Development		
	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	.6	.5			.3	.4							
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>													
Land Forces			471.9	13.2							28.6		
Tactical Air Forces													
Naval Forces							.6	3.7					
Mobility Forces													
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>													
Intel/Sec					10.1	2.3							
Centrally Managed Communication					8.3	3.6							
Research/Development											7.6	21.4	
Support to Other Nations													
Geophysical Act.					.2								
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>													
Reserve Components													
Support									4.9	11.5			
Base Operating Spt			18.6	84.5	7.2	6.2							
Force Support													
Training			.4	.2									
Command	.2		6.3	2.8									
<u>Central Support Forces</u>													
Base Operating Spt					1.1	2.6							
Medical Support					1.8	.8							
Personnel Support											5.5		
Individual Training													
Command													
Logistics					1								
Fed Agency Support													
<u>Individuals</u>													
Transients													
Patients/Prisoners													
Trainees/Students													
Cadets													
TOTAL	.8	.5	497.2	100.6	29.2	15.9	.6	3.7	4.9	45.8	7.6	21.4	8

* Less than 50 spaces
Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS

III Intelligence and Communications		IV Airlift and Sealift		V Guard and Reserve Forces		VI Research and Development		VII Central Supply and Maintenance		VIII Training, Medical and Other General Personnel Activities		IX Admin and Associated Activities		X Support to Other Nations		Total	
MI	Civ	MI	Civ	MI	Civ	MI	Civ	MI	Civ	MI	Civ	MI	Civ	MI	Civ	MI	Civ
.3	.4															.9	.9
				28.8												472.5 471.9	45.7 42.0
		.6	3.7													.6	3.7
10.1	2.3															27.9 10.1	28.4 2.3
8.3	3.6					7.6	21.4									8.3 7.6	3.6 21.4
.2														1.7	1.1	1.7 .2	1.1
				4.9	11.5											40.5 4.9 25.8	105.3 11.5 90.8
7.2	6.2													2.9	.1	.4 9.4	.2 2.9
1.1	2.6							.5	4.5	15.5 29.9 11.8	32.5 28.7 5.2					121.5 17.1 29.9 13.6	221.5 39.8 28.7 6.0
1.8	.8			5.5				.8 6.8	.3 95.6	44.3 1.5	18.1 1.9	6.6 .2 .6	14.0 6.0			44.3 8.9 7.1 .6	23.8 21.9 101.5
										34.0 3.9 80.9 3.0						121.8 34.0 3.9 80.9 3.0	
.2	15.9	.6	3.7	4.9	45.8	7.6	21.4	8.0	106.4	224.6	86.4	7.5	20.0	4.6	1.2	785.0	401.7

Navy Manpower Requirements
(FY 76 End Strengths In Thousands)

MAJOR DEFENSE

Manpower Categories	I		II		III		IV		V		VI	
	Strategic Forces		General Purpose Forces		Intelligence and Communications		Airlift and Sealift		Guard and Reserve Forces		Research and Development	
	MYI	Civ	MYI	Civ	MYI	Civ	MYI	Civ	MYI	Civ	MYI	Civ
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	19.5	1.5			.1							
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>												
Land Forces			2.8									
Tactical Air Forces			64.8						1.1			
Naval Forces			162.5	.3					9.5			
Mobility Forces							.3	5.6				
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>												
Intel/Sec					9.7	1.8						
Centrally Managed Communication					11.0	4.1					6.7	36
Research/Development												
Support to Other Nations												
Geophysical Act.					2.0	1.7						
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>												
Reserve Components									7.6	3.1		
Support												
Base Operating Spt			36.7	26.4								
Force Support			12.5	.5								
Training			11.4	7.8	*	*	*		.2			
Command	0.3											
<u>Central Support Forces</u>												
Base Operating Spt												
Medical Support					.2	.8						
Personnel Support					*	*						
Individual Training					.3	.6						
Command					.1							
Logistics			1.8	10.0								
Fed Agency Support												
<u>Individuals</u>												
Transients												
Patients/Prisoners												
Trainees/Students			2.9									
Midshipmen												
TOTAL	19.8	1.5	295.4	45.0	23.2	9.0	.3	5.6	18.4	3.1	6.7	36.

* Less than 50 spaces.

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS

rounding.

Marine Corps Manpower Requirements 1/
(FY 76 End Strengths in Thousands)

MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAM

	I		II		III		IV		V		VI	
	Strategic Forces		General Purpose Forces		Intelligence and Communications		Airlift and Sealift		Guard and Reserve Forces		Research and Development	
	MIL	Civ	MIL	Civ	MIL	Civ	MIL	Civ	MIL	Civ	MIL	Civ
<u>Manpower Categories</u>												
<u>Strategic Forces</u>												
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>												
Land Forces			82.4						1.2			
Tactical Air Forces			25.6						2.6			
Naval Forces			.6									
Mobility Forces												
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>												
Intel/Sec					1.1							
Centrally Managed Communication					*							
Research/Development											.7	
Support to Other Nations												
Geophysical Act.					*							
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>												
Reserve Components												
Support:									.5	.1		
Base Operating Spt			17.6	10.7								
Force Support												
Training			2.8									
Command			1.4									
<u>Central Support Forces</u>												
Base Operating Spt												
Medical Support					*							
Personnel Support												
Individual Training												
Command												
Logistics												
Fed Agency Support												
<u>Individuals</u>												
Transients												
Patients/Prisoners												
Trainees/Students												
Cadets												
TOTAL			130.3	10.7	1.1				4.8	.1	.7	

* Less than 50 spaces.

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

1/Includes Marine Corps personnel serving with Navy.

1/

WATER EFFECT PROGRAM

II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	
General Purpose Forces	Intelligence and Communications	Airlift and Sealift	Guard and Reserve Forces	Research and Development	Central Supply and Maintenance	Training, Medical and Other General Personnel Activities	Admin and Associated Activities	Support to Other Nations	Total
III	III	III	III	III	III	III	III	III	III
IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
32.4 25.6 .6			1.2 1.6						113.0 82.2 28.2 .6
	1.1 . .			.2				.	1.8 1.1 . .7 . .
17.6 10.7 2.8 1.4			.5 .1						22.3 10.2 .5 .1 17.6 10.7 2.8 1.4
	.				.9 1.7	3.7 . 2.9 .1 8.0 2.4	. . 4.5 2.0 1.6		22.4 9.2 4.6 1.7 2.9 .1 8.0 2.4 4.5 2.0 .8 3.0 1.6
					.2 3.0	11.7 1.3 23.9			36.9 11.7 1.3 23.9
130.3 10.7	1.1		4.8 .1	.7	1.2 4.7	51.7 2.5	6.0 2.0	.	196.3 20.0

to rounding.
serving with Navy.

11-11-41
 (11-11-41)

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**Air Force Manpower Requirements
(FY 76 End Strengths in Thousands)**

MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAM

(FY 76 End Strengths in thousands)	I		II		III		IV		V		VI		VII
	Strategic Forces		General Purpose Forces		Intelligence and Communications		Airlift and Sealift		Guard and Reserve Forces		Research and Development		
	MIL	Civ	MIL	Civ	MIL	Civ	MIL	Civ	MIL	Civ	MIL	Civ	
<u>Manpower Categories</u>													
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	81.2	2.2			.5	*			.2	4.8			
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>													
Land Forces													
Tactical Air Forces			74.0	1.3	.2				.4	13.4			
Naval Forces					2.0	-	35.5	4.6	.4	10.0			
Mobility Forces													
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>													
Intel/Sec					21.6	2.7							
Centrally Managed Communication					18.6	4.6			.2	.7			
Research/Development											16.0	20.0	1
Support to Other Nations													
Geophysical Act.					8.9	.2			-	.4			
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>													
Reserve Components									.6	6.0			
Support													
Base Operating Spt	43.5	23.0	48.9	27.6	11.6	1.6	15.8	11.0					
Force Support													
Training	3.3	.1	10.8	1.0			1.8	.2					
Command	6.7	1.3	9.2	1.7	.1	-	3.1	1.1					
<u>Central Support Forces</u>													
Base Operating Spt													
Medical Support													
Personnel Support			.1		1.9	.5					.5	.5	1
Individual Training													
Command													
Logistics					.2								4
Fed Agency Support													
<u>Individuals</u>													
Transients													
Indirect/Instructors													
Trainees/Students			.4				.4						
General													
TOTAL	134.7	16.5	143.4	31.6	69.5	10.4	54.6	17.0	1.7	35.2	16.6	20.6	6

* Less than .05 space.

Total may not add due to rounding.

MAJOR DEFENCE PROGRAMS

III Intelligence and Communications		IV Airlift and Sealift		V Guard and Reserve Forces		VI Research and Development		VII Central Supply and Maintenance		VIII Training, Medical and Other General Personnel Activities		IX Admin and Associated Activities		X Support to Other Nations		Total	
Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ
.5	.			.2	4.8											81.9	7.1
																112.4	29.3
.2				.4	13.4											74.6	14.8
2.0	-	35.5	4.6	.4	10.0											37.8	14.5
21.6	2.7															67.7	31.0
18.6	4.6			.2	.7	16.0	20.0	1.0	1.6							21.6	2.8
3.9	.3			-	.4									1.4	.2	18.8	5.3
																17.0	21.5
																1.4	.2
																8.9	1.2
																197.1	74.6
11.6	1.6	15.8	11.0	.6	6.0											.6	6.0
		1.8	.2													119.8	63.2
.1	-	3.1	1.1											1.7	-	15.9	1.4
																20.8	4.1
1.9	.5					.5	.3	3.0	14.5	13.6	12.8	3.8	2.8			103.1	129.2
										29.3	6.9					20.4	30.1
										4.4	1.7	.4	-			29.8	7.4
										27.1	7.4					6.8	2.1
								.7	2.9	1.5	.8	11.8	7.9			27.1	7.4
.2								4.4	70.5							14.0	11.6
												.4	-			4.6	70.5
																.4	-
										24.2						67.7	
										.8						24.2	
		.4								37.5						.8	
										4.4						38.3	
																4.4	
65.5	10.4	56.6	17.0	1.7	35.2	16.6	20.6	8.9	89.6	142.7	29.4	16.5	10.8	3.1	.2	590.0	271.3

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

STUDY PROGRAMS

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* Less than 10 years.
Total may not add in totals due to rounding.

Defense Agency Manpower Requirements
(FY 70 End Strengths in Thousands)

MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Manpower Categories	I		II		III		IV		V		VI		VII
	Strategic Forces		General Purpose Forces		Intelligence and Communications		Airlift and Sealift		Guard and Reserve Forces		Research and Development		
	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	*	.7			.3	.4							
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>													
Land Forces													
Tactical Air Forces													
Naval Forces													
Mobility Forces													
<u>Auxiliary Forces</u>													
Intel/Sec					2.9	2.7							
Centrally Managed Communication					1.3	1.2					.3	.3	
Research/Development													
Support to Other Nations													
Geophysical Act.					.8	7.6							
<u>Mission Support Forces</u>													
Reserve Components													
Support													
Base Operating Spt													
Force Support													
Training													
Command													
<u>Central Support Forces</u>													
Base Operating Spt													.1
Medical Support													
Personnel Support						1.5							
Individual Training													
Command					.3							.5	
Logistics					.4	.5							1.0
Fed Agency Support													
<u>Individuals</u>													
Transients													
Patients/Prisoners													
Trainees/Students													
Cadets													
TOTAL	*	.7			6.1	14.0					.3	.8	1.

* Less than 50 spaces.

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

manpower Requirements
 (thousands)

MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS

I Total Personnel Requirements	III Intelligence and Communications		IV Airlift and Sealift		V Guard and Reserve Forces		VI Research and Development		VII Central Supply and Maintenance		VIII Training, Medical and Other General Personnel Activities		IX Admin and Associated Activities		X Support to Other Nations		Total	
	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ
		.3		.4													.3	1.1
	2.9	2.7															5.2	11.9
	1.3	1.2															2.9	2.7
							.3	.3									1.3	1.2
																	.3	.3
	.8	7.6															.8	7.6
									.1	6.5	.1	.4					2.3	60.7
		1.5									.1	.2					.1	6.5
	.3																.1	.4
	.4	.5					.5		1.0	45.6			1.4	5.6			1.7	6.1
																	1.3	46.0
	6.1	14.0					.3	.8	1.1	52.1	.2	.6	1.4	5.6			9.0	73.7

rounding.

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